

# ENOJP

The European Network of Japanese Philosophy (ENOJP) was founded by a group of scholars in the field of comparative and Japanese philosophy in November 2014. The core of the organization aims to support and promote the scholarship of what is broadly construed as Japanese philosophy in European languages. The ENOJP aims to achieve this goal by organizing conferences, initiating research projects, and publishing original thematic essays and translation articles through its peer-reviewed journal: *European Journal of Japanese Philosophy (EJJP)*.

The **Second ENOJP Conference** is taking place at the **Univesité libre de Bruxelles (ULB)** in Brussels, Belgium, on **December 7–10, 2016**. This conference aims to provide the scholars in the field of comparative and Japanese philosophy with a platform for sharing our research projects, thus assisiting us to build a wider community of our scholarship across Europe and beyond. While celebrating 150 years of friendship between Belgium and Japan, this event will present three keynote addresses, one round table discussion, and 38 panles with 92 presenters from 68 Universities. For more information, visit us at <https://enojp.org/conferences/>.

Jan Gerrit Strala (ENOJP, President)

## Seconde conférence annuelle du réseau européen de philosophie japonaise

Célébration des 150 ans d'amitié diplomatique entre le Japon et la Belgique

La volonté qui a entouré l'organisation de cette conférence tient en deux points : elle désirait faire des avancées scientifiques dans le domaine spécifique de la philosophie en provenance du Japon ; elle voulait également rendre hommage aux 150 ans des relations bilatérales entre le Japon et la Belgique en renforçant les liens entre les chercheurs en philosophie. Dans ce cadre, le comité d'organisation a concrétisé des sessions dans l'intention de constituer des échanges entre les divers spécialistes présents. D'un autre point de vue, le comité a souhaité rendre la conférence accessible à un large public et sans aucun frais. Car, il pense que la valorisation des connaissances passe par un accès facile à celle-ci. Il espère donc, par ce biais et la publication future des actes de communications, rendre un service à la communauté ainsi que développer des outils au bénéfice des chercheurs et du grand public.

Toutes les contributions de communications sont le résultat de travaux de recherche fournis à la fois par des chercheurs et professeurs venus du Japon et d'Europe soumis et validés par le comité scientifique. Au fondement des sessions, différents sujets et modes de pensées de l'histoire intellectuelle du Japon seront présentés. Certains de ces sujets trouveront parfois un écho direct au sujet d'études en philosophie telle que trouvé en Europe et au-delà. Notre aspiration tend donc vers la stimulation des débats qu'elles impliquent sur des notions fondamentales qui par la mise en perspective lors des sessions de communications, contribueront à l'accroissement des compétences intellectuelles, ainsi qu'à la diffusion du savoir associé au domaine de l'actualité philosophique aussi bien au

Japon qu'en Europe.

Au dévoilement des résultats du colloque, nous souhaitons établir un diagnostic rigoureux sur les interprétations philosophiques originales qui impliquent des questionnements métaphysiques, ontologiques et éthiques. De plus, cette démarche de recherche comparative favorisera la mise en place à Bruxelles d'un réseau entre chercheurs japonais et européens qui visent à réfléchir sur les êtres, les causes premières et les valeurs humaines. Dans une vision globale et en tant qu'approche universelle, cette exploration propose donc un résultat incontournable sur la conception de la philosophie qui demande en effet à se réinterroger en tenant compte d'un socle culturel distinct sur le statut de cette dernière. Il s'agit bien là du regard philosophique croisé qui nous intéresse et désirons approcher. Ce colloque, sans commune mesure et au cœur de l'Europe, donnera finalement l'occasion aux chercheurs japonais et européens de célébrer avec tous les honneurs les 150 ans d'amitié entre nos deux pays.

Pierre Bonneels (Université libre de Bruxelles) &  
Takeshi Morisato (ENOJP, Vice President)

## Conference Program

### Wednesday, 7 December

12.30–13.00     Registration

*Auditorium (H 1.302)*

13.00–13.30     Welcome and Introduction:

Jan Gerrit Strala, Marc Peeters, vice rector of ULB, Justin Lacroix, and the Ambassador of Japan in Belgium, Mr. Masafumi Ishii

*Auditorium (H 1.302)*

13.30–15.00     A Round Table Discussion:

“Japan and the Cultural Disarmament of Philosophy”  
– Chair: Raquel Bouso

Rein Raud  
John Maraldo  
Isamu Miyahara  
Yasunari Takada

15.00–16.30     Coffee & Tea Break

16.30–17.30     Panel Sessions

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 1: *Philosophy of Time and Nature*

– Chair: Lucas dos Reis Martins



- **Rebecca Maldonado:** The Different Modes of Time in Kyoto School.
- **Kristyna Vojtiskova:** Imanishi Kinji's Ethical View of Nature.

*Room (AZ 1.101)*

Panel 2: *Comparative Philosophy: Art and Religion*

– Chair: Yukiko Kuwayama

- **Leszek Sosnowski:** Trans-Art and Trans-Aesthetics: A Phenomenological Approach into European-Japanese.
- **Ralf Müller:** Turning philosophy into a Temple Garden: On Inoue Enryō and the Problem of Translation.

*Room (UA 2.114)*

Panel 3: *Philosophy of [Self]*: – Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

- **Hans Peter Liederbach:** Anti-Cartesianism in Japanese Thought: Kuki Shūzō and Watsuji Tetsurō
- **Peter Baekelmans:** The link between Meditation and Phenomenology

17:30–17:45    Coffee & Tea Break

17:45–19:15    Panel Sessions

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 4: *Philosophy of Nature* – Chair: Felipe Ferrari

- **Quentin Hiernaux:** Le statut du végétal dans Fûdo de Watsuji.

- **Roman Paşca:** The Human Being's Lapse from Nature: A Few Considerations on Andō Shōeki's Concept of *hito*
- **Yu Inutsuka :** The Concepts of *Mono* and *Koto* in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsurō

*Room (UA 2.114)*

Panel 5: *Ueda Shizuteru* – Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

- **Ralf Müller:** TBC
- **Raquel Bouso:** TBC
- **Yuko Ishihara:** Ueda on Philosophical Reflection.

*Room (AZ 1.101)*

Panel 6: *Aesthetics I* – Chair: Cody Staton

- **Lorenzo Marinucci:** *Sabi*, *fūga* and Irony: the Aesthetic Inquiry of Ōnishi Yoshinori.
- **Diogo César Porto da Silva:** Kuki Shūzō's Philosophy of Literature: Rhyming Difference.

21.30– Reception at Cafe des Halles, Place Saint-Géry, 1, 1000 Bruxelles

\*The Recent Publications of the ENOJP members will be displayed at Room 1.

## Thursday, 8 December

8.30-9.00      Registration

*Auditorium (UA 2.114)*

9.30-11.00      Key Note Address  
                          – Chair: Takeshi Morisato

James W. Heisig:  
 An Apology for Philosophical Transgressions

11.00-11.30      Coffee & Tea Break

11.30-13.00      Panel Sessions

*Room (Victoria CIERL)*

Panel 7: *A Theme in Aesthetics: Zeami*  
                          – Chair: Roman Paşca

- Ayano Nishi: Zeami's Theory of *Yūgen*.
- David Cseh: Reflections of Ambiguous Realities: A Comparative Analysis of *Mimesis* and *Monomane* in the Writings of Aristotle and Zeami.
- Yayoi Sekiya: Zeami and his Zen Philosophy.

*Room (NA 4.302)* This Panel takes place at 12:00-13:30.

Panel 8: *Descartes in Japan with the Groupe belge de philosophie cartésienne* – Chair: Arnaud Pelletier

- Jaime Derenne : La « science de la félicité » chez Leibniz.
- Takako Tanigawa : Descartes and the Japanese Subjectivity.

- **Yoshinori Tsuzaki** : Taïken, kéïken et exercice selon Arimasa Mori, lecteur de Descartes.

*Room (AW 1.120)*

Panel 9: *Medieval Philosophy* – Christian Brouwer

- **Yoko Ito**: Shinran and Thomas Aquinas: Comparative Study of Philosophy of Religions in the 13th Century.
- **Gaetan Rappo**: Correlative Thinking and Ritual Symbolism in Medieval Japan: Monkan (1278-1357) and his Ritual of the Three Worthies (*Sanzon gōgyōhō*).

13.00–14.45     Lunch

15.00–16.00     Panel Sessions

*Room (Victoria CIERL)*

Panel 10: *Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science I*

– Chair: Yu Inustuka

- **Katsumori Makoto**: On Hiromatsu's Theory of the Fourfold Structure.
- **Piéro Ledent** : De l'hypothèse d'une logique sans axiome ni règle d'inférence primitive.

*Room (Bibliothèque CIERL)*

Panel 11: *Philosophy and the Problem of Self I*

– Chair: Cody Staton

- **Javier Santana Ramón**: The Limits of Subjectivity: Karatani Kōjin's Concept of Parallax.

- **Miyahara Isamu:** A Destruction of Subject and A Quest for Self: The Fundamental Differences between Nishida and Watsuji.

*Room (K 4.401)*

Panel 12: *Philosophy Beyond Japan I*

– Chair: Jordanco Sekulovski

- **Lucas dos Reis Martins:** Beyond Japan: Sketching Out a Decolonized Way to Intercultural Philosophy.
- **Vasil Penchev:** Heidegger Questioning (a) Japanese.

*Room (UA 2.220)*

Panel 13: *Literature and Women in Japanese Philosophy*

– Chair: Felipe Ferrari

- **Alex Lin:** A Temple Must Be Destroyed: Mishima, Nishitani, and Nothingness.
- **Christine A. James:** Zen Buddhism, Women, and Japan: The Life of Hiratsuka Raichō.

16.00–16.15    Coffee & Tea Break

16.15–17.00    **Panel Sessions**

*Room (Victoria CIERL)*

Panel 14: *Zen, Life, and ki* – Chair: Rudi Capra

- **Michiko Yusa:** Affirmation via Negation: A Zen Philosophy of Life, Sexuality, and Spirituality.
- **Maximilian Gregor Hepach:** A Phenomenology of Weather and *ki*

*Room (UA 4. 222)*

Panel 15: *Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science II*

– Chair: Filip Gurjanov

- **Pierre Bonneels:** What Kind of Generation/Evolution of Freedom Can We Find in the Works of Ōmori Shōzō?
- **Fabio Ceravolo:** Yukawa's Philosophy of Science: The Early Eastern Demise of Positivism.

*Room (R42 4.108)*

Panel 16: *Philosophy and the Problem of Self II*

– Chair: Cody Staton

- **Kyle Shuttleworth:** Watsuji Tetsurō's *Honraisei* and Nishitani's *Śūnyatā* as "Buddhist Authenticity."
- **Jordanco Sekulovski:** Rethinking Kāta as a Technology of the Self: Japanese and Continental perspectives.

17.15–17.45     Coffee & Tea Break

*Auditorium (C 2. 223)*

17.45–19.00     Break & Board Member Meeting

## Friday, 9 December

9.30–11.00      Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 17: *Japanese Philosophy and Its Place in the World*

– Chair: Didier Debaise

- **Andreas Thele:** Sérénité et culture du principe vital : conceptions philosophiques du bien-être dans la pensée japonaise.
- **Hitoshi Ogawa:** Philosophy of Japanese Sensitivity As Global Philosophy.
- **Tatsuya Higaki:** Kuki Shūzō and the Logic of Sense.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 18: *Philosophy of Religion I*

– Chair: Baudouin Decharneux

- **Carlos Andrés Barbosa Cepeda:** Logos as Dharma or the Re-enchantment of Natural Law: A Place for Interreligious Encounter.
- **Sergej Milanovic:** Comparative Philosophy as Phenomenology of Religion in Modern Japanese Thought.
- **Mark W. Flory:** Mutual Illuminations: Metanoetic and Hesychastic Insights into Spiritual Transformation.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 19: *Critique of Modernity I: Maruyama Masao and*

***Nishitani Keiji*** – Chair: Bernard Stevens

- **Samuel Marie:** The Critic of Japanese Modernity by Maruyama Masao: Beyond Ethnocentrism and Westernization.
- **Niklas Söderman:** Critique of Modernity in the Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji.
- **Annewieke Vroom:** Can the “Eastern Emptiness” Help Out in Dealing with Diversity?: A Case Study and Critique of Masao Abe’s Theory and Practice of Diversity.

11.00–11.30     Coffee & Tea Break

11.30–13.00     Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 20: *Philosophy of Nature and Time II*

– Chair: Andreas Thele

- **Marc Peeters :** Kuki Shūzō et le temps.
- **Simon Ebersolt :** Du donné à l'éternel retour du même. Phénoménologie, existentialisme et spéculation chez Kuki Shūzō.
- **Filip Gurjanov:** Nishitani's Understanding of Time.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 21: *Tanabe and Nishitani*

– Chair: Takeshi Morisato

- **Joseph O’Leary:** Tanabe’s Buddhist Reading of Symbolist Poetry.



- **Luis Pujadas Torres:** Understanding Tanabe's Experience of *Zange* from the Point of View of Ohashi's Notion of Philosophy as Auto-Bio-Graphy.
- **Amanda Sayonara Fernandes Prazeres:** Nishitani Keiji's Criticism of the Cartesian Cogito.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 22: *Philosophy of Religion II*

– Chair: Yu Inutsuka

- **Hitomi Omata Rappo :** L'adoption de la notion de « martyr » (junkyô) dans le Japon de Meiji : une réécriture du passé.
- **Rossa O Muireartaigh:** The Truth of Untruths: Understanding D. T. Suzuki's *soku-hi* Logic.
- **Liliana Timóteo:** Who is God in Nishida's thought?

13.00–14.45      Lunch

15.00–16.00      Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 23: *Nishida and Others I* – Chair: Jonatan Navarro

- **Mika Imono:** Au-delà du dualisme: chez Motoki Tokieda et Kitarô Nishida.
- **Morino Yusuke:** On Nishida Kitarô's Concept of Impulse.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 24: *The Problem of Tanabe's Species and of Doi's Expressions* – Chair: Rossa O Muireartaigh

- **Masato Gōda** : « Polémique » à propos de la « Logique de l'espèce » de Hajime Tanabe.
- **Délia Popa** : L'ambiguïté de l'expression : l'endroit et l'envers selon Doi Takeo.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 25: *Philosophy Beyond Japan II* – Chair: Lucas dos Reis Martins

- **Lucas Nascimento Machado**: Between Hegel and Nāgārjuna: Dialectics in the East and the West and Nishida's Philosophy.
- **Sekimura Makoto**: Sensation de la forme et de l'espace : dans les pensées japonaise et grecque.

*Maison des Arts (Jeanne Avenue 56, Local J56.2.205)*

Special Event: *Philosophical News*

– Chair: T. Berns (tbc) and Aline Wiame

- Lapoujade: « Deleuze, Les mouvements aberrants »

*\*This event is held between 15:00–17:00.*

16.00–16.15     Coffee & Tea Break

16.15–17.15     Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 26: *Nishida and Others II* – Chair: Leon Krings

- **John Maraldo**: What Phenomenologists Can Learn from Nishida about Self-Awareness.
- **Jonatan Navarro**: Wang Yangming in Nishida's *Inquiry into the Good*.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 27: *Critique of Modernity II: Secular or ... ?*

– Chair: Jordanco Sekulowski

- **Andreea Barbu:** The Formation of Secularity in Japan.
- **Saito Takashi:** The Abject Revenant: A Modern Japanese Ghost in the *Yotsuya kaidan*.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 28: *Philosophy of Religion III*

– Chair: Roman Paşca

- **Paulus Kaufmann:** The Gist of the Two Teachings: Japanese Discussions between Buddhism and Confucianism
- **Andrew Whitehead:** Making Rinzai Blush: Select Philosophical Poems from Ikkyū's Crazy Cloud Anthology.

17.15–17.45     Coffee & Tea Break

*Auditorium (UA 2.114)*

17.45–19.30     Key Note Address

– Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

Raji Steineck:

The Limits of Nature: Reification and Its Discontents.

21.30–             Reception at Beursschouwburg

## Saturday, 10 December

9.30–11.00      Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 29: *Key Themes in Kyoto School*

– Chair: Raquel Bouso

- **Bernard Stevens:** Nishitani, une approche bouddhique du dialogue intra-religieux.
- **Kazuaki Oda:** What is the Reality in *The Structure of iki?*
- **Frédéric Girard:** The First Encounter of Philosophy with Japan: the Compendium of Philosophy, of Pedro Gómez (1535–1600) (1592) translated in 1595.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 30: *Philosophy of Nothingness*

– Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

- **Felipe Ferrari:** A Place for Reality: The Phenomena of Consciousness in the light of the Absolute Nothingness.
- **Francesca Greco:** Between Nishida and Heidegger: A Hermeneutic Comparison of the Concept of Nothingness.
- **Philip Martin:** Images, Worlds and Nothingness: Nishida, Nishitani and Aesthetic Materiality.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 31: *Japanese Studies and Philosophy: Possibilities to Overcome Methodological Nationalism*

– Chair: Roman Paşca

- **Ching-yuen Cheung**
- **Montserrat Crespín Perales**
- **Alfonso Falero**

11.00–11.15 Coffee & Tea Break

11.15–12.15 Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 32: *Philosophy and Praxis I* – Chair: Felipe Ferrari

- **Leon Krings:** Philosophical Life as Somaesthetic Practice: *kata* in the Japanese Arts of the Body.
- **Laurentiu Andrei:** Practice and Tranquility of Mind in Zen and Stoicism.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 33: *Political Philosophy I* – Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

- **Yusuke Suzumura:** Ishibashi Tanzan, His Philosophy and Political Thought.
- **Eddy Dufourmont:** Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) and Alfred Fouillée (1838–1912): Synthesis as Philosophical Method to Think Republicanism.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 34: *Aesthetics II* – Chair: Takeshi Morisato

- **Cody Staton:** Fukada on the Experience of Art.
- **Rudi Capra:** The Role of Humor in the *Hekiganroku*

12.15–12.30     Coffee & Tea Break

12.30–13.30     Panel Sessions

*Room (Kant)*

Panel 35: *Philosophy and Praxis II* – Chair: Leon Krings

- **Vinicio Busacchi:** On Daisaku Ikeda's Philosophy of Action.
- **Mariko Ishida:** Japanese People and the Meaning of Working.

*Room (Spaak)*

Panel 36: *Political Philosophy II*

– Chair: Laurentiu Andrei

- **Martin Bolle :** Voie de la guerre chez Sun Tsu et Myamoto Musashi.
- **Patrick Simar :** Deleuze and Guattari: Towards an Ecology of Axiomatic Transactions.

*Room (Geremek)*

Panel 37: *Environmental Philosophy and Contemporary Bioethics* – Chair: Yu Inutsuka

- **Laÿna Droz:** Watsuji's Conception of the Self as the basis of Ethics of Sustainability.

- **Masahiro Morioka:** The Concept of Persona in Watsuji and its Importance in Contemporary Bioethics

*Room (K 3. 401)*

Panel 38: *Nishida's No-Self and ...*

– Chair: Felipe Ferrari

- **Yi Chen:** Not-Knowing or Knowing-Nothing? Exploring a Non-Metaphorical Epistemology Through the Aesthetics of *Yūgen*
- **Montserrat Crespín Perales:** The self / no-self in Nishida's early philosophy: An Epistemic Examination.

13.30–15.30    Lunch

*Auditorium (UA 2.114)*

15.30–17.30    Key Note Address

– Chair: Pierre Bonneels

Kuroda Akinobu:

Lieu de médiation - Nishida, Tanabe, Simondon.

17.30–18.00    Coffee & Tea Break

*Auditorium (UA 2.114)*

18.00–18.30    Closing Speech & Announcement

21.30–            Reception at Le Cercle des Voyageurs.

## What Is An Object According to Ontology Studies?

Marc PEETERS

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

One of the most important contemporary philosophical fields is ontology. One of the fathers of modern ontology is the Polish logician Stanislaw Lesniewski.<sup>1</sup> His perspective on ontology is different from classical ontology and the fundamental ontology of Heidegger. In all ontology studies, formal ontology, the notion “object” is absolutely fundamental, as only a defined object can be “something” rather than “nothing.” The purpose of this study is to demonstrate some of the consequences of a radical nominalism for the notion “object” from the perspective of the systematic organization of protothetics, ontology, and mereology. Lesniewski develops these three systems using one or more rules of production (mentioned by the metalinguistic Explanation XXXII – Lesniewski CW, 476–7; Luschei, 198–9), a method of construction we have decided, in accord with Luschei, to call a method of “relativization” and “hierarchization” of theorems, knowing that each system can also be connected to another (through using the same kind of rules that built the system itself); and that the ontological system is built on that of protothetics. In order to show this, we will have to examine the meaning of the relator  $\varepsilon$  from ontological, mereological, and metalingual

1. See Lesniewski, *Collected words*, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, PWN – Kluwer Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1992 (CW); Kearns 1967, “The Contribution of Lesniewski,” *Notre-Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Luschei 1962, *The Logical Systems of Lesniewski*, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company; Kotarbinski, *Leçons sur l’histoire de la logique*, Paris, PUF, 1964: “Notes on the Development of Formal Logic in Polen in the Years 1900-1939,” in *Polish Logic*, pp. 1-14; Miéville, *Un développement des systèmes logiques de Stanislaw Lesniewski*, Lang, 1984; P. Simons, *Parts, A study in ontology*, Oxford, 2003.



points of view. This will enable us to discover the specific time relations between the different  $\varepsilon$ 's. My main hypothesis is that the ontological system can be considered as an object, and can be "closed on itself" thanks to the mereological system (which can be conceived of as one kind of metasystematic Parmenideanism, where everything is either something or nothing but never in a state in-between).

The first question to be asked is whether or not Lesniewski's logical systems are based on extra-logical notions which cannot be defined, and whether those notions have any ontological connotations. This is clearly the case, for instance, with Frege's notion of "object," or with Russell's notion of the "individual" (which he considers to be a "logical impurity"), or the more cautiously named "ontological entities" of Carnap in *Signification and Necessity*. Can we say the same about Lesniewski? The only indefinable term is the  $\varepsilon$  of ontology (Luschei 1962, 145). This  $\varepsilon$  is not exterior to the system of logic. Thus, it is constructed within the axiom of ontology, of which it fixes the semantic category (which is of the logical type), and Lesniewski perceives it to be a singular relator which maintains specific relations with time. For Lesniewski, the only "word" that cannot be defined is the  $\varepsilon$  of every ontological proposition,  $\varepsilon$  standing for "is" as the third person singular form of the verb "to be." From my perspective, these kinds of  $\varepsilon$  are not situated outside of the system of logics (and as a consequence, they do not need any link to an ontological system that would be extra-logical).

In this paper, I will analyze Lesniewski's work by discussing two of its different and complementary dynamics: (1) the way his conception of the logical proposition evolves throughout his entire work, and (2) the evolution of the very complicated and various forms of the almost amphibological notion of "object." To do so, we first have to remember how, because of Lesniewski's radical nominalism, each and every logical object is an object characterized by specific temporal and spatial de-

terminations, which means that every logical object is first of all a concrete sign or “token.” In other words, the ontological  $\varepsilon$  has to be understood as a concrete relation between concrete names, names which exist in the world as individuals, and as such, one can say that the ontological  $\varepsilon$  can be seen as a way to talk about the world but it refers to the ways of discussing the universe.

The problem I intend to examine has been formulated in its most simple and direct way in Lesniewski’s early work (work that scholars sometimes tend to ignore). It is also in these early publications that he soon informs us of his rejection of the concepts of object and the properties of objects as proposed by Husserl, Meinong, Brentano, Marty, and of course, Lukasiewics. Initially, Lesniewski had been a student of Twardowski, until he was initiated into logics by Lukasiewics, and subsequently abandoned his search for a completely univocal ordinary language (*CW*, 181). Lukasiewics allowed him to discover Russell’s antinomy, which caused his “anxiety” concerning reality. Below, we will see how Lesniewski solved this antinomy, as his solution is directly related to my two main questions—the question of the evolution of his notion of “object,” and the question of the evolution of his notion of “proposition.” We will see subsequently that his solution continues to play an important role, when a third question, namely that of the extent to which there is a reality outside of the ontological system, becomes a centerpiece of his reflections on the object. In this way, the evolution of Lesniewski’s thoughts can be seen as an ongoing deepening of questions which in his early work are essentially philosophical, more precisely ontological and metaphysical, as he himself describes them. As Lesniewski does, we consider ontology and metaphysics (*CW*, 57) as two sciences dealing with categorical and true propositions about all objects in general; namely, all singular objects. Whereas his early work is essentially philosophical, developed during the era of logical positivism, Lesniewski came to focus more and

more, as Ajdukiewicz has shown, on issues such as the function of philosophy, and philosophy itself.

Contrary to “mathematical logicians” (*CW*, 365), Lesniewski never detaches his logical research from the elucidation of what he calls “semantic doubts” (*CW*, 182) concerning the meaning of logistical axioms, formulas, and theorems (whose absurdity and contradictions he shows in his *Foundations*). Lesniewski insisted (*CW*, 182) that he was incapable of finding the “real ‘sense’ of the axioms and theorems of that theory, ‘of what’ and ‘what’ respectively, that wished to assert by means of the axioms and theorems” (*CW*, 182). To solve this problem (and to know that he had not yet discovered the “New World” of formalized logics, which he did only in 1920, thanks to Chwistek), Lesniewski developed his three systems, while constantly going back to “intuitions.” We will see below what this means in further detail, but his method can indeed be characterized by the following leitmotif: intuition before formalization (Lejewski, 124), contrary to what leading formal logicians do. In my opinion, Lesniewski’s “intuition” has two different meanings: the first accentuates the importance of the phenomenological “intention” (*CW*, 17), as in this particular sense “intuition” refers to the “prehension” of concrete objects that surround us, in the way they present themselves to us, including things like “class” or a relation of “ingredience” (for example, in Lesniewski’s perspective, these are also concrete objects). The second meaning of “intuition”—which I would call “pure intuition” in the sense that this kind of intuition constitutes the conditions of possibility of every empirical object—refers to the fact that every intuition is first of all the intuition of objects in their spatial and temporal dimensions. In this sense of the notion of intuition, something is possible as a *token* when it can be built in space, and a priori in time (as a proposition only exists once it has been proven). All objects are constituted by space and time (we will see that Lesniewski even uses the idea of time-slice of objects). As the limit of what

is possible coincides with the limit of what can be constructed within an intuition, the nominal constant of nothing, “ $\Lambda$ ”—what is nothing, what does not symbolize nor connote any object—becomes an impossible representation. However, this impossibility (being nothing) can be “apparently constructed” in a purely formal way, using the definition of the contradictory object, as shown by Sobocinski (and whose interpretation will have to be examined):

$$(A \in \Lambda) \equiv (A \in A) . - (A \in A)$$

A is nothing if (A is A) and not (A is A).

Through the substitution of A by  $\Lambda$ , we obtain a contradictory theorem, which nevertheless seems to have a meaning, as it implies that an object has been defined. We indeed obtain

$$\Lambda \in \Lambda \equiv (\Lambda \in \Lambda) . - (\Lambda \in \Lambda)$$

whose meaning is impossible and literally incomprehensible: nothing is nothing if nothing is nothing and not (nothing is nothing). Using a traditional vocabulary, one could say that what we are facing here is a construction built by reasoning reason. This brings us to the main goal of the article: the limits of Lesniewski’s systems, and what could potentially lie outside of those limits, even when such an exteriority is supposed to be impossible from a Parmenidian point of view. For instance, if we take Russell’s antinomy, then we will have to say that asking oneself whether the “class of classes that do not contain themselves” contains itself or not, basically means asking oneself whether the two propositions “a squared-circle exists” and “not (a squared-circle exists),” are two falsely contradictory propositions, which would invalidate the principle of  $(p \vee -p)$ . In Lesniewski’s view, all classes, as aggregates, contain themselves. The object “class of classes that do not contain themselves” is and operates as the fictional name “squared-circle.” Russell’s antinomy is, according to Lesniewski, based on the adoption of the idea that “the intuition of the absolute

truth of certain presuppositions” is possible (cf. Kearns, 62). If we have to suppose that “intuition” in this sense cannot simply be identified with a certain “common sense” (Kearns 1967, 62), then in one way or the other, “intuition” has to be some kind of knowledge, more precisely a knowledge of “what is,” knowledge of the general principles of being. And in this sense, ontology is a “Protè Philosophia” (*CW*, 374 ; Lejewski, 123).

At this point it may be useful to briefly recapitulate what we have seen so far and what needs still to be studied. Lesniewski uses the notions of proposition and object most clearly in his early works. Understanding the relations between one proposition and another, or the validity of logical laws, is impossible if one fails to take the signification of language into account (cf. Kearns 1967, 62). Following the advice of Lukasiewics, Lesniewski went from searching for “an appropriate linguo-technical investigations to philosophy” (Kotarbinski, McCall, 5) to looking for answers to more fundamental questions that determine the first one, namely “the general theory of objects” (Luschei 1962, 167–288 & Kearns 1967, 62–3). Within this framework, Lesniewski wanted, from a “layman’s perspective”—in other words, rejecting mathematical creationism (which is disconnected from reality) as well as a platonism of invention (preferring the idea of discovery)—to find a logical foundation of mathematics free from antinomies, as mathematics, in his conception, consists of “deductive theories, which serve to capture various realities of the world in the most exact laws of possible” (*CW*, 177). What are those “various realities”? Are they mathematical entities, or rather concrete objects? In his early publications, Lesniewski had not as yet developed the neutrality of ontology, so when he spoke of objects, he was clearly referring to objects given *de re* through intuition. What does not exist *de re* cannot be accepted as existing within the formal system, because the formal system is entirely based on “what is.” Moreover, the meaning of the words used by axioms is explained through

the function of those axioms in the formal system. The rules of adequate language cannot possibly contradict the content of intuition.

Lesniewski's philosophical and logic works are atypical. Lesniewski began his philosophical career under the strict authority of Professor Twardowski. This phase is referred to as his "early work." Later on, Lesniewski radically altered his attitude towards the formalization of the *Principia Mathematica*, for which he had very little esteem. Lesniewski's shift in attitude towards the *Principia Mathematica* allowed him to invent what he named his three systems. These systems are (in order of their appearance) the following: mereology, ontology, and protothetics. Before considering the work which is referred to as his "mature work," and the denial by Lesniewski of his "early work" (which took place in 1914), the knowledge deriving from the "early work" should not be ignored, as this knowledge is very rich and is fundamental to the question that we are exploring in this study. However, before concentrating on this very complex work, metaphysics, ontology, and logic need to be redefined (*CW*, 30). The extralogical system of mereology also needs to be redefined. My goal is to show that the radical nominalism of Lesniewski has significant consequences, which impact the creation, the discovery, and the invention of the three systems of metaphysics, ontology and logic.

Given that being does not imply any properties, it cannot be an object. Thus, what is the state of the  $\epsilon$  which was constructed in both the axiom of ontology and in the very peculiar denotation of metalanguage? Everything that Lesniewski discusses can stand on its own, and Luschei went so far as to talk about his systems in terms of the Rosetta Stone (Luschei 1962, 44). But the philosophical question that I am setting forth in my text right now aims to establish if there is an "exteriority" to mereology and ontology, if the latter were considered as a systematic object, within the Parmenidian di-

agram upon which Lesniewski based his work. All of these notions depend on the extremely problematic notion of the logical object which his philosophical and logical thinking embodies, starting from his resolution to the Russell's antinomy, and going on to the construction of his metalanguage. One could thus be led to question the condition of all formal objects:  $(A \in A) - "A \text{ is } A,"$  which means that "A" is an object, without which it is nothing. It is impossible in all of the three systems. What is the state of the nominal constant of the impossible void of Lesniewski " $\Lambda$ " (will this impossibility be heavily nuanced with regard to the void classes of the PM, which is also formulated as an " $\Lambda$ ," but which does not possess exactly the same meaning)? The same goes for the constant of "something": " $V$ ," which is to be found both in Russell and in Lesniewski. There is no void class for Lesniewski. At this point, it may be helpful to focus our attention to the value of a subtle debate concerning this issue. Recognizing and describing the elements which constitute the world (or, to be more precise, partial sections of the world, which are temporalized and spatialized) is, firstly, to recognize access to this world, and, secondly, to understand the rules of description (as opposed to the rules of invention). This is only possible because Lesniewski makes abundant use of the interpretative method (Kotarbinski, *Leçons*, 295–6). This method consists in giving a meaning to variables in order to ascertain the validity of the axiomatic which is being studied. Is this method not subjective? No, it is not because space and time guarantee a solid constitution of the problematic object or entity to be defined, and because it is impossible to deny that which is nothing. This is a fundamental thesis of developmental logic and ontology.

All linguistic expressions denote something, or denote nothing, or even symbolize something or nothing, i.e. are symbols of "something" (*CW* 1912, 31–3). But what is a symbol? A symbol which is a denoting expression always refers to

an extralogical object which has an intuitive reality. By definition, the notion of a symbol supposes that there is a concrete object to which the symbolizing object (a name) is related. The symbolizing object (a name) is itself concrete: Indeed Lesniewski twice demonstrated the impossibility of abstract terms. In other words, a symbol is singular, as is its extralinguistic reference. Can any traits of the ontology of maturity and its singular terms in the singular propositions of the type  $(A \in b)$  be seen? Indeed, because propositions are all inherence propositions, Lesniewski participated in the battle against the “dogma of internal relations,” as did Russell and all the other logicians of this period. It must not be forgotten that this battle, according to Russell, would be a failure of the *PM*, because he used in this major work the abstractors of classes which, as if “by magic,” transform intension into extension. There is no trace of such abstractors of classes in the work of Lesniewski, nor is there any trace of reducibility axioms. Lesniewski progressed from a neo-aristotelian logic to a purely extensional logic. This abandonment of internal relations explains, among others things, why there are no void classes even and especially if the classes are generated by their elements, as is maintained by Whitehead and Russell.

## ONTOLOGY AND OBJECTS

One of the main goals in this article is to verify if there is an “exteriority” or a “logical limit” to ontology and mereology. So, I will adopt a metasystematic stance which will facilitate the analysis of these strange logical beings which are referred to in completely different manners by Russell and by Lesniewski. These “beings” are the nominal constant, the “name” of “something”: “V,” the Russell’s universal class and the nominal constant, the “name” of “nothing”: “ $\Lambda$ .” The function of this void class is to respond to the monist objection in the *Principia*. Formal ontology is a system of partial



ontologies which make it possible to formally justify the relations between names of objects. This ontology does not aim at a general theory of “existing things,” of the world or of “objects,” if “world” and “object” are taken to mean the physical universe. Ontology refers to the universe, but it also and especially refers to the ways of discussing the universe.

Ontology is a logic of names. In opposition to his “early work,” in ontology, Lesniewski abandoned this “relations of inherence” in favour of the rules and directives of extensionality. In short, “ontology is ontologically neutral” (Miéville, *passim*). Since ontology is a calculation, it is necessary to have rules of appropriate reductions and an exhaustive presentation of the relations between the names of objects: the “unshared names,” the “shared names” which are not classification concepts and the “fictitious names,” which must not be confused with the abstract, contradictory terms of Lesniewski. Singular, unshared names are, e.g., “Socrates,” “The Moon” and each of them designates one and only one entity. These are the individuals to which the axiom of ontology refers and which satisfy the same requirements and conditions as the definite descriptions developed by Russell (Simon *Parts*, 63).

The names of singular objects constitute true propositions as long as they are connected by the extensional relator of eternity  $\varepsilon$ . Why the relator of eternity? Because it embodies the non-defined functor of ontology as well as the eternal truth of all true propositions. Furthermore, in order to understand the function of the development of eternity within partial, infinite ontologies, which are always spatio-temporally determined, it is necessary to analyze what the value of the  $\varepsilon$  of metalanguage is. This term  $\varepsilon$  is constructed and fixes the semantic category of the axiom of ontology. This must not be confused with a creative or non-creative definition of  $\varepsilon$  (as “coimplication” fixed the axiom of protothetics).

Semantic categories, which also have the function of logical types, are concrete spatio-temporal logical objects. Such

objects can be identified as time-slices: “The Warsaw of 1830,” for example, is a time slice of the object “Warsaw since the beginning until the end of its existence (*CW*, 380-381).” Furthermore, the  $\epsilon$  never means “is currently,” that is why it is suggested to perceive it as a relator of eternity, *sub specie aeternitatis*, which embodies the permanent present. Such a permanent present, which is the definition of eternity, constitutes the temporality of the  $\epsilon$ , which institutes the time of these spatio-temporal systems. Unlike all forms of Platonism (mathematical creationism and Fregean judgements of recognition), these systems develop as *tokens*, concrete objects, i.e. as a spatio-temporal development of this eternity. Ontological systems are the embodiment of eternity. Partial ontologies are time-slices of concrete objects. Since there are no abstract names in ontology, the  $\epsilon$  can never be confused with the symbol of belonging in an ensemble.

### MEREOLGY

Mereology is an applied ontology. It is essentially characterized by the rehabilitation of collective classes (against the distributive classes of Russell and Whitehead), the identity of the class with its unique element and the impossibility of void classes. Ontology focuses on the names of objects, whereas mereology focuses on the relations between the objects themselves and their implications (the symbol). As seen above, beyond fictitious names, a constructed limit of ontology can be invented, the name “ $\Lambda$ ,” which is totally empty of meaning. How does the “void object” (which is impossible) stand in terms of mereology? Furthermore, Lesniewski introduced specific functors in mereology: “part,” “ingredience,” “element,” “collection,” “sub-collection,” “complementarity” and “exteriority.” These mereological functors support the links between concrete objects of systems. In note 60, chapter 4 of the Foundations of 1928 (*CW*, 248), Lesniewski suggested a

simplification of his terminology by stating that the functors “ingredient” and “element,” could be inverted, as could the functors “element” and “sub-collection.” An “element” of a class or of a collection, or of an ingredient, does not necessarily verify the concrete being which is the class, the collection or the ingredient, i.e., in Russell’s terms, the concept which defines the class. It is very important to understand that mereology is an applied logic whose relevance for ontology will be examined in this article: ontology, let it be recalled, constitutes and is included in an integrated, complete and whole system (bearing in mind that there is an infinite number of potential ontologies).

According to the Russell’s void class : “ $\Lambda$ ” has, among others, the function of preventing ontological monism. Therefore, it is important to understand if the Lesniewski’s nominal constant of nothing also fulfills the same function. In other words, the aim of this study is to understand if there is another “something” than the universal class, and what the function of the nominal constant of “nothing,” “ $\Lambda$ ,” is. In other words, on what does one find oneself in order to construct the contradictory object in ontology? This consists in verifying, or in invalidating the “eternal” Parmenideanism of Lesniewski.

Lesniewski employed “part of” as a first intuitive functor: one part is never identical to the entire entity of which it is a part. Nonetheless, the part “ingredience” was used. “Ingredience” is a philosophical term which means that an expression is part of, or is identical to another expression of which it is precisely an ingredient. I chose the operator of ingredience for two reasons: firstly, it is much more flexible than the factor of “one’s own part,” because it can indicate a section or an identity. On the other hand, ingredience is the functor which is used by Lesniewski in the construction of propositions, which are also theses of metalanguage of which the  $\epsilon$  is the non-defined functor, as in ontology. These two reasons for choosing the functor of ingredience as the prime mereological functor

have a high degree of plausibility: a thesis, as a collective class, is always an ingredient of itself.

What about the “denotation” of the “object” “ $\Lambda$ ”? It is vital that the Russellian void class “ $\Lambda$ ” (which, as all classes, is fictitious) and the nominal constant “nothing,” “ $\Lambda$ ” of Lesniewski (according to whom all classes are objects) should not be confused with one another. Firstly, according to Lesniewski, “ $\Lambda$ ” is a *nominal* constant, a term, an apparently singular name which denotes and connotes nothing. Since the mereological classes contain themselves, one can legitimately question what the ontological status of the nominal constant “nothing” is. Furthermore, the collective (mereological) class needs to be an object in order to contain at least one element which, in this case, identifies with it. Could “ $\Lambda$ ” be such an element? Certainly not, because “ $\Lambda$ ” cannot be an ingredient of a class, which would be empty, which is a non-meaning. To show the reasoning relating to the limits of ontology and the limits of that which is “real,” the unicity of the classes (that is, the unicity of ontology, the universal class: “ $V$ ”) needs to be expressed, which will be examined in the rest of this article.

The following are some of the consequences which establish the nominal constant of the universal object “ $V$ .” To discuss them, Lesniewski introduced the definition of the term “exterior to” (*CW*, 248-249). An object is exterior to another object iff no element of this object is an element of the class which is exterior to this object. On these grounds, it can be concluded that an object cannot be exterior to itself. Mereological exteriority is introduced by the nominal constant of “something,” since Russell started from the universal class “ $V$ ,” rather than by the nominal constant of “nothing” which, being imperceptible, cannot be expressed in any other than a formal manner within the mereological class of all objects. This is contradictory. What can be done about this contradiction and what is its purpose? It must be shown that this mereological exteriority lacks the least meaning. In order to achieve this

goal, the “mereological complement” must be used as an operator (*CW*, 251). The definition of complementarity within a class implies that the universal class contains all mereological complements. So, what is the nature of complementarity? The mereological complement means that an ingredient cannot be its own complement in a class, because it is an ingredient of that class. A section of this class always has a complement in this class (*CW*, 254-255).

Lesniewski established that an object cannot be the complement of another object which is within itself (*CW*, 256). Thus, there is no complementarity to the universal class, nor is there any mereological exteriority to this class, thus there is none to the “being,” either. Therefore, from the Russell’s point of view in the *PM*, the mereology of Lesniewski is monist, even if it allows the object “contradiction” to be precisely constructed: nothing produces nothing, *ad infinitum*; this consists in a reasoning construction of reason, which must therefore be rejected. But, since one cannot deny that which is nothing, there is no other class of which the name would be the complement of the universal class. The mereological constant of “nothing” designates nothing and connotes no property, not even the property of carrying its own name, because this name is nothing. So, the name of the nominal constant “ $\Lambda$ ,» as defined by Lejewski, is not a fictional name. It is a name which lacks any meaning, as shown in the theorem of contradiction:

$$(\Lambda \varepsilon \Lambda) \equiv (\Lambda \varepsilon \Lambda) . - (\Lambda \varepsilon \Lambda)$$

and, even if by impossibility, it were maintained that “nothing” existed, that this “void, nameless object” existed, this would not indicate a phenomenological intention of nothing (*CW*, 17).

## INSCRIPTIONAL METALANGUAGE

I would now like to focus on the foundations of the notion of object on the basis of an example of how the axiomatic of protothetics and the Explanations are organically connected (*CW*, 467–92). This connection rests upon what is called a “rule of equivalence” or of “inheritance” of properties, and starts from Axp1 (the first axiom of protothetics). The systems of protothetics are constructed on the only sign of equivalence (the coimplication) as a first, non-defined functor. The formal norms of Lesniewski’s production of his three systems have links with metalanguage, although some mereological constants which are one part of the language-object of mereology are necessary so that they can be expressed in written form (these are the functor of ingredience and the ontological  $\varepsilon$ ). The Lesniewski’s metalanguage, which is expressed in a formal manner, is a concatenation (T.E.VII) of Latin abbreviations, which have been articulated by the relator  $\varepsilon$  and the operator of ingredience with linked variables (T.E.XIV–T.E.XV) constructed and laid out as propositions (T.E.XXXIX’).

Ontological systems are spatio-temporal entities (objects, *aliqua*) which have already been demonstrated and which are logically constructed in a determined order: protothetics, ontology and mereology. What are the rules governing the insertion of new theses in the systems? As a general theory of the names of objects, ontology finds its roots in protothetics and requires the axiom of protothetics (Axp1) and an always and necessarily finite number of real, well-formed and well-asserted theses which precede the first thesis of ontology, i.e. its axiom (T.E.XXXIIo; cf. Luschei 1962, *passim*), as a propositional basis. So, what are the differences between the  $\varepsilon$  of ontology and that of metalanguage? To answer this crucial question, I will introduce the relation of “equiformity.”

It can be concluded, on the basis of the spatio-temporality of the Lesniewski’s object-systems, that there is no logical

object in the universe which is the same as another, or even, if two objects are identical in the universe, that they are the same object. Also, two different occurrences of one same word do not present the same word in two different places, or at two different times. Thus, the  $\epsilon$ 's of ontology and of metalanguage are equiform, but different in space and in time. Therefore, equiformity is a relation of equivalence. The two  $\epsilon$ 's are fundamentally different. The  $\epsilon$  of ontology is built in the axiom of ontology and the other  $\epsilon$  of metalanguage is operative and mereological, as in any constant which is established on a thesis that has a relation with Axp1.

Since all of the theses of ontology and of protothetics are relative to Axp1, it is pertinent to consider the "ontological" status of Axp1. So, the first axiom of protothetics is a complex (CW, 472; Luschei 1962, 180–1). The notion of "complex" belongs to metalanguage (Luschei 1962, 180–1). The "complex" responds to the characteristics of collective classes : each complex is unique. A complex is the metalinguistic expression of a collection of equiform or non-equiform objects, which are different and varied, and are the ingredients of the class which is the interior of a generalization, i.e. a well-formed expression, which is universally quantified, and is either of protothetics or of ontology. Such a collection can be perceived as an organized sequence of words, of "parentheses" (expressions which are placed between brackets and which indicate the spatio-temporal context of an expression, and, in this way, its semantic category). The collection is then a concatenation (Luschei 1962, 179–80). These two metalinguistic notions (the complex and concatenation) symbolize formal, concrete beings of the language-object. They constitute the neutral, material ontological basis of which all of the tangible (cf. Luschei, *passim*), logical theses of systems are constituted (Luschei 1962, 152). A concatenation is a class which belongs both to the language-object and to metalanguage, and which is itself governed by the rules of construction which it imposes. Con-

sequently, by virtue of the radical nominalism of Lesniewski, there are no void concatenations, void generalizations or abstract ones. The concrete content of these terms (with their signs of punctuation - parentheses) of a generalization is the essence of the generalization.

The word “essence” (T.E.XIII; *CW*, 474; Luschei 1962, 185) is one of the most important “terms” of the vocabulary which constructs the concrete, well-formed expressions which are the theses of any system, and, especially, of the metalanguage of the protothetics. The essence of a logical proposition is a concrete object, and not an abstraction of characteristics of concept. It is singular, individualized, concrete and lacks substance. The essence of a generalization is composed of concatenated and parenthesized objects which are therefore categorized and locked in by symmetrical brackets (the marks of punctuation which surround and outline their category). For example, the essence of a generalization generates a new semantic category, i.e., a new logical, concrete object within the system (provided that the essence of the generalization is a creative one).

All theses which precede or are identical to a thesis of protothetics are a thesis which is relative to this thesis. Thus, a thesis is relative to itself, or—and this is equivalent—belongs to the field of the relation of ingreience “being a precedent thesis or an identical thesis to an individual thesis.” This rule which determines logical languages could be constructed and named “the rule of relativity or of relativization,” and is established in T.E.XXXII: “If A is a thesis, taken as a parameter, preceding or identical to B, then any thesis relative to A is any thesis relative to B.” Since the axiom Axp1 is a thesis which is relative to all theses in the system of protothetic, it follows that any thesis of the system in relation to the axiom Axp1 is any thesis relative to this system. With T.E.XXXII, the rule of construction of the protothetic and ontological systems, and the rule which gives rise to the theses of metalanguage, which,



as a language, is controlled by the same governing rules, that is the “relativization” starting from Axp1 (Luschei 1962, 199 & *passim*).

Lesniewski was one of the first logicians to insist upon the distinction between language-object and metalanguage. This distinction is radical, even if the language-object and its semantic objects could be an ingredient of the metalanguage in which they were written. The terms of metalanguage are also expressed in spatio-temporal propositions which have been determined as explicit metalinguistic definitions. An architectonic point of view would suggest that, other than the directives for the insertion of theses, the Lesniewski’s most original contribution is his principle of “hierarchical stratification and of relativization” (T.E.XXXII). The principle of stratification makes it possible to deal unambiguously with contextual analogies.

Lesniewski’s logical grammar requires that, at each stage of a system which has been formulated in the language L, there is a corresponding, finite number of semantic categories in this system. This can be generated and constructed with no contradictions. Thus, Lesniewski can challenge Russell’s axiom of reducibility, as well as his usage of the abstractors of classes, by unambiguously constructing all possible semantic categories, providing that the principles of continuous hierarchical stratification and of the “relativity” of theses are respected (Luschei 1962, 97). The ultimate reason for the “constructivist nominalism” of Lesniewski can thus be seen: if his systems were not spatio-temporally determined objects, it would be impossible to avoid any paradoxes, because these systems would presuppose the illegitimate totality of semantic categories in order to be able to define at least one of them. In this case, the axiom Axp1 would be formally impredicative. (Luschei 1962, 103–4). Nevertheless, such an axiom cannot be generated in protothetics, because the negation of all non-propositions is not a proposition. Thus, it is always unambiguous if a

proposition is actually a proposition. It is impossible for any non-proposition “to slide” into L (Luschei 1962, 98), because such a non-proposition does not exist in L. i.e. thus it cannot be constructed in L. If all well-formed propositions are constructed, neither language L nor its metalanguage can be abstracted from each other.

## CONCLUSION

At the end of this study it seems useful to recap on what has been analyzed. Very few studies question in a metasystemic way the status of logical systems themselves. According to Lesniewski, the universe is an open space whose infinity is marked by partial ontologies. Furthermore, there are neither empty classes, nor an actual infinity in Lesniewski’s logical world. Thus, without an empty class it has been possible to show the Parmenideanism of classic developmental extensional logic. In addition, it is important consider the nothing theorem, including impossible and contradictory, which has a formal reality and could have a resonance with the key philosophical themes developed by Japanese philosophers.

I have shown the necessary spatiotemporal closure of the objects that are Lesniewski’s logical systems. The next step would be to explain the fracture in the very heart of those objects. The equiformity of each single object, like the logical systems in question, has a spatio-temporal appearance. This is what Kant and Lambert called a *simulacrum*. If we follow the two models—Russell’s and Lesniewski’s—the world is simply intertwined fictions overlapping and infinitely multiplying in a contingent world. For Lesniewski, there are no possible worlds, only infinite ontologies. Of course, in Russell’s terms, Lesniewski’s thought is a monism, for the constants are simply names—among them the empty name—contradictory and therefore nothing.

If I submit these thoughts on this aspect of western phi-

losophy, it is mainly to evaluate metaphysics as it is practiced today—formal ontology—and compare it with Japanese philosophy. On this final note, I am convinced that this rich exchange of ideas would contribute to the friendship between Japan and Belgium.

## Abstracts

### —Keynotes—

#### An Apology for Philosophical Transgressions

James W. Heisig  
(Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture)

Having spent half a life time collaborating in the effort to make the philosophical resources of Japan more accessible to those trained in classical Western philosophy, I think it is time I took stock of just how all that access has affected my own habits of thought. More specifically, I would like to address, in concrete terms, the question of how far the writings of the Kyoto School philosophers have altered the worldview I came to Japan with over forty years ago. To accomplish this, I will lay out, as clearly as I can and in the most general terms, the philosophical perspective from which I have come to look at the things of life, and offer it by way of apologia for my transgressions of established academic boundaries. Finally, and on this basis, I would like to propose a new question to be added to the fundamental questions of philosophy.

#### The Limits of Nature: Reification and Its Discontents

Raji Steineck (University of Zurich)

An essential ideological problematic of premodern societies was “anthropomorphism”: anonymous forces and processes presented themselves to common sense as so many manifestations of the intentions of personal agents – be they identified as human or otherwise. In modern society, this problematic

has been reversed into one of “reification”: processes and forces that are the result of human interaction now present themselves as anonymous “natural” relations between things. Consequently, human beings are not only factually subjected to forces beyond their individual control, they are also mentally restricted to think in ways that perpetuate their subjugation. In my presentation, I follow Hiromatsu Wataru and Maki Yūsuke, who take the Marxian critique of commodity fetishism as the basis for more general critiques of reification. Special attention will be given to their analyses of “nature” and “time,” which play a crucial function in the workings of modern society. Finally, I question whether reification is an evil to be avoided at all costs, or whether it has its legitimate place and function even after the “merciless criticism of all that exists” that philosophy needs to undertake as long as there are social relations that subjugate and denigrate human beings.

Lieu de médiation - Nishida, Tanabe, Simondon.

Akinobu Kuroda (Université de Strasbourg)

Nous nous proposons dans cette intervention de structurer synchroniquement trois moments philosophiques d'origines différentes : l'intuition agissante chez Kitarô Nishida, la dialectique de la médiation absolue chez Hajime Tanabe et la philosophie de l'individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, dans un contexte de réflexion philosophique sur la nature de la vie humaine. Ces trois moments nous semblent susceptibles de se croiser, se critiquer et se compléter dans un terrain transductif au sens où l'entend Simondon. C'est ce nouveau terrain que nous entendons défricher afin d'ouvrir une perspective où un individu humain se transforme en agent responsable d'un transhumanisme à travers le processus de l'individuation dynamique et transindividuelle, laquelle nous préparerait à l'émergence du posthumain dans un futur proche.

—Panel Presentations—

**Panel 1: Philosophy of Time and Nature**

The Different Modes of Time in Kyoto School

Rebecca Maldonado

(Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico)

When Ueda Shizuteru talks about language in Zen buddism, we can perceive how he thinks about time as an absolute present in natural events. In other words, time is thought as what we can observe in the expression of nature: Flowers bloom, and as such, they bloom. However, we must pay attention to the fact that in a metanoetic consciousness of time, nature is absent, existing only in a circular present of constant surrender and repentance. On the contrary, Ueda brings us to absolute present through nature. In this presentation, we will think about the relationship between nature and time in Kyoto school philosophy.

Imanishi Kinji's Ethical View of Nature:  
Recognized World and Integrity

Kristýna Vojtíšková

(Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic)

Imanishi Kinji's *shizengaku* developed in his major work *Seibutsu no sekai* (The World of Living Things, 1941), is considered to provide a substantial basis for discussions on the relationship between humanity and the natural world that challenges the contemporary approaches to natural ethics. His thought was predominantly influenced by Nishida Kitarō's Zen philosophy, Kyōto School, environmental sciences

(e.g. primatology, botany, ecology, and biological evolution), anthropology, and sociology. The broad knowledge of these disciplines shaped his view of nature as a society of organisms interrelated in a holistic system which is based on an undivided continuity of individual-nature non-dualism.

In *Seibutsu no sekai*, Imanishi embraces a notion of socially related organisms interacting with and within their environments. The environments are conceived here as parts related to the whole, i.e. continuum of nature. The interaction of organisms within the natural continuum is characterized by an active interrelation of equal sentient beings as well as the intrinsic value of integrity (e.g. moral, aesthetic and spiritual values). The integrity is developed in the process of evolution, whereby sentient beings expand their own environment, i.e. recognized world. As a result, this expansion extends the scale of their integrity and intensifies it. In my paper, I strive to examine the very notion of the process of expansion of recognized world and its relation to the development of integrity within the community of living things.

## Panel 2: Comparative Philosophy of Art

### On the Protection of National Heritage: the Case of Japanese-European Relations

Leszek Sosnowski  
(Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Japan remained in isolation until the mid-nineteenth century. The first treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed under the threat of use of military force (1854). Japan became a part of the international community, and the government and administration made an effort to face the educational, economic, and political challenges.

One area of Japanese culture required neither creation from the ground up nor borrowing from Western models. This was Japanese culture in its artistic aspect. In fact, the situation was reversed here: this area became an ideal, imitated by Westerners. This also represented a paradox which manifested itself in the “collision” of the two cultures. This period of Japanese influence on Europe was expressed by neologisms in French and English, *Japonaiserie* and *Japanism*, respectively, meaning a fascination with this new country.

The emergence of Japanese culture in Europe was accompanied by cultural and commercial events that captured the imagination of Europeans, all of which influenced the formation of new artistic and aesthetic tastes in Europe in this period. European artists, dealers, and collectors who appeared on the art market, such as Samuel Bing, Édouard Manet, Claude Monet, and Edgar Degas, followed by Vincent van Gogh and his brother Theo, were all greatly inspired by the new art. There was also the Polish collector Feliks “Manggha” Jasieński. Japanese art, properly speaking, which already had its place in the collections of European collectors, was impossible to find in Japan itself.

The question remains: How did it happen that thousands of examples of Japanese works of art made their way to Europe? It is puzzling how so many artworks and artefacts could have been taken out of Japan in such a short period of time. The answer appears simple: no effective protection of national goods existed in Japan. It took time to discern the needs of the country and to organise efficient agencies with proper laws for this special purpose.

The Convention of Kanagawa contains twelve articles: the sixth concerns trade between Japan and other countries, giving them complete freedom. However, not even one article touches on the case of artistic or craft production. What was the situation regarding the preservation of cultural property at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries?



Decrees for the protection of antiquities were issued in both of these centuries. I believe the most important was the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties, passed in 1950. It took Japan almost a hundred years to establish this law. The new law defined the notion of cultural property: any items may be given this designation if they are of “particularly high value from the standpoint of world culture or outstanding treasures for the Japanese people.” Cultural Property includes seven categories of properties. From my point of view, the most interesting are the first two, namely, tangible and intangible properties. In the latter case, it turned out that Japan had overtaken Europe, demonstrating the proper method of protection of a country’s own heritage.

Turning Philosophy into a Temple Garden:  
On Inoue Enryō and the Problem of Translation

Ralf Müller  
(University of Hildesheim, Germany)

### Panel 3: *Philosophy of [Self]*

Anti-Cartesianism in Japanese Thought:  
Kuki Shūzō and Watsuji Tetsurō

Hans Peter Liederbach  
(Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan)

The influence of the anti-Cartesianism, Heidegger had developed in *Being and Time* on philosophers in early Shōwa Japan can hardly be exaggerated. By anti-Cartesianism, I mean a position that rejects the notion, according to which any relation between human beings, humanity and the world, and the sub-

jective self-relation of human beings must be established and mediated qua mental representations authored by the subject. Among the Japanese philosophers who adopted this position, Watsuji and Kuki are of particular interest, because their appropriations of *Being and Time* represent two ways of being anti-Cartesian which, if held together, can help to shed light on a fundamental problem concerning the future of philosophy.

Since Heidegger's proclamation of "the end of philosophy" and his inauguration of "the other beginning of thought," the assertion that modern Western philosophy had reached an impasse, has become ubiquitous. Giving the names of Lyotard, Derrida, Rorty, Vattimo, and others will suffice to show how influential this view has become, not only in the West, but also in Japan. It could be argued that one of the reasons why Heidegger and his post-modern followers were so enthusiastically received in Japan, lies in the fact that their fundamental criticism of modernity—in particular the deconstruction of the modern aspiration for radical self-determination of thought, judgement, and agency—resonated with arguments developed by philosophers of the Kyoto School long before it had become fashionable in the West to speak "post-modern." In fact, it has been claimed in recent scholarship that drawing from the insights of Nishida et al. might help us to surmount the impasse modernity has led to. The philosophy of the Kyoto School is significant, so we are told, because it is operating at the very frontiers of philosophical future.

Within this broader context, Kuki's and Watsuji's attempts at coming to grips with the relation of I and Thou are important inasmuch as they bear witness to (a) the irresolvable ambiguity of any encounter with the other under modern conditions, and (b) the immense difficulties and contradictions any anti-Cartesian stance is fraught with. Neither Kuki nor Watsuji, that is, has succeeded in developing a defensible position that could account for origin and structure of the I-Thou relation. Kuki's theory of contingency, for all its admirable meta-

physical breadth and depth, cannot explain human agency, in particular common practices, while Watsuji's ethical thought is based on a notion of totality that contradicts his otherwise illuminating insights into the structure of human agency.

The purpose of this presentation is to sketch out the pre-suppositions responsible for these failures and relate them to the problem of Western modernity sketched out above. As I will claim, Watsuji and Kuki got into troubles over determining the relation between theoretical and practical philosophy. What is at stake here is the possibility of developing an account of historically grounded agency that, while having a normative bite, can be defended against naturalistic objections. The insights of Kuki and Watsuji are useful for reassessing this most pressing problem associated with the frontiers of the philosophical future.

### The Link Between Meditation and Phenomenology

Peter Baekelmans (KU Leuven, Belgium)

One of the great teachings within Buddhist philosophy is the Method of Stopping and Seeing as described in the Tendai Buddhist scripture *Shoshikan*. When we analyze this Eastern philosophical method behind the process of meditation, and compare it to the Western phenomenological method as developed by Husserl, we find a surprising similarity. If we further deepen this three- and five-fold method we can systemize many philosophical and theological systems that are in search for the truth about an object, a phenomenon, rituals, Buddha or God. Kyoto philosophy becomes also more comprehensible through this comparison.

## Panel 4: *Philosophy of Nature*

### Le statut du végétal dans Fûdo de Watsuji

Quentin Hiernaux  
(Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

Après avoir introduit les concepts de base de Fûdo, nous proposons une interprétation du texte problématisée autour du statut de la végétation. Il s'agira de montrer pourquoi et comment la place que tient la végétation joue un rôle médiateur fondamental en tant que principe mésologique de première importance, y compris et surtout ici pour la vie humaine décrite par Watsuji. Ce faisant l'objectif est double. D'une part montrer la cohérence de la visée mésologique initiale de l'auteur en donnant un fondement théorique à ses exemples végétaux. D'autre part, se recentrer sur le rôle mésologique de la végétation permet de relativiser la place du climat et donc du déterminisme environnemental souvent surévalués dans beaucoup des traductions et commentaires de Fûdo.

### The Human Being's Lapse from Nature: A Few Considerations on Andō Shōeki's Concept of *bito*

Roman Paşca  
(Kanda University of International Studies, Japan)

Andō Shōeki 安藤昌益 (1703–1762) is undoubtedly one of the most puzzling names in the intellectual landscape of Tokugawa Japan. Very little is known about his life, and most of his texts remained completely unknown until the Meiji period, when they were (re)discovered by chance by Kanō Kōkichi 狩野亨吉. Spending his final years as a physician in the remote fief of Hachinohe in northern Japan, Shōeki only started writing after witnessing and experiencing firsthand the

harsh life of the farmers in the countryside, deprived of the fruit of their labor by the severe climate and burdened by the taxes imposed by the shogunate. He never saw himself as a “thinker” or “philosopher,” and was never part of any of the major schools or currents of thought; as a matter of fact, he criticized them all, from Confucianism to Daoism, and from Buddhism to Shintoism, exposing them as mere “fabrications” devised in order to create the means to regulate and control human society and a narrative of authority, thus isolating it from the realm of Nature.

He was also an extremely frank and sometimes abrupt social critic, repeatedly voicing his discontent with the shogunate and the general state of things in Tokugawa Japan. He was particularly dissatisfied with the destitution of the farmers and with the hierarchical class system, and he put forth an image of the world in which all creatures and things—from humans to animals to plants—are equal, bound together by a constant flow of energies governed by principles and notions such as reciprocity and respect of *chokkō* 直耕 (“straight cultivation”), i.e. observance of the “True Way of Nature.” Thus, in *Shizen shin’eidō* 自然真営道 (“The True Way of Functioning of Nature”), his major work, he described a vision of the universe in which Nature (*shizen* 自然) is an entity sufficient in itself, complete in its isness, all-encompassing and inclusive, in which no hierarchies of any kind whatsoever can exist. For Shōeki, *shizen no yo* 自然の世 (“the World of Nature”) is the unspoiled, primordial realm where all manifestations of life coexist in a pristine, quintessential state. Opposed to this realm is the *shihōsei* 私法世 (“the World of the Private Law”), which represents human society, warped by an antagonism with the “True Way” because of the existence of self-serving, man-made laws.

In my presentation, I will discuss Shōeki’s understanding of the concept of *hito* (the human being) as it appears in the fragments from *Shizen shin’eidō* where he discusses the “World of

the Private Law.”

## The Concepts of *Mono* and *Koto* in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsurō

Yu Inutsuka (The University of Tokyo, Japan)

In the past decades, several Japanese philosophers have addressed the Japanese concepts of *mono* and *koto*. Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) was the first to focus on these notions before Hiromatsu Wataru (1933–1994) and Kimura Bin (1931–) (Kimura 1982). However, it is not well known that Watsuji more precisely came to distinguish these concepts on the basis of his thinking in a foreign language because of his works in German. Further, in recent works on Watsuji’s philosophy, the concepts of *koto* and *mono* have not been mainly focused on (apart from some studies such as Miyagawa 2008). Nevertheless, understanding these notions, including their basis, is important for comprehending the development of Watsuji’s philosophy and positioning his theory of *fūdo* (climate) and ethics within this development. Considering these situations, this paper aims to examine the generation of Watsuji’s analysis of *mono* and *koto* and shows the development of Watsuji’s thought within and among these concepts.

Before his studies in Germany from 1927 to 1928, Watsuji conducted a research on Buddhist philosophy. During that time, Watsuji began to use the concepts of *mono* and *koto* in a distinctive way and to consider the fundamentality of *koto* for all ephemeral existence. In his lecture notes, we can note that Watsuji acquired his idea from the work of a German Orientalist, Wilhelm Geiger. The distinction between the two concepts of *mono* and *koto* became more evident in the revised edition of Watsuji’s work, *The Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism*. Watsuji’s reference to Heidegger’s philoso-

phy after studying in Germany was partially also due to the notions of *mono* and *koto*. Watsuji reinterpreted Heidegger's discussion of *daß* using Geiger's ideas. Watsuji also attained new interpretations of *mono* and *koto*, under the influence of Heidegger, in two ways. First, taking Heidegger's idea of *Dasein*, Watsuji began to distinguish *mono* as a human being from *mono* as a non-human and to consider the former as the basis of *koto*. Watsuji further proposed the sociality of *mono*. Secondly, Watsuji adopted from Heidegger the idea of self-understanding of *Dasein* in the interaction with *mono*, which is later reinterpreted in Watsuji's theory as *fūdo*. Under the influence of Heidegger, these two aspects, the particularity of *Dasein* and its self-understanding, led to Watsuji's finding of the particularity and fundamentality of interactions between people. Watsuji finally proposes his ethics as comprehending *koto no wake* in order to understand human existence, which possesses a duality of the individual and the social. Thus, these notions led to a generation of the analysis of *fūdo* and ethics by Watsuji, who thought in a world of multiple languages.

## Panel 5: Ueda Shizuteru

### *Current Themes in the Philosophy of Ueda Shizuteru*

Ralf Müller (University of Hildesheim, Germany)  
Raquel Bouso (University of Pompeu Fabra, Spain)

Ueda Shizuteru, the last living member of the Kyoto school of Japanese Philosophy, has carried on and extended the East-West dialogue initiated by his teachers. Ueda has been central in continuing this tradition while helping to construct the Western image of Japanese philosophy through his engagement with the Zen tradition. This panel reflects upon this inter-cultural aspect of Ueda's philosophy, and also touches

upon other themes developed in his writings, including language, experience, and his methodology. Young and established scholars will contribute to this unique introduction to and reception of Ueda's philosophy.

### Ueda on Philosophical Reflection

Yuko Ishihara

(University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

The problem of reflection, and specifically philosophical reflection, has a peculiar place in Nishida's philosophy. On the one hand, to the extent that he does not thematize philosophical reflection (*tetsugakuteki hansei*) as such in his writings, it seems that it was not so much a "problem" for Nishida. On the other hand, if *jikaku* can be understood as a special form of reflection, then the problem of reflection belongs to the very core of his philosophy. Indeed, after his publication of *Zen no kenkyu* (*An Inquiry into the Good*), Nishida was very keen to clarify the method of philosophy and, on many occasions, he speaks of the "standpoint of philosophy" (*tetsugaku no tachiba*). For him, this means clarifying the philosophical method in contradistinction to the other disciplines' methods and standpoints. Accordingly, Nishida does discuss philosophical reflection throughout his writings, albeit indirectly.

It is important to articulate the specific nature of philosophical reflection in Nishida's philosophy in order to properly understand his position. This becomes even more urgent due to "religious" or "mystical" elements of his philosophy that make it susceptible to some misunderstandings. Such a "misunderstanding" dates back to his time. Upon the publication of Nishida's seminal essay, "Basho" (1926), Sōda Kiichirō criticized Nishida for stepping beyond the bounds of theoretical reason by seeking the grounds of knowledge in that which is beyond reason and thereby falling into a pre-critical dogmatic



metaphysical position. In “A Reply to Dr. Sōda,” Nishida attempts to rebut Sōda’s criticisms by showing that his position is a critical position rather than a pre-critical dogmatic metaphysical position insofar as it arises from internally criticizing and developing Kant’s critical philosophy. But if this is the case, can we then say that Nishida’s philosophical reflection is a kind of a critical or transcendental reflection? Put differently, is it comparable to Kant’s transcendental reflection that seeks to clarify the conditions of possibility for our experience of objects?

In this presentation, I attempt to show how the answer to the above question is affirmative. In doing so, I employ Ueda Shizuteru’s distinction between two kinds of reflection: “small turn reflection” (*komawari no hansei*) and “big turn reflection” (*ōmawari no hansei*). According to Ueda, while the former kind of reflection is prevalent in the Western philosophical tradition, Nishida’s philosophical reflection belongs to the latter. Although Nishida himself does not make this distinction, it is nonetheless helpful in articulating the sense in which his philosophical reflection differs from more typical forms of reflection found in the Western tradition, whilst still remaining a kind of a critical or transcendental reflection. By showing how this is the case, I hope to clarify that Nishida’s position is a radically critical rather than a pre-critical dogmatic metaphysical position.

## Panel 6: *Aesthetics I*

*Sabi, fūga* and Irony:  
the Aesthetic Inquiry of Ōnishi Yoshinori

Lorenzo Marinucci  
(University of Rome, Tor Vergata, Italy)

Ōnishi Yoshinori (1888–1859) has been a major figure in the field of aesthetics in Japan, although his work is almost untranslated and addressed by few Western studies (Marra 2001). Ōnishi's most particular contribution to this field lies in his refection about specifically Japanese aesthetic categories such as *Yūgen*, *aware*, and *fūga*. His work however does not stress the uniqueness of the Asian Japanese consciousness: these concepts are observed in their general validity, and as necessary addition to Western discourse on beauty. While this universalism too exposes itself to possible criticism, it shapes an attempt of intellectual unity that directly contrasts with the other contemporary forms of alleged “Japanese exceptionalism.” Ōnishi's Aesthetics is conceived as a field were opposite moments are gathered in a particular unity, first internally (in the complementary relationship of feeling and intellectual reflection) and ultimately in intercultural terms.

This presentation will examine Ōnishi's treatment of *sabi* (“rust,” “loneliness”) and *fūga* (“wind-grace”), in particular as it is presented in the essay *Fūgaron: sabi no kenkyū* 風雅論—寂の研究 (1939). How does the apparently negative experience of solitude and the progressive withering of things assume a positive aesthetic connotation, and how is the category of *sabi* connected by Bashō's school to the wider Asian notion of “wind-grace” (風雅)? In dealing with *sabi* within *haikai*, that is “comic poetry,” Ōnishi also consider it as a counterpart to Western irony. The apparent contrast between these two notions is resolved in the realization of their common insight into the “fragile” (O. Becker) character of manifestation, that is first grasped aesthetically, and acquires an existential and metaphysical relevance within this field. Both laugh and sadness are aesthetical realizations of this empty (that is, relational) quality of reality, and thus the Asian notions of “wind beauty” (風流・風雅) cover these two extremes as a contradictory unity.

Hardly an isolated attempt to consider the premodern tradition of Japanese aesthetics in philosophical terms, Ōnishi's

analysis of *sabi* and *fūga* can be fruitfully compared with those of Kuki, Watsuji, Okazaki and others: what appears in such a comparison, and makes Ōnishi's effort particularly relevant in a European perspective, is his willingness to consider together Western and Eastern ideas—a fruitful approach, given the increasing challenge of thinking particularity in a culturally globalized world.

Kuki Shūzō's Philosophy of Literature:  
Rhyming Difference

Diogo César Porto da Silva  
(Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil)

The goal of this paper is to look at the Japanese philosopher Kuki Shūzō's philosophy of literature through the lens of the concept of difference that we find in his work on contingency. In *The Problem of Contingency* (偶然性の問題) of 1935, we face a complex relation between the concepts of necessity and contingency that results in a even more entangled concept of “the necessity-contingent one” (必然—偶然者). Since, Kuki identifies necessity with identity and contingency as the opposite of necessity, we make an attempt to interpret the movement of contingency as one that breaks open the identity of necessity establishing difference. As the concept of “the necessity-contingent one” shows us, this difference is not one that opposes the identity represented by the necessity by erasing it, rather it is the kind of difference that makes unable identity to delimit itself in a pure, clear sameness with itself as a tautology that would say  $A = A$ . In this sense, difference through the movement of contingency brings about complexity to the relationships, somehow akin inside Kuki's thought, necessity-contingency, essence-existence and being-nothingness. It is meaningful that the problematization of those same relationships plays an important role in Kuki's lecture “An Introduc-

tion to the Literary Art” 「文藝概論」—delivered in 1933 and now present in Kuki Shūzō’s *Complete Works* volume 11— because, as he argues, it is the encounter with art, but specially with poetry, that makes us realize the existential deepness of contingency and, therefore, difference. Furthermore, as he claims in another essay “Rhyme in Japanese Poetry” 「日本詩の押韻」, it is the fortuitous encounter (邂逅) between sound and sound of words without any previous necessary connection (as for instance the necessary connection between two synonymous words) that we find in rhyming poetry a philosophical beauty. This philosophical beauty, I would like to claim, is one that drives philosophizing out from the search for necessity and identity to the creative thinking of contingency and difference. I would like to go even further in this interpretation by claiming that this creative thinking—like I name it—is a way of philosophizing adopted by Kuki himself in his works. That is the reason why it is so hard to categorize Kuki’s philosophy in a pure, delimited fashion: Kuki is not neither a philosopher nor a poet, he is not neither an European thinker nor a Japanese one, he is not neither defending the traditional Japanese poetic forms nor defending a complete renovation of Japanese poetry through the influence of the West. Kuki’s thought follows the path of difference that no pure category could ever encompass. I believe that we can transform our own way of philosophizing by following Kuki’s philosophy of difference.

Panel 7: *Japanese Aesthetics: Zeami*

Zeami’s Theory of *Yūgen*:  
A Way to Explain *hana* in *Fushikaden*

Ayano Nishi (Osaka University, Japan)

Zeami was a performer of *Sarugaku* (comical mimicry and speech performance) who was popular in the early time of Muromachi period. He was a son of Kan-ami, a popular performer in Yuzaki-troupe, which was one of Four Troupes of Yamato-Sarugaku, and Zeami himself was a talented performer. He was also gifted in writing Noh plays and is said to have written more than 200 works of Noh. Not a few works of his are still being played today.

Zeami enjoyed the patronage of Shogun Yoshimitsu Ashikaga, the third Shogun of Muromachi period, and he succeeded in enriching the art value of Noh through associating with the noble culture. However, he was not treated well by Shoguns after Yoshimitsu and his promising son, Motomasa, died young. Also in his late life, Zeami was deported to Sado.

During such a eventful life, Zeami wrote many *Densho* (book of secret techniques of Japanese arts or martial arts) based on the teaching of his father Kan-ami and his culture fostered with aristocrats. 21 kinds of *Densho* were found by now, and one of the early works was *Fushikaden* (The Flowering Spirit). The book explains his theories on the performing art acquired by himself, such as the practice method and the understanding of Noh, the theories on acting and directing, etc. *Fushikaden* is said to be the first and oldest theory of drama in Japan, and this book contains key concepts of Zeami's theories.

Among those theories, the theory of *hana* (flower) has been focused most. The word *hana* is used to explain amusement, curiousness and ideals that appear in different stages of actor's life: for example *jibun-no-hana* (the temporary beautiful flower in a young age) and *makoto-no-hana* (the real flower obtained by one's training and ingenuity in the process of aging).

Today, however, the most famous word of Zeami is *Yūgen*, which means "the subtle and profound" or "immeasurably profound beauty." In today's Noh plays, being *Yūgen* is considered the best and superb performance. But in *Fushikaden*, *Yū-*

*gen* is not the supreme ideal. The book says what is important in Noh is reaching *makoto-no-hana*, and the concept of *Yūgen* is discussed within the theory of *hana*. This presentation is to reconsider the meaning of *Yūgen* in *Fushikaden* and discuss it in its relation to *hana*.

Reflections of Ambiguous Realities:  
A Comparative Analysis of Mimesis and *Monomane*  
in the Writings of Aristotle and Zeami.

David Cseh  
(Eötvös Lóránd University, Hungary)

In my paper I will pursue a comparative study of the Ancient Greek term mimesis (or *mīmēsis*) and the Japanese idea of *monomane* (物真似) in their theatrical context and use by Aristotle and Zeami in their writings. By comparing the Western idea of mimesis to the Japanese idea of *monomane*, I hope to gain a better understanding of the vague Japanese distinction between reality and unreality, which is needed if we wish to understand the stylistic devices of *Nō* theatre, along with its ambivalent view of reality. I will first compare the basic metaphysical backgrounds of the ancient Greek and the classical Japanese *Nō* theatres, and then point out their differences based on Aristotle's *Poetics* and Zeami's *Sandō*, *Kakyō* and *Fūshikaden*. Though both Aristotle and Zeami wrote important texts pertaining to their respective theatres, the former was a theoretician and philosopher, while the latter was a practitioner of theatre who also had a firm philosophical grasp of his art. I will strive to take this difference into account during my analysis of their texts. I believe that through such an analysis a detailed comparison of mimesis and *monomane* would shed light on the aspects of traditional Japanese theatre aesthetics which Western philosophy and theatre studies find difficult to define.

Zeami and his Zen Philosophy:  
A Travelling Monk's Experience of Enlightenment in  
His Dream

Yayoi Sekiya (Osaka University, Japan)

Noh is a Japanese traditional theatre style which was perfected by Kan'ami (1333–1384) and his son Zeami (1363–1443) in the Muromachi period (1336–1573). The issue of the extent of Zen philosophy's influence on Zeami has long been discussed by scholars, confirming that numerous Zen words and ideologies were incorporated into his theoretical treatises such as *Fushi-kadden* and *Kakyo*, as well as into his works. The reason behind these connections between Zeami and Zen is thought to be his close relationship with Zen abbots, whom he seems to have known via people around him. These people included Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, the third shogun of the Muromachi dynasty and the playwright's foremost patron. Yoshimitsu's successor, Yoshimochi, is also said to have much to do with Zeami's growing interest in Zen because he was a very devout believer in it. Furthermore, it has been revealed that Zeami went to practice Zen meditation under Giyō Hōshū (1361–1424) of the Tofuku-ji Temple in Kyoto and under Chikusō Chigon (?–1423) of the Fugan-ji Temple in Nara.

Although studies have been conducted on the influence of Zen philosophy on Zeami as mentioned above, one aspect seems to have been lacking in them; that is, how the process of “enlightenment” in Zen is also presented in his works, especially in those which take the form of the so-called *mugen noh* (dream noh).

In a *mugen noh* play, which typically consists of two acts, a traveller visits a historical site and encounters a ghost or a spirit, who initially appears in ordinary human form. After the spirit speaks of past events which took place at that location, s/he fades away and reappears again in his/her true form in

the traveller's dream. The traveller is often a travelling monk, who is the supporting character called *waki*, while the enigmatic person whom he meets on his way is an obsessed spirit seeking to gain enlightenment, i.e., the main character called *shite*. The label *mugen noh* was given after the plot developed in this dream seen by *waki*.

As it is said that the central focus of *noh* plays is the performance of *shite*, *waki* tends to take the role of the listener throughout the play, simply sitting near the pillar at stage's right front. However, considering Zeami's devotion to Zen, we can reasonably conclude that the emphasis is rather on *waki's* experience in his dream, not on *shite's* performance because his experience represents the very process that a Zen practitioner undergoes when seeking to reach enlightenment through meditation practice.

A person who has achieved enlightenment is often expressed as "awakened one" in Buddhism. The opposite of an enlightened person is, therefore, "one who dreams," and *waki*, the travelling monk, can have a dream as he is still a practitioner without enlightenment. As the Zen's motto "No reliance on words" suggests, we can see the uniqueness of Zen philosophy in its emphasis on the physical method of meditation training, not appealing to intellection or theorization. Zen practitioners can gain the truth only by experiencing directly a part of their forefathers' enlightenment process. The present paper is going to examine the extent of Zen philosophy's influence on Zeami, focusing on *waki's* experience of enlightenment in his dream.

#### **Panel 8:** *Descartes in Japan with the Groupe belge de philosophie cartésienne*

Le Groupe participera sous la forme d'une continuité avec le colloque «Fortune de la philosophie cartésienne au Japon»



organisé à l'ULB par le GBFEC (2014) et dont la publication des Actes chez l'Éditeur Classiques Garnier est prévue en 2017. Ainsi, notre participation à la Seconde conférence annuelle du réseau européen de philosophie japonaise (ENO-JP) est pour le GBFEC, l'occasion de présenter les récentes recherches de nos membres concernant la réception de la philosophie cartésienne au Japon, mais aussi, et de manière générale, de présenter les recherches de nos membres portant sur des problématiques du 17<sup>ème</sup> siècle. À l'occasion de cette manifestation, Yoshinori Tsuzaki présentera une conférence intitulée « Taïken, kéïken et exercice selon Arimasa Mori, lecteur de Descartes. » Tanigawa Takako abordera la réception de la philosophie cartésienne par le biais de sa conférence « Descartes and the Japanese subjectivity. » Derenne Jaime présentera un aspect de la philosophie pratique de Leibniz : « La science de la félicité. »

### Descartes and the Japanese Subjectivity

Takako Tanigawa (Tsukuba University, Japan)

Nishida criticizes Descartes. First, by seeking the direct and immediate knowledge, he takes as its starting point the fact of direct experience: "When Descartes says 'I think therefore I am,' this 'I' is not the fact of immediate knowledge, but a reasoned knowledge." And regarding the cogito of Descartes, Nishida remarks the limits: the "inferential formulation of *cogito* by *ergo* (copula), is the abyss of direct evidence of self-awareness." Cartesian logic is to form the "subject": Descartes sought in the *cogito* as grammatical subject, following the Aristotelian logic of the subject. It is to deviate from the concrete, actual situation, to be placed in a logical and abstract universe.

Watsuji also tries to clarify the "mistake" and "abstraction" of the modern western world, mentioning, "ego isolated as

the starting point of modern philosophy.” This starting point refers to the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes. If Descartes sought the foundations of knowledge and the certain, it was in the questioning of scientific circles with “scholars-ningen.” Watsuji claims that knowledge and interrogation are in the middle (“milieu”) of scholars-ningen. These are the activities of *nin-gen*, and it takes shape in relationships. The knowledge is in *aidagara* (between) research. Before the ego becomes certain, the *aidagara* scholars who question must be certain.

In the Japanese language, the personal pronoun has a function, totally different from that of European languages. While I, Ich, Je suffice to designate the first singular person in invariable manner, the Japanese “I” varies by social relation, context, circumstances and other parameters.

To translate “think,” we use generally, *omo-u*, which not only refers to the act of reflective thinking. Besides the thoughts, it includes various emotional states of mind, heart conditions, image of the past. In this way Japanese tradition has a different manner of subjectivity. Motoori Norinaga investigated the origin of Japanese thought, going back to literary texts from antiquity. This investigation is applicable to the literature of the Heian period, especially at Genji Monogatari. The notion of “penetration (sentiments) of things” (*mono no aware*) already governs its aesthetics. Norinaga defined this concept in philosophical terms, the notion that comes from the harmony between emotion and things. The *mono no aware* constitutes the essence of the Japanese mind. These are the feelings, emotions, and even atmospheres that arise in us in contact with things and facts. *Mono*, which usually means “thing” or “object” in Japanese, refers here a much broader scope and ambiguous, thus encompassing the emotions and feelings. All these feeds in the subjective.

*Taïken, kēiken* et exercice selon Arimasa Mori,  
lecteur de Descartes

Yoshinori Tsuzaki (Tsukuba University, Japan)

Toute la réflexion philosophique d'Arimasa Mori (1911-1976), lecteur attentif de Descartes, consiste, nous semble-t-il, à éclaircir ce qu'est l'« expérience (*kēiken*) ». Distinguée d'un simple « vécu (*taïken*) » par un « Moi » en tant qu'individu, l'« expérience » se définit comme « ce qui rend transparent vis-à-vis de soi ce qui existe déjà », et ce notamment dans l'un de ses ouvrages les plus académiquement encadrés : *Kēiken to shisō* (*Expérience et Pensée* (1970-1972)), traduit par les soins de Laurent Rauber en français en 2014. Notre communication se propose d'aborder la question de savoir si la conceptualisation morienne d'« expérience » comme « autocritique » de soi ou comme « approfondissement de cette transparence » pour soi pourrait se caractériser au reflet de la problématique cartésienne de l'« exercice » qu'on se donne pour soi-même.

Dans une tradition qu'on peut rapporter aux « *exercitia spiritualia* » de la philosophie antique, Descartes s'intéresse en effet à la formation de l'esprit, en particulier dans ses *Méditations métaphysiques* (1642) : l'accès à la vérité n'est possible qu'à la condition d'accomplir un exercice correcteur et formateur des facultés épistémiques. Cette action critique sur soi aboutit à une transformation de l'esprit dont la visée est triple : grâce à la distinction de l'âme et du corps, la vérité offre à l'esprit la connaissance de soi plus claire ; avec l'accès à la connaissance de Dieu, elle peut provoquer l'extase ; l'accès à la vérité produit le contentement et la tranquillité dans l'âme, marque de la sagesse.

Cette transformation de l'esprit – qui n'est réalisable qu'à travers la voie méditative – correspondrait-elle, et dans quelle mesure, à l'« expérience » conçue par Mori pour qui « ce qui y est approfondi dans la mesure du possible, c'est la sagesse » ?

## La « science de la félicité » chez Leibniz

Jaime Derenne (Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

Il y a bien des façons d'envisager les transformations que la construction leibnizienne de la raison fait subir à la raison elle-même. Étant donné que « connaître la pensée d'un philosophe ne consiste pas à totaliser ses connaissances », et cela vaut surtout pour Leibniz, ma recherche fait le choix d'interroger un pan de cette construction qui se justifie par la nécessité de rendre compte d'un des aspects fondamentaux de sa philosophie : la félicité. Cet aspect est fondamental non seulement parce que la félicité est l'horizon idéal de la connaissance de Dieu et des sciences ; non seulement parce que la félicité apparaît comme la notion constitutive du devoir et comme l'horizon par lequel se régule le rapport entre les hommes ainsi que le rapport à Dieu ; mais surtout parce que Leibniz tente de concilier sagesse, comprise comme étant la connaissance de la beauté divine accessible par la connaissance de la création, et félicité, entendue comme un état de satisfaction/plaisir marqué aussi bien par cette connaissance que par l'objet de celle-ci.

Si la notion de félicité est ainsi essentielle pour la compréhension générale de la philosophie de Leibniz, la présente étude se propose d'interroger le domaine dans lequel cette science surgit et se fonde. Grua rapporte que la définition de la félicité en tant que science est déjà adoptée dès 1670-1671 où, en effet, Leibniz écrit que la « *Sapientia est scientia felicitatis*. » C'est donc dans le domaine du droit que la notion de félicité fait son apparition. Ceci parce qu'en interrogeant le rapport de l'homme dans la société ainsi que son rapport à Dieu, la notion de justice se développe. Elle consiste à considérer que chacun occupe dans la société une place la plus convenable à l'utilité commune. Comprise comme « vertu sublime », la justice fait également l'objet d'une science : la Jurisprudence,

elle-même définie comme «science du juste.» C'est la notion de justice qui se trouve à la source de la question de la félicité, et celle-ci couronne la science du juste en lui indiquant son usage. Naert souligne à propos de la justice et de sa place privilégiée dans la philosophie pratique de Leibniz, qu' «elle englobe en elle toutes les vertus. Elle est la vertu par excellence car plus on est juste, plus on prend plaisir au bien commun.» Une analyse de la félicité doit donc prendre en considération la question de la justice, puisque c'est en fin de compte sur elle qu'elle se fonde. L'acte juste mène à la félicité. La félicité doit donc être médiée par l'amour que peut exprimer l'homme de raison, c'est-à-dire par la justice définie dès 1678 comme une charité dirigée par le raison. Nous interrogerons donc dans un premier temps la question de la justice entendue comme «charité du sage» et nous verrons comment cette notion conduit, en tant que réquisit fondamental, à la compréhension de la félicité.

### **Panel 9: *Medieval Philosophy***

Shinran and Thomas Aquinas:  
Comparative Study of Philosophy of Religions  
in the 13th Century

Yoko Ito (University of Bonn, Germany)

What is the difference between Japanese Buddhism and Christianity? This question is helpful to clarify the history of Japanese Philosophy since the Meiji era, in which Japanese thinkers encountered with European Philosophy. Many of the leading thinkers of the day, e.g., Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime 田辺元 (1885–1962), Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945), wrestled with European Philosophy which is

composed of mainly Greek Philosophy and Christianity, with the help of the doctrine of *Jōdo-Shinshū* 浄土真宗 as one of the fundamental and traditional Japanese thoughts.

In this presentation, I will deal with Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1263) who is the patriarch of *Jōdo-Shinshū* and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who is the representative in Scholastic, and compare ontologically their views of human beings.

*Jōdo*-Buddhism 浄土教 accomplished by Shinran and Christianity show a variety of similarities in religious framework. Both are “religion of salvation” which aims to redeem human beings from sin. In the former, *bompu* 凡夫 (ordinary person) tries to reach *Jōdo* and becomes Buddha by invoking the Buddha. Likewise, in the latter, especially in Catholicism, the ultimate aim for human beings is *visio beatifica* on an absolute communication of love with a triune God. Both in these religions, the moment of the faith has radical passivity; in the former, it is given by Amida Buddha to ordinary person and in the latter by God through Holy Spirit to human beings. And furthermore these two religions have a communal characteristic. With the doctrine of *Ōsō-Gensō-Nishu-Ekō* 往相・還相二種回向, *Jōdo*-Buddhism maintains its structure that the Buddha who has already reached *Jōdo* by chanting a prayer to the Buddha comes back to this world to give helping hands toward people who are not saved from the bondage of sin. On the other hand, generally in Christianity, the practices of neighborly Love, which is based on divine Love (*caritas*) that showed Jesus Christ who was crucified for the salvation of human beings, is regarded as an important element.

However, these two religions of salvation never coincide on ontological view of human beings. Their opposite positions become remarkable when Shinran and Thomas try to understand evil or sin in relation to human desires. In short, Shinran recognizes the desires as unfreedom and unavoidable evil, whereas Thomas regards those as human free faculty with a natural inclination to goodness. Therefore because of these

different viewpoints, the way of salvation is not the same either. We will discuss the contrast between the two prominent thinkers by means of interpretations of texts mainly from *Tannishō* 嘆異抄 and *Summa Theologiae*.

Correlative Thinking and Ritual Symbolism in Medieval Japan: Monkan (1278–1357) and his Ritual of the Three Worthies (*Sanzon gōgyōhō*)

Gaetan Rappo (Harvard University, USA)

In medieval Japan, esoteric Buddhism not only provided the main framework for religious practice, but it also gave birth to extremely influential discourses on the relation between monasteries and political power. Monkan, a monk of the Shingon school, was a prime example of this way of thinking. As a close advisor of the emperor Go Daigo, he reached the top of the monastic hierarchy under the sovereigns' patronage, and became a significant figure in the political and religious life of such times. His works, recently rediscovered, are extremely diverse, ranging from scriptural commentary to ritual manuals, including new iconography of several deities.

In this presentation, I aim to examine the correlative thinking, associating gods with doctrinal concepts, or symbols, he uses in his major work, the *Ritual of the Three Worthies*. This practice constitutes a performative embodiment of the principle of non-dualism, at the basis of Shingon doctrine, incarnated by the Science-Kings Aizen and Fudō, through a third element, the *Wish fulfilling Jewel* (or *Nyorin Kannon*). In his texts, Monkan created a complete system, where this structure is associated to deities from the whole medieval pantheon, including Shintō figures such as Amaterasu, and therefore the Emperor himself.

I will show how, in his ritual constructions, Monkan, and other monks of the time, acted as what we may call a “semi-

urge,” a creator of new meanings who manipulates pantheons, symbols, spaces, and images. In doing so, he deployed a way of thinking that, with its detours and sometimes striking shortcuts, runs through the entire mental world, or the imaginary of the Japanese Middle Ages.

### **Panel10: *Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science I***

#### **On Hiromatsu's Theory of the Fourfold Structure**

Katsumori Makoto (Akita University, Japan)

Hiromatsu Wataru (廣松渉1933–1994) characterizes the basic motif of his philosophy as a systematic critique of the “modern world-view” based on substantialist ontology and the epistemological subject/object schema. He strives to replace the modern world-view with a new philosophical orientation marked by “the primacy of relation” and what he calls the intersubjective “fourfold structure” (四肢構造). In this paper, I begin with an outline of Hiromatsu's theory of the fourfold structure as it is largely presented as synchronic structural analysis. I then go on to examine this theory and to show, in particular, how his overall synchronic framework tends to be exceeded by some of his dynamic conceptual motifs.

Hiromatsu's theory of the fourfold structure, developed in his major work *Being and Meaning* (『存在と意味』) and elsewhere, may be summarized as follows: Any phenomenon in the world “appears in itself always already as something more than the mere ‘sensuous’ given.” A phenomenon thus consists of two factors, given and meaning, inseparably linked in such a way that the former appears as the latter (p as [p]). Further, Hiromatsu continues, a phenomenon is every time a phenomenon “for someone,” and this someone is also of twofold character. That is, something appears to someone as someone more



or someone else, or to a specific individual as a general knower (P as [P]). These twofold structures of both knower and known are combined to form a fourfold structure: “A given presents itself as something to someone as Someone.” As Hiromatsu stresses, these four moments of the phenomenon are not independent elements, but “can subsist only as terms of the [fourfold] functional relationship.” This relational character of phenomena has been missed, however, in the substantialist philosophical tradition, and Hiromatsu critically characterizes this tendency as “reification” (物象化)—the hypostatizing misconception of what is in fourfold structural relation.

While largely presented within the synchronic framework, however, Hiromatsu’s theory of the fourfold structure is not conceptually homogeneous, but rather contains some diverse and partly conflicting lines of thought. Specifically, part of his texts suggests the way in which phenomena are displaced in meaning when there arises a meaning common to different phenomenal givens. In Hiromatsu’s account, such a common meaning derives from a “direct equating” of different phenomena, and my analysis shows that this equating cannot be a pure reproduction of the same meaning, but contains a movement that each time displaces the phenomena in meaning. It is also noteworthy that this displacement cannot be unambiguously determined, and may thus be called ‘uncontrollable.’ It is commonly the case, however, that this uncontrollable displacement of meaning tends to be concealed, and this leads to the reifying notion that the series of phenomena shares a purely identical and directly present meaning. In this way, Hiromatsu’s philosophy can be reconfigured in such a way as to open itself up fully to the dynamic dimension of the structuring of phenomena, in which the critique of reification may also be dynamically reconceived.

De l'hypothèse d'une logique  
sans axiome ni règle d'inférence primitive

Piéro Ledent  
(Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgique)

Nous partons de la question suivante : Dans quelle mesure la logique peut-elle s'appliquer au discours apophantique ? D'aucuns pourraient penser, qu'afin d'être à même de répondre à cette question, peut-être bien simple en apparence, il suffirait de se mettre d'abord en quête du système axiomatique qui lui fût conforme. Mais nous montrons que l'on se heurterait alors immanquablement au constat suivant : c'est qu'il n'existe aucun critère proprement logique qui permette, depuis l'intérieur même d'un système axiomatique, de décider quel serait celui qui fût conforme au langage apophantique. Force nous est alors d'en conclure que ce problème, étant inhérent au relativisme logique induit par la méthode axiomatique, est, et restera insoluble tant que l'on ne cherchera pas sa solution en dehors ; et dès lors, que la seule logique qui puisse s'appliquer au langage apophantique, ne peut être qu'une logique sans axiome. Et pour prouver, contre une idée peut-être un peu trop répandue, que la construction d'un tel système, sans aucun axiome, loin d'être impossible, est déjà chose faite, et depuis longtemps, nous passons promptement en revue les systèmes de Prior, Suszko, Popper, Blewitt et Costello, qui tous ont, chacun à leur manière, montré qu'il était possible de les remplacer par des règles d'inférence primitives. L'on a cependant tôt fait de constater que le remplacement des axiomes par des règles d'inférence primitives ne permet point de résoudre notre problème, dans la mesure où ces dernières posent en fait exactement les mêmes difficultés que les axiomes incriminés. D'où l'on en conclut que cette logique, qui ne peut ainsi n'être basée ni sur des axiomes, ni sur des règles d'inférence primitives, ne peut en réalité n'avoir, pour fondement, aucun élément posé

comme vrai (et l'on explique en quoi nous considérons comme tels tant les axiomes que les règles d'inférence primitives). En venant alors à faire l'hypothèse que cette logique pourrait être fondée uniquement sur la base de définitions, nous présentons brièvement le système de Popper, qui fut inspiré par la même idée. Et nous montrons que, loin d'y parvenir, ce dernier ne fit que démontrer qu'une telle entreprise serait vouée à l'échec tant que l'on voudrait ériger un système qui fût purement syntaxique. Ce par quoi nous en concluons qu'une logique, pour être véritablement fondée sur des définitions, se doit aussi d'être fondée sur des bases sémantiques. Nous en venons alors, pour finir, par faire la proposition d'une ébauche de système sans axiome qui serait seulement fondé sur des définitions sémantiques.

### **Panel 11:** *Philosophy and the Problem of Self I*

#### The Limits of Subjectivity: Karatani Kōjin's Concept of Parallax

Javier Santana Ramón  
(Freie Universität Berlin, Germany)

In his book *Transcritique*, Karatani Kōjin introduces the concept of “parallax” in order to describe the dynamics implied in the constitution of subjectivity, and in the very relation between subject and object. The idea of a “parallax,” or an “error of perspective” arising out of the very fact of taking a concrete point of view different from others (as considered traditionally in Optics and most prominently in Photography, but used by Kant himself in his early works) is here understood as an ontological characteristic of any subject. With this concept, Karatani promotes an update of the Kantian conception of the dialectics, in the sense of conceptual delusions arising out

of reason's very nature (such as God, the world, and the self in Kant's famous examples). Kant realized that these delusions cannot possibly be eradicated, but nevertheless they have to be dealt with necessarily if we are to consider ourselves as subjects in the first place: every subject encounters constitutive contradictions or "antinomies": these are conceptual errors which have their origin in a subject's very condition of being limited to sensorial experience. Karatani specifies this idea by pointing out to the fact that antinomies arise not only out of a subject's experience (as opposed to metaphysical knowledge), but out of a subject's very position (as opposed to other subjects): that is, antinomies have their origin in the fact that "every subject" is "a subject" with a concrete quantity and quality of knowledge different from others. He follows Kant when he considers that these contradictions should not be "sublated" or "surpassed" in order to achieve something like "absolute knowledge" (as in Hegel), but rather have to be considered in their negativity, and their impossibility of being reduced to any kind of positive content or position. Karatani consequently considers the effect of parallax as a "limit" to subjectivity, and not as a part of a higher dynamic process (as in Hegel). In this sense, he is offering a conceptuality which is capable of rethinking dialectics in a truly Kantian paradigm.

Karatani offers us with his philosophical actualization of the concept of "parallax" a conceptual instrument which is at the same time intellectually accurate, coherent with humans' limited existence and abilities, and able to articulate an emancipatory project. In this paper, I will discuss Slavoj Žižek's appropriation of this concept in his book "The Parallax View" (which has made Karatani popular in the West) and try to differentiate the various conceptions of the dialectics underlying both Karatani's Kantian idea of a limit as essential to subjectivity, and Žižek's Hegelian-Lacanian notion of the "ontological gap" in the idea of a subject (which is the framework of his reception of Karatani's "parallax"). There is a subtle but cru-

cial difference in the way antinomies are considered by both thinkers which affects their respective overall philosophical and political projects decisively. It ultimately amounts to the way in which they are willing to inscribe human finitude into the idea of subjectivity itself.

### A Destruction of Subject and the Quest for the Self: A Fundamental Difference between Nishida and Watsuji

Isamu Miyahara (Nagoya University, Japan)

*An Inquiry into the Good* (1911), written by Kitaro Nishida is said the first philosophical thought in the modern Japan. It is so “individualistic” as the tendency of almost Japanese intellectuals in the period from the late Meiji to Taisho. We can take it for an attempt of philosophical inquiry into the “deepest” self that might be found in our intrinsic and personal inner field. But the “self” which Nishida had searched for was not so firm, and it doomed to be “destroyed” by being sentenced as “nothingness,” namely “the lack of consistent reality.” It is totally different from Cartesian “ego,” which should be established as “substance” supporting absolute certainty in the Western thought. The destiny of Nishida’s “self” does not suggest that our “self” should be dispersed into the relationships with others, in other words, be scattered among others in our ordinary lives. Rather in the course of our philosophical inquiry into the inner intrinsic field of our own mind, we should reach the deepest dimension in which we could not realize any kind of “selfness” only by the self-reflective recognition, and the selfness in such a deep dimension of our inner field is not so firm and infallible one.

In contrast to Nishida’s “selfness,” Watsuji who thought that the essence of human beings lies in the “between”-relationship [aida(between)-gara(relation, state)] had attempted to build a new “relativistic” ontology of human beings, according to

which the essence of our being has been realized totally in the networks of others-oriented interpersonal relationship, and therefore there is no core of our own individual beings. We can characterize his theory very “relativistic” in the sense of “relationship-oriented,” and in other words “communitarian.” According to his ontology the “Self” in Nishida’s meaning has been vanished from the outset, and it is possible only through the concept of “knot” made of various strings of interpersonal relationship to define the essence of individual entities. So it is totally different from the ontology of Nishida. We can interpret Watsuji’s “anthropological” ontology as an academic expression of the traditional ethos of Japanese people.

In my speech, comparing the contrasting two types of ontology of both philosophers I will search for the reason or origin of the difference between them, and will ask: what is the significance of the philosophical thinking for modern intellectuals in the late Meiji and Taisho period. In the alternative form of expression, I will ask whether philosophy was for Japanese “an attempt to search for an existential self” (in case of Nishida) or “longing for the past and lost community as the basic background for modern individuals” (in case of Watsuji).

In so far I expect that the above mentioned alternative in the ontologies has originated in the two types of way of thinking of Mahayana Buddhism, namely: Madhyamika (all phenomena are only “empty” and lack any independent reality) and Yogacara (which is a kind of “phenomenology,” according to which all that we experience that is only by the cognition of our inner mind). Former is a type of “relationship-oriented” relativistic ontology, latter is a type of philosophical attempt, which has been tried in vain, to search for or quest for the “self” in the deepest layer of our mind.

**Panel 12: *Philosophy Beyond Japan I***

Beyond Japan:  
 Sketching Out a Decolonized Way to  
 Intercultural Philosophy

Lucas dos Reis Martins  
 (University of Hildesheim, Germany)

The globalization is far from being a phenomenon that feeds the cultural diversity, important for the exercise of Intercultural Philosophy. It is closest to be a contemporary word to what that once was called imperialism or colonialism, unmistakable movement that began with the European Expansion in the 15th century and changed the earth's surface. "Colonization of thought" is a label of a set of domination's effects that critical thinkers (Paulo Freire, Frantz Fanon, and others) point out to understand and propose alternatives to this europeanization of the world. Since the first Portuguese landed on Tanegashima in 1542, Japan has developed in peculiar way in contrast to America, Africa or even China. How is this peculiarity reflected in the concept and praxis of Philosophy in Japan? Could the case of Japanese philosophy offer a light to deal with the development of philosophies in Latin America or Africa? With this open research issues in the background, I will sketch out a way to make usefull the concept of "permanent decolonization of thought" take from anthropology (Viveiros de Castro) through the unfolding of Philosophy in Japan to the praxis in the Intercultural Philosophy.

Heidegger Questioning (a) Japanese

Vasil Penchev  
 (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria)

Language is *koto ba*: “the petals of rhapsodic silence,” so the Questioning synthesizes the elucidation of the Japanese about what the Japanese word for “language” means.

That text of Heidegger is unusual among all of his texts. It is the only one in the form of dialog and the only one comparing his thought with the Japanese way of thought. What the dialog addresses is the being of language, where “being” should be heard also as both “creature” and “essence” as in the German word *Wesen*. So, the unusual form and subject should answer to the questioning being of language: the dialog with an otherness, but not any, and a certain otherness, that of Japanese.

If the word of language in Japanese might be thought as “the petals of rhapsodic silence,” the Japanese language tells us the being of language. That was the reason for Heidegger to choose its otherness to think of the being of language just as he chose Hölderlin’s poetry for Hölderlin created in verses (*dichtet*) the being of poetry (*Dichtung*).

The dialog of the Questioning with the Japanese about the being of language (in Japanese) is just right the being of language. This means: the being of language is a dialog with an otherness, but not any, and a certain otherness, that of poetry. Japanese is poetic, here is why it is chosen to reveal and bring out the being of language from hiddenness in *Alethea*. The being of language questions its otherness of poetry, or “rhapsodic silence,” always, and this is the only way for language to be.

One might complement that Japanese and German (as well as English) languages are petals of the “rhapsodic silence” not less than the words in Japanese (or in any other language).

“Rhapsodic silence” is both metaphor and oxymoron for a speech can be naturally rhapsodic. “The petals of rhapsodic silence” is both second metaphor and meta-metaphor thus reflecting and repeating the oxymoron of the former. That is an attempt for language to reply to its asking being revealed in Japanese as *koto ba*. Whether the notions of language as linguistics or the being of language as an open and inexhaustible



questioning says more? European science and even philosophy prefers the concepts. Heidegger preferred Japanese and Japanese philosophy to poeticize language and thus to reveal its being in this text.

The concepts do not need any questions or interpretations to be what they are and mean. Language is a conversation and thus it needs both to exist.

My talk for the conference is intended to discuss also the other three Japanese words in Heidegger's text: *ku*, *iro*, and *iki*.

#### Reference

Heidegger, M. "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache (1953/54). Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden, in: Untreue zu Sprache (Gesamtausgabe, Band 12). Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1985, pp. 80-145 (English translation: "A Dialog on Language," in: On the Way to Language (transl. P. D. Hertz). New York, etc.: Harper & Row, 1-54).

### **Panel 13:** *Aesthetics and Japanese Literature*

A Temple Must Be Destroyed:  
Mishima, Nishitani, and Nothingness

Alex Lin (Princeton University, USA)

The existential and metaphysical crises that Mishima Yukio wrestles with in *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*, aside from animating the plot of what many consider his finest novel, can also contribute powerful and paradoxical philosophical insights to the investigations of nothingness that distinguished such Kyoto School thinkers as Nishitani Keiji. The protagonist Mizoguchi's struggle to overcome alienation and regain a certain unity with the world around him leads him to intense philosophical discussions with his depraved friend Kashiwagi

and an obsessive engagement with the infinitely beautiful and ineffable Golden Temple. Through these, he learns that the basis of the world, and the temple, is chaotic nihility, and then he by his arson poses a question that may not be immediately apparent. Rather than ask, “Why was the temple destroyed?” we must interrogate its hidden mirror-image: “Why was the temple erected?” It is only within the framework of nothingness that these opposite poles of creation and destruction can be located together; in fact, such polarities abound in the novel and populate it within characters and actions, culminating in the complex structure of the temple itself. At once flammable and indestructible, dully existent and shiningly imaginative, contingent and eternal, it provides the very locus at which the individual must confront his times and strive to liberate past and future. Where Mizoguchi is, when in the last line of the novel he settles down for a smoke as one would do after some work, is at the end of a process of understanding; from a negative understanding of the temple as a “structure of nothingness” oppressing and baffling him, he has progressed through a second negation to a positive understanding that allows him to live with it. It is in this final turn that Mishima departs from Nishitani, in that enlightenment is considered less a kind of vision and more a kind of action. From here we may walk a path, albeit a very precipitous one, to a model of individual engagement with history.

Zen Buddhism, Women, and Japan:  
The Life of Hiratsuka Raichō

Christine A. James  
(Valdosta State University, USA)

Hiratsuka Raichō (1886–1971) was a major feminist in Japan during the Meiji era. Her education incorporated both Western literature and Zen Buddhist practice, combined to

shape her perspective and inspired her to produce a new literary magazine, *Seitō*. She is regarded today as a leading figure who argued for women's rights, including suffrage and the right to divorce. The publication of her autobiography in Japanese, and the translation of her autobiography into English in 2006, provide a unique opportunity to understand the role of religious practice in Raichō's life. Raised in a traditional, wealthy family, during her college years Raichō began Zen practice, and credited it with helping her through physical and social difficulties throughout her life. She achieved *ken-shō* (the first stage of enlightenment) at an unusually early age. Michel Mohr (1998) utilizes Raichō's testimony as a way to understand the religious practices, and the primarily male religious leaders, of her time. Depictions of women in traditional Japanese Buddhism, contrasted with Zen, were traditionally negative or limited to specific physical roles and sexually coded duties. But in Zen Buddhism, Raichō claimed to find the way to focus her thinking and empowered her to become a self-aware and active feminist. Raichō's Zen Buddhist practice gave her a way to transcend the specific physical roles and expectations of women in her time. By understanding the historical Buddhist texts that described women, the specific Rinzai masters she studied with during her lifetime, and her current status as a figure that inspired socially engaged activist Buddhism, we can better understand how her Buddhist practice defined her experience as a woman and feminist.

**Panel 14: *Zen, Life, and ki***

Affirmation via Negation:

A Zen Philosophy of Life, Sexuality, and Spirituality

Michiko Yusa

(Western Washington University, USA)

In this essay, I take up D. T. Suzuki, Hiratsuka Raichō, and Nishida Kitarō as “Zen philosophers,” (i.e., thinkers who philosophize based on their practice and understanding of Zen teaching), on the question of life, sexuality, and spirituality, with the view on unfolding a “Zen philosophy of peace” (*philosophia pacis*), to grapple with the pressing issues of the day.

Contrary to the popular image of Zen, which seems to affirm death as, for instance, associated with the medieval samurai way of life, these Zen philosophers squarely promote their philosophy of life as the most fundamental reality. When we come to think about it, the traditional terms such as the “Buddha nature” or “tathāgatagarbha” (*nyōraizō*) actually retain something of the vital force that creates and sustains any life form.

The reason for this seeming discrepancy or incongruity between the image of Zen and the Zen teaching of life derives from at least two grounds: (1) the linguistic level, at which one and the same experience can be described either negatively (as being “ineffable”) or affirmatively (as “the best,” the “fullest,” the “deepest,” the “ultimate,” and so on); (2) the ontological level, in which the reality of “life” consists in growth and decay. What is born grows up, gets old, and perishes. Life individuated is impossible without death; life and death constitute one unified integral reality.

Once this ambiguity is cleared up, it still remains that the mystery of “being” persists over that of “nonbeing.” Life is bigger than death, as it were. But in this case, what is this “life”?

These Zen philosophers recognize that the vital aspect of “life” is sexuality, the procreative reality. Zen approaches this vital question cast in the necessity for the “transformation” of the raw procreative instincts and drives (libido) into compassion. In fact, this physical reality (i.e., human beings exist as the unit of body-mind-spirit) is viewed as the very source of egocentrism and altruism (Raichō); the very source of beauty and joy as well as ugliness and destruction (Suzuki); and the very source of poiesis and praxis (Nishida).

The following outline of my essay will give you some in-depth idea of the direction my reflection is proceeding:

1. Introduction
2. “Life” affirmed via negation
3. Philosophy and “kenshō,” a Zen experience of initial awakening (or its bearing on the types of “philosophy”)
  - (a) Raichō’s case
  - (b) D. T. Suzuki’s case
  - (c) Nishida’s case
4. Zen wakening and sexuality (à la Raichō)
5. Raichō’s philosophy of life
6. D. T. Suzuki on “sexual life” to Nishida
7. D. T. Suzuki on “sexuality and spirituality”
8. Nishida’s philosophy of “Poiesis and Praxis” as a philosophy of life
9. Conclusion: towards a Zen philosophia pacis

### A Phenomenology of Weather and *ki*

Maximilian Gregor Hepach

(Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany)

Phenomenology, which concerns itself with shedding light on our everyday experiences, has been strangely silent on one of the most influential aspects of our everyday lives: weather. If phenomenology asks how we experience, it seems problematic to leave out what—literally—sheds light on our everyday experiences, to leave out that which allows things to appear in broad daylight or to disappear in the mist. Weather thus becomes the condition for the possibility of the appearance of things, second only to space itself. I here draw on Günter Figal’s recent work on the inconspicuousness of space and rooms, which allow us to experience our surroundings in a certain way, without themselves appearing as something. Things rather appear in space and rooms, space and rooms then appear with the things we experience. Space and rooms

thus allow things to appear in certain ways while they themselves remain—mostly—inconspicuous. I hold weather to be inconspicuous in a similar sense. Weather is taken for granted and only becomes conspicuous to us when it interferes with our plans and belies our expectations. Weather is not only a phenomena of light: We also hear, smell and feel the weather. Some aspects of weather even escape our primary senses completely, such as the air pressure. When we try to concentrate on one aspect of weather, we find that we are always already immersed in the weather. When we see, hear, smell and feel the storm approaching, we experience ourselves as inside the storm. Weather, as Tim Ingold states, is thus not so much a mode of perception, but rather a mode of being. This is true in all weather. Although a storm may make our dependency on the weather more apparent, even on an unremarkable sunny or rainy day weather determines our being and what can be experienced. Depending on the weather, we often experience subtle shifts in our mood, our expectations for the day and the plans we make. Said shifts are not only experienced by us, but by all who are immersed in the same weather as we are. In the weather we then experience our interrelationships with our surroundings and the people which inhabit them. This aspect of weather allows us to metaphorically speak of an office, a cultural or political climate, in which we also experience our interrelatedness while that in which we are interlaced remains implicit.

I believe that the concept of *ki* in Japanese philosophy resembles some of what I have tried to describe here. In his recent book, Yuho Hisayama tries to make *ki* accessible to a “Western audience” not by providing a translation of the term, which seems impossible, but by attempting a phenomenology of *ki*. Since we can relate to certain experiences of *ki*, we can “piece together” different dimensions of what *ki* is. In comparing both the phenomenology of weather and *ki*, I hope to shed light on both experiences reciprocally.

**Panel 15: *Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science II***

What Kind of Generation/Evolution of Freedom Can We  
Find in the Works of Ōmori Shōzō?

Pierre Bonneels  
(Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

Given that Ōmori Shōzō's work is already widely known by philosophers in Japan and is starting to get some attention in Europe, it might be the right time to address his writings thematically. I will be talking about liberty or, perhaps, freedom. In and of itself this term has two strong occurrences in his oeuvre. The first is in a debate concerning determinism which we can find in the end of the early phase of his works. The second can be found at the end of the next period of his work within his New new theory of vision, which is an approach that tries to revisit the ideas of George Berkeley (and this is the reason why he calls it a "New new theory"). What does the recognized philosopher of science come to address the question of freedom? Where does this question come from? How does his research on reality and consciousness progress, by using one of his favorite conceptual tools, *kasane-egaki* 重ね描き? Why is freedom no longer studied after this specific transitional period between the early and the later Ōmori? Did the investigation lose its relevance thanks to his later philosophical explorations or was the conclusion he reached warranted no return to the same problem of freedom during his third and last period of his writings? This is what I will try to answer through presenting the basic outline of the original thinker, whose universality probably reaches beyond the geographical limits of Europe and Japan.

Yukawa's Philosophy of Science:  
The Early Eastern Demise of Positivism

Fabio Ceravolo (University of Leeds, UK)

In 1937, physicist Shin'ichiro Tomonaga visited Heisenberg in Leipzig. He was recommended not to further spend his time with his friend Hideki Yukawa's recently developed meson theory, on the grounds that "it would be good... to treat something having a concrete basis and... its foundation does not seem to be very clear" (Kim 2007: 82). Yukawa found no better luck in Japan. As Yoichiro Nambu (1985: 2–3) recalls, those were times when young Japanese physicists were recommended, dismissively, not to concern themselves with a subject that is only "for geniuses."

But what exactly is Yukawa's "non-concreteness" in the eyes of his contemporaries? Based on how the development of Yukawa's work is retraced by Nambu and in Yukawa's autobiography, I claim that Yukawa should be seen as anticipating a non-Positivist understanding of theory-building. Indeed, only within an academic environment unscathed by European Neo-Positivism, could the meson theory find its fertile terrain.

A prominent post-positivistic instrument in Yukawa's work is the appeal to analogies, which replaces the Positivist requirement that sentences with observable content be derived exclusively by the rules of a logical system. Because the meson theory makes use of the same predicates as past theories such as electromagnetism and Newtonian dynamics—"force," "field"—those predicates will apply to entities similar to those in the extension of the classical predicates. The only known non-electrostatic property proportional to force was gravitational mass. Hence, because the proton/neutron interaction is not electrostatic, it must be proportional to the mass of the interacting particles—not to some previously unknown property. Second, because every previously known classical field



determines the dynamics of point-particles at the spacetime points where the field is defined, there will be a particle with the predicted dynamics at all such points, viz., there will be particles in addition to the interacting protons and neutrons—particles nowadays known as force-mediator.

Generally, analogical theory-building that can be pursued until the having of an old property by some entities in the extension of the new predicates is incompatible with experimental data. Neither of the above analogical conclusions is in contrast with observations. However, observations prevent two further conclusions, which indeed Yukawa does not take: that proton/neutron force is ordinary gravity and that the mediating particle is an electron-neutrino pair, as proposed by Enrico Fermi. When analogical inference is so constrained, there is space for expanding analogies: the proton/neutron force is neither gravity nor electrostatic force, so it must be a new force. The mediating particle is neither an electron, nor a neutrino, nor a combination of the two—hence it must be a new particle. This aspect of expansion must be that which most shocked Yukawa's contemporaries and produced the impression that he was taking buntly creative guesses (Nambu 1985: 40). Yet, if there is any value in illuminating his (largely unconscious) philosophical stance, it is to dismiss all the accusations of ungrounded creativeness. Yukawa's conclusions were natural and well-motivated, insofar as one understands them along with the Positivist downfall and an associated theory of analogical inference.

#### References:

- Kim, D. (2007), *Yoshio Nishina: Father of Modern Physics in Japan*; Taylor-Francis. Nambu, Y. (1985), *Quarks: Frontiers in Elementary Particle Physics*; World Scientific. Yukawa, H. (1982), *Tabibito: The Traveler*; World Scientific.

## Panel 16: *Philosophy and the Problem of Self II*

Watsuji Tetsurō's *Honraisei* and Nishitani's *Śūnyatā*  
as "Buddhist Authenticity"

Kyle Shuttleworth  
(Queen's University of Belfast, UK)

Various commentators (Sakai, Liederbach, Hall, and myself) have analysed the supposed concept of authenticity inherent within the thought of Watsuji Tetsurō. The general consensus is that Watsuji does indeed advocate an ethic of authenticity. In this enquiry it will be illustrated that many of the ideals which Watsuji puts forth form a parallel with those inherent within Nishitani Keiji's thought. Although no such term is employed by Nishitani to designate a concept of authenticity, it will be argued, based on the criteria for Watsuji's concept, that Nishitani does indeed espouse such a concept. The primary question which propels this enquiry is therefore whether there is a concept of authenticity present within the thought of Nishitani. Having demonstrated that there is, it will then be claimed that these accounts not only constitute, but ought to be categorised as forms of Buddhist authenticity. The importance of attributing a concept of authenticity to Japanese intellectual thought is not simply for categorical purposes. Rather, the desirability of such is to increase philosophical interaction between East and West.

Rethinking Kāta as a Technology of the Self:  
Japanese and Continental perspectives

Jordanco Sekulovski (Kobe University, Japan)

This presentation investigates alternative histories of systems of thought to that of the West. If we take a closer look at Ja-

pan's long philosophical tradition we can ascertain a unique history of thought based on the use of *kâta* or *shikâta* (型 or 形). This presentation explores the function of *kâta* as a generic technic of self-perfection and transformation of individuals in Japan. It defines the Japanese system of thought as an alternative system of thought to that of the West. Japan's long philosophical tradition is discussed as a history of thought based on the use of *kâta* (型). In comparison, Michel Foucault's research on technologies of the self is explored through analysis of the principle of "epimeleisthai sautou" (taking care of oneself), an ethical and aesthetical paradigm used during European Antiquity. *Kâta* and the principle of taking care of oneself will be assessed through a comparative analysis in terms of their similarity as techniques of individuation. We will explore the instrumental function of *kâta* as a generic technic of self-creation and transformation of individuals in Japan and its society as a whole.

## Panel 17: Philosophy Beyond Japan II

Between Hegel and Nāgārjuna:

Dialectics in the East and the West and Nishida's Philosophy

Lucas Nascimento Machado

(University of São Paulo, Brazil)

In a remarkable passage of his *Less Than Nothing*, Žižek notes that, in comparison with what he calls "buddhist ontology," "not even Hegel's dialectic seems radical enough: for him, Being still has primacy over Nothing, negativity is still limited to self-mediating movement of the Absolute Spirit, which thus maintains a minimum of substantial identity." However, he also relativizes this observation by posing critically, against "buddhist ontology," the question about "the properly hege-

lian dialectical process, in which negativity is not reduced to a self-mediation of the positive Absolute but, on the contrary, positive reality arises as a result of the self-relational negativity.”

One could question in many different ways the form through which Žižek proposes this comparison, not the least of them being how he seems to understand “buddhist ontology” as a monological entity. Nevertheless, we believe this comparison puts forward a meaningful philosophical question, and one which could be of profound consequences to philosophical reflection as a whole: in what way—if any—should a kind of “buddhist dialectics” be brought together with “hegelian dialectics,” in order to bring about a new kind of dialectics which could grasp that which each of these dialectics separated can not, but together might be able to? In other words, could a sort of “buddhist dialectics” and “hegelian dialectics” be seen as complementary dialectics, each of which is capable of grasping a problem or an aspect of reality the other is not able to? And, if that is the case, would it be possible to fuse these dialectics somehow in order to propose a new kind of dialectics, a dialectics which could grasp the self-relationality and self-referentiality that is constitutive of each thing and irreducible to their relation to something external to them, while at the same time grasping the relationality of each thing to one another which is just as constitutive of them and which cannot be reduced to a mere form of self-relation?

We believe that the answer to this question is positive. Moreover, we believe it is programmatic. In other words, we believe that any attempt on thinking dialectics today ought to think how a certain kind of buddhist dialectics and hegelian dialectics can be brought together. In order to defend this point, we shall discuss briefly both hegelian dialectics and the kind of buddhist dialectics we believe to see expressed in one of the most meaningful buddhist philosophers, Nāgārjuna. We will try to show, in regard to these dialectics, what we think each is capable of grasping that the other is not capable of. Finally,

we shall discuss one example of a philosopher that we believe that, in a way, could be seen as following the very program for a new dialectics that we outline here, namely, Nishida.

Sensation de la forme et de l'espace :  
dans les pensées japonaise et grecque

Makoto Sekimura  
(Université de la ville de Hiroshima, Japan)

Née en Grèce la philosophie s'est développée jusqu'à aujourd'hui notamment dans le monde occidental. Le Japon s'est occidentalisé à partir du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle et a développé l'étude des sciences naturelles et humaines à l'instar de l'Occident moderne. Il est parfois affirmé qu'aucune relation n'existerait entre la pensée japonaise et la philosophie grecque. Cependant, il me semble que dans la pensée japonaise se trouve une certaine similarité, consciente ou inconsciente, avec la pensée grecque. On peut ainsi se demander dans quelle mesure il est possible de recourir à la philosophie grecque en se fondant sur la pensée japonaise ? S'il est vrai que les chercheurs japonais qui étudient la philosophie occidentale ont tendance à respecter et à mettre en valeur la philosophie grecque comme origine des courants de la pensée occidentale, cette attitude les incite à se rapprocher de la tradition grecque aux dépens de la pensée japonaise alors qu'il me semble que ce qui constitue l'essentiel de la pensée japonaise apporte elle-même des solutions comparables à celles de la philosophie grecque.

Pour étayer ma thèse, j'examinerai le problème de la sensibilité des Japonais concernant la forme et l'espace en comparant la pensée de Tetsurō Watsuji à la philosophie grecque et à l'art grec. En effet, Watsuji admire les œuvres d'art de la Grèce antique et distingue l'art grec de l'art occidental depuis l'époque romaine, bien que le premier soit à l'origine du second. Il souligne aussi l'affinité qui existe entre l'art grec et l'art

japonais. C'est à travers sa sensibilité propre, fondée sur la tradition japonaise, qu'il apprécie la manifestation dynamique de la forme intérieure lorsqu'il observe les arts grecs. Dans cette fonction sensitive qui consiste à saisir la manière d'apparaître de la forme et qui est fondée sur la puissance autogénétique de la nature, nous pouvons distinguer un certain point commun entre la culture du Japon et celle de la Grèce.

Or, il y a bien sûr des divergences entre ces deux cultures. En ce qui concerne la fonction sensitive, Watsuji affirme que «les Grecs ressentaient les choses dans le voir, alors que les Japonais voient les choses dans le ressentir.» Pour bien comparer ces deux cultures, il me semble donc utile de comprendre la signification de ces mots de Watsuji concernant la modalité de la sensation. Les Grecs s'appuient plutôt sur la vision des formes dans leur intuition du dynamisme de la vie. C'est pourquoi leur sensibilité se relie assez facilement à la manifestation de la forme extérieure proportionnée et à la reconnaissance de la symétrie, alors qu'ils cherchent, notamment dans la tradition platonicienne, l'existence de la forme intelligible. Par contre, dans l'intuition sensitive des Japonais, le rôle de la vision n'est pas aussi important que chez les Grecs. Sur la base de cette différence, nous pourrions examiner la relation entre la notion de *fûdo* chez Watsuji et la notion de *chôra* chez Platon, et trouver une certaine résonance entre ces deux notions. En examinant ainsi les relations qui existent entre la culture des Japonais et celle des Grecs au sujet de la sensation, nous poserons les bases qui serviront à approfondir une réflexion sur les fondements de la pensée japonaise et de la pensée grecque.

**Panel 18:** *Japanese Philosophy and Its Place in the World*

Sérénité et culture du principe vital :  
conceptions philosophiques du bien-être  
dans la pensée japonaise

Andreas Thele (Université de Liège, Belgique)

La «sérénité» comme conception philosophique a joué un rôle important dans la pensée grecque antique. Elle est devenu une attitude choisie et volontaire de l'être humain, tentant à établir une approche harmonieuse et équilibrée du corps et de l'esprit à travers les joies et vicissitudes de l'existence. L'approche mesurée des plaisirs et l'acceptante des souffrances conduisaient à une «vie symétrique.» Démocrite, Epicure, Plutarque et d'autres penseurs de l'antiquité consacraient leurs écrits à ce sujet.

Cette sérénité philosophique qui portait une attention particulière au soin et au bien-être de l'individu a été abandonnée sous l'influence du christianisme. Elle laissera la place à une approche religieuse qui met en avant l'idée de la félicité dans la foi, renversant ainsi l'approche équilibrée de la pensée ancienne.

Cette conception de félicité religieuse, qui visait à établir des notions positives en écartant les aspects contraires, a déséquilibré l'approche harmonieuse envers la vie et y a introduit la notion du progrès, en tentant à réduire et à éviter toute notion négative, comme la douleur, la mort, etc. Ainsi croyance et confiance dans un progrès et dans une évolution positive vont mener au «positive thinking», en contribuant à remplacer la sérénité par l'optimisme.

En Asie orientale cette notion de sérénité se trouve d'abord chez les anciens penseurs chinois. Dans les «Entretiens de Confucius» (Lun Yu) la sérénité du junzi sera évoquée comme exemplaire (Lun Yu, VII, 36), mais ce sont surtout les textes taoïstes comme Laozi et Zhuangzi qui prônent la sérénité,

l'absence d'occupation ou d'action. Nombreuses sont chez les taoïstes les allusions au bien-être et aux techniques de méditation ou à des exercices physiques pour établir un équilibre et une harmonie avec le monde, à stimuler les forces vitales et de contribuer à « nourrir la vie » (chin. yangsheng/ jap. yôjô). Ces conceptions qui font partie de l'univers spirituel chinois seront ensuite pratiqués dans tous les domaines de la vie quotidienne, comme la cuisine ou l'habitat. A travers les traditions du bouddhisme chan elles vont influencer les conceptions du zen et déterminer les bases spirituelles et esthétiques de la pensée japonaises.

Ainsi le Japon possède une longue tradition de conceptions philosophiques liées à la sérénité et au bien-être. Contrairement à l'Occident, la perception de l'être humain comme unité esprit-corps en Asie orientale a fortement favorisée le développement de cette tradition, et nombreux sont les penseurs qui consacrent leurs réflexions à ce sujet. En présentant plusieurs auteurs japonais comme Kenkô ou Kaibara Ekiken, et en les juxtaposant à des penseurs occidentaux, nous essayons d'analyser les différents aspects qui contribuent à la culture du soi et au développement de l'individu.

### Philosophy of Japanese Sensitivity As Global Philosophy

Hitoshi Ogawa  
(Yamaguchi University, Japan)

*Spirited Away, My Neighbor Totoro, Princess Mononoke* and so on by Hayao Miyazaki are highly admired not only in Japan but also throughout the world. We can say his works entered into the Hall of Fame of Japanese cultural traditions which have a long history. At their background, we can recognize Miyazaki's genius sensitivity which turned anime into sophisticated literature or even philosophy. As soon as I say such a thing, the definition of philosophy comes into question with-



in academic society. However, in Japan, a wide range of intellectual activities have been recognized as “thought.” This includes religion, literature and even performances such as Noh play. If we call them philosophy according to Western tradition, Miyazaki’s works fully deserve the name of philosophy.

Once Watsuji Tetsurō claimed that Japan didn’t have philosophy because Japanese people were not good at thinking logically. Meanwhile, he praised Japanese people for producing a lot of poetry (*waka* or *haiku*), making use of their sensitivity. Is this true? I think poetry is just different in its style, but it is also logical. In addition, poetry could be said to be more complicated and sensitive than logical works. If we can say poetry is “philosophy” produced by Japanese sensitivity, then Miyazaki’s anime can also be recognized as Japanese philosophy. As you may know, Miyazaki often depicts the relation between human beings and elements of nature including water, forests, even earthquakes and especially wind. The world he depicts is filled with beauty and fear of nature, which is something we have already forgotten. This is the reason why we seek Miyazaki’s works and praise his sensitivity. Hayao Miyazaki is a valuable survivor who still remembers such sensitivity and can express what he senses.

Unfortunately, Japanese poetry has not been admired much by the world, but Miyazaki’s works have. Here we might be able to find a potential of Japanese philosophy of sensitivity spreading to the rest of the world as global philosophy. Advent of philosopher Hayao Miyazaki must bring miraculous “wind” to a global society at a dead end.

### Kuki and Lévi-Strauss: Two Logics of “Sense”

Tatsuya Higaki (Osaka University, Japan)

In his magnum opus *Iki no kōzō* (*The Structure of iki*), Kuki Shūzō developed his study of “ethnical emotions” using the

hermeneutic method. In explaining his theses, he uses very peculiar structural diagrams. Kuki's fondness of diagrammatic explanations can also be seen in his other chef d'oeuvre *Gūzen-seino mondai* (*The Problem of Contingency*), where the logical modalities (e.g. necessity and possibility) are arranged on the vertices of a cubic structure. But such structural diagrammatic explanations appear most frequently in *The Structure of Iki*, where Kuki presents the emotions (e.g., *shibumi* and *hade*) in relation to the keyword *iki*.

Regarding this point, we can see some similarities between Kuki and Lévi-Strauss. While their backgrounds are of course totally different, both of them try to describe emotions in the context of ethnology (for Lévi-Strauss, the issue was food and the sense of taste) in their own structural way. For Kuki, *iki* expresses one of the emotions particular to Japanese culture, especially in the Edo Period. The concept is a way of capturing his own culture in a European way. Lévi-Strauss, on the other hand, adopting a broader and more universal perspective, deals with the sense of taste of other cultures using the methods of ethnography. In this presentation I want to consider why Kuki and Lévi-Strauss used very similar methods to "structuralize" the emotions, which are closely related not only to history and ethnicity, but also to the environment and atmosphere. It seems to me that the method they used is the principle way to investigate ephemeral things like emotion, taste and subtle senses that cannot be described by language.

Furthermore, Lévi-Strauss analyzed the poems of Baudelaire together with Jacobson, especially from the standpoint of "phonology." Kuki also had much interest in the phonetics of the Japanese poems and searched for subtle jokes. For both Kuki and Lévi-Strauss, it was a crucial problem to think about the synchronicity of sound, that is, the sensorial part of language and its structure.

**Panel 19: *Philosophy of Religion I*****Logos as Dharma or the Re-enchantment of Natural Law:  
A Place for Interreligious Encounter**

Carlos Barbosa Cepeda  
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain)

The general aim of my presentation is to explore how Nishitani Keiji's philosophy may help us find a solution to the crisis of religion in modernity. More concretely, I will address the following question: from a religious viewpoint, is it possible to appropriate the scientific notion of natural law in a way that makes it not alien or even hostile to the pursuit of life meaning—in other words, is it possible to re-enchant natural law?

In the context of modernity, natural law is conceived as entirely impersonal and inert, completely devoid of any significance whatsoever. As law is merely about facts, in the scientific worldview there is no place for value as something real. Therefore, nature is disenchanted. In such circumstances, traditional teleological worldviews, which used to ground the meaning of people's lives, begin to crumble. The urgent question, then, is: how can religion overcome this crisis?

As it is known, Nishitani takes this problem seriously and consequently agrees that religious people cannot accept the disenchantment of nature. However, he also remarks that trying to revive the traditional, teleological worldviews is no solution. The past does not come back. Rather, he proposes the alternative of reinterpreting natural law as Dharma: that is, instead of interpreting law as the inexorable ruling that things cannot help "obeying," he interprets it as the natural order that enables them to be what they are in harmony with what they ought to be. This means that: (i) law is intrinsically constitutive of each individual being; and (ii) by means of self-realization of law, the individual can embody its own na-

ture and understand what it ought to do. This is how nature is re-enchanted—i.e. how the link between nature and life meaning is reestablished. This reinterpretation makes it possible to rediscover the place of meaning and value within the framework of natural law without the need to appeal to old metaphysics.

It can be suggested that this re-enchantment is available not only for Buddhism, but for many other traditional religions, since they often give central importance to a notion of nature as ineluctably following an eternal order (cosmos) that is at the same time the ground of facts and the ground of right (or good) conduct—or, what in the long run is the same, the ground of good. Besides, once religion critically appropriates the notion of natural law as suggested above, it also empowers itself for a constructive (in contrast to a reactive) critique of reason: it becomes able to redefine reason in terms harmonious both to the scientific endeavour of discovery and the spiritual pursuit of meaning and value.

### Existential Phenomenology of Religion As a Method for Comparative Philosophy

Sergej Milanovic  
(University of Copenhagen, Denmark)

Although struggling on the European continent, comparative philosophy has been the nature of doing philosophy in Japan ever since it was introduced in the Meiji period. One problem in comparative philosophy is that it has not developed sufficiently in terms of methodology and theory to constitute a field of research. One place to start, therefore, is to look at its development in Japan. And there is a need for comparative philosophy if professional philosophers are to become better at entering into dialogue with other intellectual traditions. Such a dialogue would, as the Kyoto School bears witness to,

in return enrich philosophical thought.

In this paper I attempt to provide such a resource for comparative philosophy by focusing on a distinct methodological tendency in Japanese comparative studies. It is invoked by some of its most distinct comparative scholars, such as Keiji Nishitani, Toshihiko Izutsu and at present Shizuteru Ueda, and might be termed existential phenomenology of religion. Of these three Izutsu is, I believe, the strongest and most rich proponent of this theoretical approach. As a scholar of religion, and fluent in over twenty languages, his studies are much wider in scope and cover virtually all Asian and European schools of thought. Furthermore, since phenomenology of religion is already an established tradition in religious studies, his studies are followed by numerous remarks on some of its leading proponents. What differentiates him from other religious scholars, is his particular use of and comparisons with western philosophy. In his 『意識と本質—精神的東洋を求めて』 from 1983 (not yet available in English), wherein he attempts to provide a ground for comparative studies of Asian thought, he touches upon a number of philosophical schools in the West.

That being said, there is no doubt that Izutsu's existential phenomenological approach is inspired by a methodological tendency in modern Japan going at least back to Nishitani and still alive today in Ueda. Common to these, and other less famous proponents, is the application of existential ideas to the study of Asian, especially Zen Buddhist, thought, and a phenomenological focus on the Zen Buddhist religious experience. Consequently, the tendency might be called existential phenomenology of religion.

I say "tendency" because although invoked by well-known scholar, the approach has by no means been systematically clarified as a tradition. This will be the purpose of my paper. My questions are: how do these proponents apply existential phenomenology in doing comparisons and what are their re-

sults? Finally, after having settled these questions, I wish to propose how such a method could be applied to a philosophical investigation of a contemporary case.

Mutual Illuminations: Metanoetic and Hesychastic  
Insights into Spiritual Transformation

Mark W. Flory  
(Metropolitan State University of Denver, USA)

Tanabe Hajime's metanoetic philosophy provides not only an important rapprochement between Japanese and European philosophy, between theology and philosophy, and between modern and postmodern concerns in philosophy and theology; but also between spiritual practices and phenomenology. In my paper, I am interested in the last of these connections, and in the nature of their connecting. That is, my aim is not only to examine how Tanabe's work brings philosophy back to its therapeutic roots, but also to look at the nature of the "spirituality"—or, to use a more helpful terminology, the system of spiritual practices—that forms the bridge between philosophy and religion. Perhaps even this is too dualistic. Rather, my essay explores the systematicity (i.e., the nature of the system) of spiritual practice that not only rejoins philosophy and religion, but also comprises their essential unity.

The key to this unity is transformability—that is, in Tanabe's words, the "relationship of reciprocal mediatory transformation between the absolute and the self." This transformation relationship implies the transformative and transformational nature of spiritual practice itself. Tanabe suggests that our "true self" is the "center of mediation from which coordinates can be drawn to determine the transformative movement of the absolute in time and space." The object of this essay is to trace those coordinates, which is to say, to present a system of spiritual practice.

Here, both the terms “system” and “practice” are complex, and must be distinguished from their everyday usages. Spiritual practice is not systematic in the modern scientific or logical sense. Rather, the system is the cohesion of a variety of dynamics that take place in the process of spiritual transformation. Therefore, the system not only provides the means of transformation, but transforms itself. Metanoia (*zange*) is not limited to the self of the practitioner, but is a mutual, kenotic reciprocity between practitioner, practice, and the system itself. The term practice, as used here, captures the sense of individual exercises, their manifold relations, and their reciprocal transformation with the total system itself.

While Tanabe’s spiritual reference was primarily to True Pure Land Buddhism (though he is clearly a student of Christian thought, as well), and particularly Shinran, my own spiritual reference is to the Hesychastic tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. At the “meta-” level of analysis employed here, the differences between these traditions is not ignored, but subsumed in the examination of the general dynamics of spiritual progress. At this level of analysis, the primary concern is to describe the complex relationships of exercises and practices, steps and stages of progress, scopos and telos, body and soul and spirit. Tanabe’s metanoetics provides the phenomenological framework for an understanding of these relationships, and Hesychasm provides, for me, the symbolic world in which these relationships find incarnation.

**Panel 20:** *Critique of Modernity I: Maruyama Masao and Nishitani Keiji*

The Critic of Japanese Modernity by Maruyama Masao:  
Beyond Ethnocentrism and Westernization

Samuel Marie

(Jean-Moulin Lyon III University)

The attempt of Maruyama Masao to define a modernity which could be understood independently of a mere process of westernization has local and global meaning. Indeed, this question is not just the concern of the historian of political thought, but also the concern of political philosopher insofar as the problem of alleged universality of political modernity, namely democracy and human rights, is growing nowadays. Indeed, long before the works of Amartya Sen, Maruyama Masao was one of the first political thinker, outside the west, to defend the possibility to elaborate a concept of modernity which doesn't implies neither the acknowledgment of the so-called superiority of the west, nor the rejection of the very idea of modernity as such. In other words, the aim, for Maruyama Masao, is to get out of the alternative between the rejection of modernity and democracy, in the name of Japanese tradition, and the mere acceptance of western model of modernization as the only possible way to embrace modernity. The theory of modernity developed by Maruyama Masao is based on a critic of the way Japan has realized his own modernization.

The main argument of Maruyama Masao is quite simple. Modernity in Japan can be seen as an unfinished project insofar as the country has built up a modern centralized state and a capitalistic economy without concern of developing a genuine democratic society. The consequence was fascism and imperialism. In this perspective, the military defeat of 1945 and the return of democracy is seen by Maruyama as the third opening (*kaikoku*) of Japan, a new Meiji restoration which could allow the country to establish a genuine democratic culture. Indeed, for Maruyama, without the embodiment of a "democratic frame of mind" the democratic institutions will not be successfully implemented. Nevertheless, it was a necessity to initiate a movement of modernization/democratization coming from inside Japan and not just imposed by force by the



American occupier, otherwise the process of modernization would be doomed to fail once again. In order to achieve this, Maruyama thought it was needed to overcome what he called the East-West paradigm. Indeed, Maruyama tried to defuse the dichotomy between the East and the West and put in its place the opposition between the internal and the external. In other words, the distinction between, on one hand, a social change imposed from outside in an authoritarian way, and on the other hand, a social change coming from inside, which means involving the people as the main actor of social and political change, is more relevant according to Maruyama. Here the notion of subjectivity (*shutaisei*) as autonomy is needed. Indeed, without autonomy it would be not possible, for the people, to embody the principles of democracy and to become the true actor of political change. In other words, for Maruyama, to be modern means to be able to act autonomously, that is to say, to act as a subject. The incapacity of the Japanese to see themselves as subjects is the reason why fascism has been possible in Japan.

### Critique of Modernity in the Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji

Niklas Söderman (University of Tallin, Estonia)

After decades of rapid modernization and cultural change following Japan's opening up to the West, fundamental asymmetry of this cultural encounter began to receive more serious attention as the 20th century got under way and a counter-movement against Western influences began to build up again. It was from such a situation that the Kyoto School's project to mediate a philosophical space between East and West came to be as part of an effort to come to terms with Western cultural and intellectual influence from an Asian point of view.

While seeking to redefine Japan's relation to the West, the

Kyoto philosophers were also redefining Japan's relation to itself and its past. Many were concerned that Japan was losing its authentic self in its encounter with the West, so a key aim was to recover what could still be retained. This involved emphasizing that which was seen as fundamentally Japanese—or in a more nebulous sense as "Eastern"—but also a preparedness to purge or rethink issues that had been functionally invalidated by Western science and philosophy. As a result, their outlook was progressive, but it came through a lens that was made much more critical by the reappropriation of what was reconstructed as Japanese culture and thought.

In this paper, I will concentrate on understanding Nishitani Keiji's persistent critique of modernity and how it intertwines with the issue of nihilism in his philosophy. While Nishitani achieved some notoriety for his views on overcoming modernity during WWII, this paper will look at his relationship with the issue more in the scope of his whole philosophical career.

Pulling together the various strands that weave through Nishitani's treatment of modernity, its relation to nihilism and his views for overcoming both, we find that it motivates his themes of Heideggerian critique of technology and Nietzschean redemption of tradition that combine with the Kyoto School's overall reverse-Hegelian search for an originary ground that is grasped via existential realization revealed through religious praxis. In fact, Nishitani welcomes the crisis brought on by modernization as means to shake up settled views and open a way to deeper understanding. This is the kind of philosophy that he seeks to articulate in order to counter the nihilistic abyss opened by secularization and mechanization in modern society, thus overcoming the dehumanization involved in these processes and finding a path towards interconnectedness with each other, the world and our ultimate source.

In the end, for Nishitani the social is always returned to the

personal, and the issue of modernity is at its root an issue of the self and nihilism, given form in the historical context and social structures of the society. Nishitani's views on modernization evolved over his philosophical career, although they did not so much change as become less confrontational. He still remained convinced of the necessity of overcoming the problems inherent in modernity, but more in the terms of its cultural particularity as a Western phenomenon.

Can the "Eastern Emptiness" Help Out  
in Dealing with Diversity?  
A Case Study and Critique of Masao Abe's Theory  
and Practice of Diversity

Annewieke Vroom  
(Vrij Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

Introduction: What is the problem?

The introduction deals with the need for a framework to conceptualise diversity. Worldwide, people are finding (and losing) ways to deal with diversity. Our current debates inherit the past, which fills the discourse with fruitful lessons as well as painful and sensitive ones. One influence within the many voices is the one formerly ascribed to the mysterious "East," which still is claimed as a source for an attitude focused on oneness, non-duality and leaving "ego"-positions. Can one still take this language seriously, is it still an option, or does it need to be rendered redundant in face of current stress on difference?

Middle part: What is a possible approach coming from "the East"?

The middle part sets out one example of those mystifying "eastern" perspectives, namely that of Masao Abe which roots back to other Kyoto School thinkers as well as Daisetz Suzuki and several Christian philosophers who work on pluralism,

most importantly John B. Cobb and John Hick. The paper lists several “diversities” or rather polarisations that kept Abe busy in the period from 1963 to 1998, beginning from “east and west,” continuing via “religion and irreligion,” to “Christianity and Buddhism.” It explains why the thinking is always binary. It further notes the differences and continuities within Abe’s development, consisting of thirty-five years of philosophising and engaging in dialogue. Of particular attention is the relation and gap between the theory of and practice of diversity. The fact that Abe throughout his 35 years worked both on theory of intercultural thought and in practice of dialogue makes him a very interesting research object.

The Third part: What critiques have developed related to this approach?

The third part deals with several criticisms that have been versed against Abe’s views on diversity, as well as the alternatives that have been stressed. Main question here is whether the talk of emptiness in the context of building an theory and practice of diversity is an option for any of the dialogue partners, and if not, why so.

Conclusion: Can this specific “Eastern emptiness-talk” be of any value for thinking diversity in our day and age? The conclusion gives an evaluation: if Abe’s view is of such and such value, what does this mean for the more general popular life-attitude spiralling around loosely based on eastern concepts? What exactly gets lost when cast out?

## **Panel 21:** *Philosophy of Nature and Time II*

A demi-allègre sur la ligne :  
Temps, contingence et métaphysique modale  
chez Kuki Shūzō

Marc Peeters (Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgique)

Partant de la conception à la fois métaphysique et logique du problème de la contingence, définissable par rapport à la nécessité, cette étude vise à montrer l'originalité de l'approche quasi-phénoménologique que Kuki met en œuvre dans son analyse des divers types de contingence. Ce concept, pensé également dans une approche ontologique, permet de dégager des coupures temporelles d'ontologies partielles qui ont le pouvoir de rendre compte dans une logique appliquée, quantifiée sur le temps, des espaces méréologiques se recouvrant les uns les autres. Faisant un usage approfondi de la tradition et des écoles de philosophie allemande, de Heidegger aux néo-kantiens des Ecoles de Bade et de Marburg, Kuki procède à une analyse originale de la spatio-temporalisation de l'esprit – le célèbre *Gemüt* et l'*Iki* – en vue de l'établissement architectonique, au sens kantien, de la contingence. Cette étude montre qu'une telle approche architectonique, et donc métaphysique, de la contingence et du temps originaire, renvoie à la question épistémologique de la complémentarité entre nécessité et temps. L'œuvre de Kuki sera analysée dans toutes ses dimensions historiques, pour parler comme Heidegger, - ce qui n'est évidemment pas un hasard, puisque Kuki a introduit la pensée de Heidegger au Japon – à partir de l'approche quasi-phénoménologique de l'*Iki*. Cette analyse permettra de mettre en perspective la spécificité de la pensée philosophique japonaise. Cette recherche a pu bénéficier des travaux et de la thèse de Takako Saito de 1998. Les travaux approfondis de Saito nous permettront de mettre en évidence une métaphysique du temps, dépassant le débat bien connu entre Kant et Bergson, au profit d'une authentique métaphysique de la temporalité. Nous montrerons la portée de toute analyse logico-transcendantale de la contingence et du temps dans une logique modale revisitée. Nous mettrons en évidence quelle est la place de la logique du temps dans la métaphysique de la quantification si controversée de la durée et de l'éternité. L'apport de Kuki sera clairement mis en évidence dans ce débat qui

a nourri la pensée philosophique des confins du XXème siècle essentiellement en Allemagne et en France où Kuki a étudié auprès notamment de Heidegger. Il sera également mis en évidence que la littérature, et plus particulièrement la poésie japonaise (que nous avons pu aborder grâce aux travaux Takako Saito) mettent en œuvre une méditation sur le temps que nous aurons l'occasion de confronter à la méditation cartésienne, et son acte fondateur du temps vécu, dans l'analyse de ce que nous appelons l'auto-décomposition désintégrative du temps de la conscience et de la conscience du temps. Ce débat actuel vise à montrer l'extrême pertinence de la pensée de Kuki dans le concert de la philosophie contemporaine et de la métaphysique spéculative.

Du donné à l'éternel retour du même :  
Phénoménologie, existentialisme et spéculation  
chez Kuki Shūzō

Simon Ebersolt  
(INALCO, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Kuki Shūzō a développé une pensée de la contingence, dont le «sens nodal» est le donné phénoménologique comme rencontre entre deux individualités, et une pensée de l'éternel retour du même, qu'il appelle «temps métaphysique.» Or, il ne va nullement de soi que l'affirmation de la contingence débouche sur celle de l'éternel retour du même, c'est-à-dire de l'identique, d'autant plus que Kuki oppose explicitement la position du principe d'identité à celle de la contingence, qui «nie la nécessité du principe d'identité.» En réfléchissant sur les aspects phénoménologique, existentialiste et spéculatif de son œuvre, nous nous efforcerons de montrer comment s'articulent le donné contingent et l'éternel retour du même.

## Nishitani's Understanding of Time

Filip Gurjanov

(University of Vienna / Charles University in Prague)

Nishitani's theory of time emerged out of his critical engagement with several key theories. He made discussions of Christian theology, progressive Enlightenment thinking and of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence of the same a fruitful dialogue partner for developing his own philosophical theory of time, based on Buddhist religious insights. While the said theories portray according to Nishitani a one-sided view, they can nevertheless be incorporated into a complex Buddhist system of time, which allows for contradictions to exist. Thus, rather than dismissing these theories as outright wrong, Nishitani critically engaged with these theories in a manner of a genuine philosophical dialogue.

To give an example: Christianity and Nietzsche contradict one another on the point concerning the existence of a transtemporal ground of time, but both theories acknowledge the present moment as dimensionally different from the past and future. By bringing up the field of emptiness at the bottom of the present moment as the origin of time, Nishitani manages to extract their essential implications, while also pointing at the limitations of the views, when taken individually. That time originates from emptiness means that it does have a ground, albeit one that does not lie beyond time. And while the structure of the constant emergence of time out of the present emptying itself of emptiness remains indeed "eternally the same," and is reminiscent of Nietzsche's "big mid-day," it also allows for the radically new to appear, thus allowing for "creation."

The aim of this presentation is to discuss Nishitani's engagement with the above-mentioned theories and to show how he develops his own theory from such engagement. I will

also present potential problems with Nishitani's interpretation of the said theories as a way to open up further discussions regarding Nishitani's theory of time.

## Panel 22: *Tanabe and Nishitani*

### Tanabe's Buddhist Reading of Symbolist Poetry

Joseph S. O'Leary

There is a faint rumor of Buddhism in the background of the young Mallarmé's discovery of nothingness (*le néant*) in that Lefébure, a friend of that time, was fascinated by both Hegel and Buddhism. The poet caught the Hegelian bug, if not the Buddhist one, and his poet's ambition to sublimate the entirety of existence into a pure Conception or Notion, and to provide "the Orphic explanation of the Earth" owes much to Hegel. Hegel presides over Tanabe's reading of Valéry and his final essay on Mallarmé's most advanced composition, *Un coup de dés* (1897). Writing shortly before his death in 1962 and informed by such sophisticated literary critics as R. G. Cohn and Gardner Davies, Tanabe is still almost our contemporary. Only a few years later Julia Kristeva will present the Mallarméan *chôra*, in which the dynamism of Hegelian negativity is deployed precisely as force (*Kraft*). But Hegelian force is "subjugated" to the Concept, whereas "the whole experience of the avant-garde, since the end of the 19th century, from the poète maudit to schizophrenia, shows to the contrary the possibility of a process of signification different from that of unifying conceptual thought" (Kristeva, *La révolution du langage poétique* [Paris: Seuil, 1974], 166).

But what drew Tanabe to the Symbolist compositions of Mallarmé and Valéry was not just their philosophical suggestiveness, but also the hunch that they had made a break-



through to the dimension that Buddhism describes under such titles as nirvana and emptiness. Inevitably his inquiry ends with *Un coup de dés*, experienced as an explosion of Absolute Nothingness, zettai mu, 絶対無. In that explosion

“Rien n’aura eu lieu que le lieu” (nothing will have taken place but the place). Symbolist poetry brings all phenomena back to this ultimate place of nothingness, revealing, in Buddhist terms, that “Form is emptiness; emptiness is form.” The thing, in this poetry, is replaced by the effect it produces, and in *Igitur* and *Un coup de dés*, the rich

symphony of themes and allusions built up in Mallarmé’s other compositions is replayed in a more abstract key, as purely internal motions of the mind, midnight shimmerings of metaphysical possibility.

Tanabe brings Buddhist criteria to bear, discerning limitations in these poems when they are caught by a residual substantialism (notably in Valéry’s failure to open up to the dynamism of historical consciousness and the freedom of religious awareness) or when they deviate in the opposite direction of annihilationism (as when Mallarmé’s sacrificial depersonalization of the self becomes its materialistic ensurance). The two extremes may go together. As a rather Christianized Buddhist, Tanabe tends to arrange the great Symbolist works he studies in a dialectical progression that may be too neat: in Valéry’s comeback poem *La Jeune Parque* (1917) he finds limits, whether due to some holding back from the radicality of emptiness, or from a failure, once the world has been volatilized through radical negation, to allow it to re-emerge transformed on the ground of emptiness, now manifesting as empty form. *Igitur*, likewise, is contrasted with *Un coup de dés*, which has a different, more positive upshot. In the latter poem Mallarmé’s espousal of the void comes closer to being an opening up to authentic emptiness, in a dynamic of death-and-resurrection, rather than a barren suicidal nihilism. Absolute nothingness takes the initiative in the vast spaces of

virginal white against which the graphic design of the verse is set off (as in Chinese painting). Tanabe has to forego this layout and its impact in his own translation of the poem.

Understanding Tanabe's Experience of Zange  
from the Point of View of Ōhashi's Notion of  
Philosophy as Auto-Bio-Graphy

Luis Pujadas Torres  
(Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain)

Ōhashi Ryōsuke defines philosophy as auto-bio-graphy. By this, he means three things: (1) philosophizing is the knowledge of to autō, (2) philosophy always concerns the biōs of to autō, and (3) philosophy as the biōs of the autō demands graphē. Ōhashi's idea must not be confused with autobiography tout court. According to Nietzsche and others, every great philosophy is autobiographical in the ordinary sense. This conception is wrong, at least if it is taken to be applicable to all philosophical activity, but some philosophers sometimes philosophize in a way that is conveniently illuminated by it. This is the case when their philosophical theories are strongly dependent on their lived experiences. Tanabe Hajime's meta-noetics is largely autobiographical in this ordinary sense.

But the self that Ōhashi is concerned with differs considerably from the Cartesian ego. For one thing, it is the egoless self we find in the Buddhist tradition. For another, it is a self which is "the same as that of the world." Although Ōhashi intends to use the Kyoto School as an example in order to develop his main idea, he barely mentions Tanabe. This is surprising, because Tanabe's later philosophy of religion is obviously a case in point. His central notion of zange (repentance) is not only explicitly autobiographical in the ordinary sense, but also fits closely into Ōhashi's idea of "auto-bio-graphy."

Tanabe's zange brought with it a conversion which implied

abandoning his own power (*jiriki*) and letting the Other-power (*tariki*) take control of himself. Thus the self is not being but nothingness. Moreover, zange must not be only individual, but collective. The whole of humankind should practice zange. According to Ōhashi, everyone's life is her or his life, and so is independent from that of all the others. But precisely for this reason, "everyone is the same as everyone else." There is a biological connection between individual creatures discernible in their evolutionary lines. So Tanabe's vision of the self complies with Ōhashi's first and second theses: to *autō* is ego-less and all individuals are interconnected thanks to the *biōs* manifested in them. As for the third thesis, every *graphé* is the description of the world by a subject-less subject, which enables to *autō* to know the performance of the *biōs*. Auto-bio-graphy thus happens to be the autobiography of the world. Tanabe does not mention *graphé*, but he sees absolute knowledge as the historically mediatory nature of absolute spirit. So in a way he complies as well with the third thesis.

But the fact that Ōhashi's idea can be conveniently applied to Tanabe's metanoetics does not imply that either of them can escape criticism. It is not clear why the Kyoto School, taken as one of the possible expressions of the auto-bio-graphy of the world, should be thought to overcome a more Eurocentric one, as Ōhashi thinks. Neither is it clear how Tanabe's lived experience can be accepted as a reason to accept his universal prescription of zange.

### Nishitani Keiji's Criticism of the Cartesian Cogito

Amanda Sayonara Fernandes Prazeres  
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain)

We intent to discuss the criticism developed by the Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), in his masterpiece *Religion and Nothingness* (*Shūkyō to wa nani ka*), to the

subject-object dualism and the conception of the *res cogitans* formulated by the Modern thinker René Descartes (1596–1650). The aim is to clarify the problem of subjectivity by analyzing why Cartesian dualism is problematic and how it is also problematic not to overcome this perspective, according to Nishitani. – As well, we will investigate how this conception of man in Cartesian philosophy is related to a notion of substance and, consequently, how the proposal for overcoming this perspective devised by Nishitani can also mean a critique to the metaphysics bases of West philosophy.

### **Panel 23: *Philosophy of Religion***

L'adoption de la notion de « martyr » (*junkyô*)  
dans le Japon de Meiji : une réécriture du passé

Hitomi Omata Rappo (Boston College, USA)

Quand les missionnaires sont arrivés au Japon, au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, ils ont été, malgré un accueil initial plutôt favorable, très vite confronté à des politiques restrictives des autorités, menées contre les chrétiens. En réaction à ce que les pères considéraient comme une « persécution », le concept de martyr en est venu à occuper une place importante dans l'enseignement prodigué aux nouveaux convertis. Le thème des martyrs du Japon a ensuite été diffusé en Europe à travers les images, le théâtre ou encore la littérature, devenant le concept essentiel pour décrire non seulement les activités missionnaires dans ce pays, mais aussi l'Archipel en lui-même dans les esprits européens de la période moderne.

Cependant, l'idée de martyr n'a pas été acceptée par les autorités japonaises de l'époque. En effet, la traduction japonaise du concept utilisée à ce moment, une transcription phonétique du portugais « *martírio* » ne s'est pas imposée

dans l'usage, et l'idée même du martyr chrétien n'a pas été adoptée. Il faut attendre le XIXe siècle, avec la restauration de Meiji, pour qu'une traduction japonaise de la notion soit adoptée. Cette adoption s'est déroulée dans un contexte très particulier, et elle a entraîné une forme d'adoption du discours issu de l'Occident sur la période de la mission au Japon. De criminels ayant enfreint la loi, les victimes chrétiennes de l'époque devenaient des martyrs.

Dans cette présentation, je vais montrer comment cette assimilation non seulement d'un terme, qu'il faudra expliquer, mais aussi d'une idée a profondément marqué la manière d'écrire et d'envisager le passé au Japon, et aussi en quoi elle a accompagné la création d'une communauté chrétienne locale. J'analyserai également sa place au sein d'une réflexion plus globale sur la place de l'Archipel dans le monde de l'époque, tout en revenant sur le contraste saisissant qu'offre l'exemple du voisin chinois.

### The Negative in Nature: Understanding D.T. Suzuki's *soku-hi* Logic

Rossa O Muireartaigh

In his book, 『金剛經の禪』 (*Diamond Sutra Zen*), D.T. Suzuki introduces his *soku-hi* (即非) logic. This is of the form: A is A implies A is not A therefore A is A (AはAだというのは、AはAでない、ゆえAはAである。). Elsewhere, it is simplified to “A is not A and therefore it is A”). According to Suzuki, this formula represents the “logical” thinking displayed in the semantics of the Diamond Sutra, and more generally, the logic of prajna intuition. The accuracy of Suzuki's parsing of the Sutra has been challenged, but either way, *soku-hi* is an elegant formula to describe a core point prevalent in wider modern Kyoto-School thinking. Indeed, both Kitaro Nishida and Keiji Nishitani have referred to *soku-hi* logic in key works. However, what

exactly does *soku-hi* mean? What is the conceptual and ideological paraphernalia that can support this blatant challenge to the law of identity and commonsense? Suzuki in 『金剛經の禪』 points out that this logic only makes sense when view through a certain spiritual awareness that, Suzuki adds, is peculiar to Japan. He also, interestingly, points out that the mediation through negation implied in *soku-hi*, this “round-about” (まだるこしい) way of seeing things, is a process that humans alone go through. Suzuki’s privileging of Japan in this way is silly and dangerous, but it does place prajna wisdom in the realm of culture and civil society, with all the contingencies and historicity implied in this shift, and away from the limiting narrative of teleological religious revelation. Similarly, his attribution to humans alone of this logic in some way creates a naturalist context for spiritual awareness, in the sense that it is from humans, as humans, that the process of spiritual wisdom begins and ends. Perhaps by taking into account these moves by Suzuki, we can see *soku-hi* logic as a robust challenge to the new materialism of today’s post-metaphysical ontology, in the sense that it recognizes the both the contingencies of history and the status of humans as the negative in nature but still holds out for an opening to a higher wisdom that transcends the material without ignoring it.

Who is God in Nishida’s thought?

Liliana Timóteo  
(Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades  
e Tecnologias, Portugal)

In this research Project the main goal is to analyse who is the God that Nishida feels as a part of the whole. We should be aware that in Eastern cultures, even if we don’t consider directly religion, the notion of God as we know in the West doesn’t exist.

Even the ones in light of being atheists are determined by the cultural conscience of their environment. The negation of God or the validation of His nonexistence only happens by opposing his existence. Therefore, in Nishida's thought this is not what it takes place because the image of God as a superior being and a creator is not suitable.

So how an Eastern academic perceives God? The one that generates everything but also punishes in the Abrahamic cultures. Greatly inspired by Taoism, through Zen, Nishida experiences God as the centre of consciousness, unifying and bringing order to the Universal, space and time. We exist together with God, having the same nature, so how can we be individual but a part of it as Nishida claims?

Outside the laws of nature there is no God and without being pantheist, he states that these laws are the concrete evidences of His will. So as the beings are the unity of the individual consciousness is God the consolidation of the universal consciousness?

#### **Panel 24:** *Nishida and Others I*

Au-delà du dualisme:  
chez Motoki Tokieda et Kitarō Nishida

Mika Imono (Université de Strasbourg, France)

Deux penseurs sont concernés dans cette communication : Motoki Tokieda (1900-1967) et Kitarō Nishida (1870-1945). Nous allons situer la théorie de langue-processus de Tokieda sur le prolongement de la philosophie nishidienne, et, par cela, essayer d'esquisser un développement de la philosophie de la langue à partir de Nishida, que pourra apporter l'interprétation de la théorie de Tokieda.

Motoki Tokieda est un linguiste, qui était actif durant les

années 40 aux années 60. La notion la plus importante chez lui est la théorie de langue-processus, qu'il a introduite en rivalité avec la théorie de Saussure, et selon laquelle une langue est une apparition de processus psychique. Tokieda, en détaillant les faits linguistiques observés dans la langue japonaise, a découvert l'importance de saisir la langue dans le processus.

Quelques petites remarques sont déjà faites sur le rapport de Tokieda à Nishida. Cette communication essaiera d'abord de trouver des points communs entre les deux. 1° Tous les deux ont tenté de surmonter le dualisme occidental. 2° Ils ont vu une genèse réelle de l'expression dans la rencontre du sujet et de l'objet. 3° Tous les deux ont remarqué le rapport du moment d'expression individuelle à la formation de l'habitude collective.

En interprétant la théorie de Tokieda comme un développement de la philosophie nishidienne dans le domaine de la langue, se dévoilera une base possible de la recherche sur l'imagination qui travaille directement entre le sujet et l'objet et qui s'échappe tant qu'on les objective.

### On Nishida's Concept of Impulse

Yusuke Morino (Osaka University, Japan)

The purpose of this presentation is to draw an outline for a possible reconsideration on the concept of "place" in Nishida Kitarō's philosophy. Especially, this presentation is about to focus on the concept of "impulse" 衝動.

Nishida's discussion on "impulse" is directly inspired by Schopenhauer's concept of drive and Bergson's concept of duration. In other words, "impulse" is a double principle of life and death. Additionally, the concept of "impulse" relates to his discussion on self. According to him, self is not concrete object but field (or "place") that cannot be designated. Plus, we can find that pre-personal "impulse" creates our objectified "ego."

Plus, in my view, we can extend his theory on "impulse." By



this concept, this presentation tries to rebuild the concept of place of Nishida. According to Nishida, consciousness creates by the moving of masking and de-masking (“self-awareness”) of “place.” But Nishida’s text hides another orientation for the concept of “place.” That can be said as the flowing place or place in motion.

**Panel 25:** *The Problem of Tanabe’s Species and Doi’s Expressions*

« Polémique » à propos de la « Logique de l’espèce »  
de Hajime Tanabe

Masato Goda (Université Meiji, Tokyo)

La « Logique de l’espèce » 『種の論理』 est le nom que donne Hajime Tanabe 田邊元 (1885-1962) à sa théorie globale de l’Etat- nation élaborée dans les années 30. Le processus d’élaboration de la « Logique de l’espèce » était plein de péripéties—soit dans le monde politique soit dans le monde intellectuel—à la veille de la Guerre. Après la parution du texte de Tanabe intitulé “Logique de l’être social” (1934), Satomi Takahashi 高橋里美 (1886-1964) aussi bien que Risaku Mutai 務臺理作 (1890-1970)—disciples de Nishida et de Husserl tous les deux—ont publié des textes qui mettent en question chacun à sa manière la notion de l’« espèce », voire l’articulation dialectique « individu-espèce-genre » chez Tanabe. Quant à Tanabe, il n’a pas manqué à la convocation de leur part et il a publié des textes justifiant ses positions en 1937. C’est à travers cette polémique que Takahashi a perfectionné sa « Dialectique englobante » (包弁証法), et Mutai est arrivé à établir sa « Logique du Lieu » (場所論理). Quels étaient, quels sont les enjeux de cette polémique ? La question-là n’est jamais surannée ; au contraire elle s’actualise de plus en plus

au fur et à mesure que le système Etat-nation doit rester en agonie interminable.

L'endroit et l'envers :  
l'ambiguïté de l'expression selon Doï Takeo

Délia Popa  
(Université catholique de Louvain, Belgique)

Après «Le livre de l'indulgence», le psychiatre Doï Takeo poursuit son analyse structurale de la culture japonaise en se penchant sur le couple de notions «omote»/«ura ». La relation complexe de ces deux notions, à la fois antinomiques et complémentaires, rend compte d'une certaine ambiguïté linguistique de prime abord déconcertante, dans la mesure où chacune de ces deux notions peut changer de sens en fonction du point de vue que l'on adopte sur sa fonction, pour autant que leur opposition est maintenue. Or, ce qui s'exprime à travers cette dualité conceptuelle n'est pas seulement un goût pour l'équivocité manifestée dans différentes pratiques du langage au Japon, mais aussi une ambivalence ontologique plus profonde, que l'on retrouve également dans la philosophie occidentale. Nous nous proposons d'interroger cette «double nature des choses» qui fait qu'elles ont un «endroit» et un «envers» par une approche phénoménologique de la perspective de Doï Takeo.

**Special Event:** *Philosophical News Series* at the PHI

Deleuze, Les mouvements aberrants

D. Lapoujade

La philosophie de Deleuze se présente comme une sorte d'en-

cyclopédie des mouvements aberrants. Ce sont les figures déformés de Francis Bacon, les non-sens de Lewis Carroll, les processus schizophréniques de l'inconscient, la fêlure de la pensée, la ligne de fuite des nomades à travers l'Histoire, bref toutes les forces qui traversent la vie et la pensée. Mais le plus important, c'est de dégager les logiques irrationnelles de ces mouvements. C'est l'une des grandes nouveautés de son œuvre commune avec Guattari : créer de nouvelles logiques, loin des modèles rationnels classiques, et des modèles du marxisme ou du structuralisme orthodoxes des années 1960-1980.

Ces logiques n'ont rien d'abstrait, au contraire : ce sont des modes de peuplement de la terre. Par peuplement, il ne faut pas seulement entendre les populations humaines, mais les populations physiques, chimiques, animales, qui composent la Nature tout autant que les populations affectives, mentales, politiques qui peuplent la pensée des hommes. Quelle est la logique de tous ces peuplements ?

Poser cette question est aussi une manière d'interroger leur légitimité. Ainsi le capitalisme : de quel droit se déploie-t-il sur la terre ? De quel droit s'approprie-t-il les cerveaux pour le peupler d'images et de sons ? De quel droit asservit-il les corps ? Aux logiques que le capitalisme met en œuvre, ne faut-il pas opposer d'autres logiques ? Les mouvements aberrants ne deviennent-ils pas alors les figures d'un combat contre les formes d'organisation – politique, sociale, philosophique, esthétique, scientifique – qui tentent de nier, de conjurer ou d'écraser leur existence ?

## Panel 26: *Nishida and Others II*

### What Phenomenologists Can Learn from Nishida about Self-Awareness

John Maraldo

(University of North Florida, USA)

Some features of Nishida's notion of *jikaku* 自覚 parallel descriptions found in recent phenomenological investigations (by J.G. Hart, D. Zahavi, S. Gallagher) and theories of enaction (F. Varela, E. Thompson), where self-awareness enjoys an experiential and epistemological primacy, and where it is self-luminous or self-revealing and not the result of acts of reflecting on oneself. In other respects, however, Nishida's notion of *jikaku* disrupts phenomenological accounts: it is ascribed to totalities like the world as well as to individual consciousness; it is non-differentiating (like the pure awareness of some *Upanisads* and *Sankara*) and does not divide self and world; its scope can be expanded through practice (like the *Upanisadi* notion again); but it is through absorbed bodily activity (through Nishida's enactive or performative intuition) that it is cultivated. But if this *jikaku* still counts as "self-awareness," then who (or what) is "aware"?

### A Philosophical Articulation of Zen or Neo-Confucianism? The Thought of Wang Yangming in the First Work of Nishida Kitarō

Jonatan Navarro (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain)

Until recent times, the thought of the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō (1879–1945) has been understood as a formu-

lation of Zen Buddhism in western philosophical language. Even though Nishida makes reference to Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, the Japanese philosopher never specifies whether his thought is a direct expression of one of these traditions. Recently, authors like Dermott J. Walsh or Michel Dalissier have pointed out the influence of neo-confucianism, especially the neo-confucian school of the mind represented by the Chinese thinker, Wang Yangming (1472–1529), in the first writings of Nishida. This should not strike us as something strange, due to the great reception that Wang has had in Japanese soil, from its introduction in the country by Tōju Nakae (1608–1648), through its great influence during the Meiji reforms, to the writings of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970). Nishida himself was part of the last generation of Japanese educated in Chinese, and had a neo-confucian teacher.

In my presentation, I will try to answer whether it is pertinent, and, if so, to which extent, to set the first work of Nishida, *Zen no kenkyū* (1911), as a part of the neo-confucian tradition. To do this, I will summarize and problematize the studies of Walsh and Dalissier, who respectively bring out similarities in the ethical (the identity of knowledge and action) and metaphysical (the unification process in a nondualist context) dimensions of Nishida and Wang Yangming. With the insights provided by these two studies as a foundation, I will develop my own comparative study, and I will try to answer the above mentioned question, as well as another question raised while problematizing Dalissier's study.

According to Dalissier, the metaphysics of Nishida and Wang Yangming coincide in a number of points, like their nondualistic character, or a voluntarist and organic dimension typical of the neo-confucian tradition and absent in the Zen tradition. There is, though, one difference: the creative dimension of Nishida's nondualist metaphysics, absent in Wang Yangming. Thus, in the context of answering the main question of whether *Zen no kenkyū* can be considered as a

neo-confucian work, I will address the question of creativity in the metaphysics of Nishida and Wang Yangming. In the end, this questions turns out to be intimately linked to the dialectics of the individual and the absolute in both metaphysics. Is the individual subsumed into the absolute? To which extent and in what way are the individual and the absolute identical? Answering these questions regarding the metaphysical thought of both thinkers will allow me to answer the main question of whether and to what extent is the first Nishida a neo-confucian thinker, while deepening and being critical of previous studies that have tackled this question.

### Panel 27: *Critique of Modernity II: Secular or ... ?*

#### The Formation of Secularity in Japan

Andreea Barbu

(University of Bucharest, Romania)

Secularization is one of the most noticeable elements of modernity, which has stepped outside its European formation grounds and is now present in other areas, such as Japan. Through its spread it has created new characteristics and trajectories, and at the same time, it still generates new debates regarding its variations and whether we should consider it plural terms or singular ones.

In the Japanese context the religion-secular dichotomy was imported around the Meiji period and has been inserted initially at certain levels of discourse - most notably the juridical, the constitutional and the academic - without taking root in the fundamental categories of Japanese thought and behavior.

The idea of “religion” (*shūkyō* 宗教) was also introduced during the same period, so religion and secularity (*sezoku* 世俗) are both modern categories, transferred during the pro-

cess of modernization. In this context, secularity is seen more as construction of modernity, more specifically as a project of elites, and the reference point is represented by the Western meanings of secularity. This is the first perspective on secularity in this paper and at this level I will use the two main categories of secularization defined by Charles Taylor in *A Secular Age* (2008): one that refers to the process by which the religious and political spheres are separated from one another, and the other one that regards the decline of religious faith and practices.

The second perspective on secularity is focused on its interaction with traditions, such as the Confucian one and how Neo-Confucianism influenced the particular relationship between religion and governance in the Meiji Period. At this point, the heritage of Neo-Confucianism from the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), through the works of Neo-Confucian philosophers such as Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) becomes relevant to the process of secularization, particularly at the political level, and reflects some continuities in the process of modernization.

This paper draws insights on secularity in Japan and tries to see how a concept, having roots in the West, was redefined in order to incorporate the experiences of East-Asian society. The Neo-Confucian influence highlights one of the continuities formed between the Tokugawa and Meiji periods, and shows that there are also indigenous elements of secularity.

The liaison between modernity and secularity is different in the East-Asian space when compared to Europe, and the background of traditions has added nuances that enrich the understanding of secularity and the secularization process.

The Abject Revenant:  
A Modern Japanese Ghost in the *Yotsuya kaidan*

Saitō Takashi

(Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Japan)

Not unlike the philosophical Enlightenment of the West, Meiji Japan's attempts at a break from the shackles of superstition had to contend with modes of thought that reach back deep into its history. An examination of the *Yotsuya kaidan*, one of the most famous ghost stories in Japan, is a case in point. The story is set in the Edo period, where the protagonist, O'Iwa, is reputed to have put a curse on those around her with catastrophic results. As her legend spread, she was subsequently enshrined in the Yotsuya Inari Shrine and her grave became a popular pilgrim site. In a word, so powerful and awe-inspiring was her curse that she was venerated as a Shinto deity and at the same time memorialized in a Buddhist temple. There is no doubt that she was a real person, but details of her life were overshadowed by the literary genres that immortalized her. These took three main forms: documentary novels, theatrical performances (*kabuki*), and oral storytelling (*rakugo*).

I will focus on the *rakugo* version, translated into English by James S. de Benneville in 1917, and attempt to draw out the logic of O'Iwa's apparition from the structure of the narrative. At the time, enlightened writers often sought to explain away phenomena associated with ghosts by appealing to the scientific category of "neurosis" (*shinkei*). For them, ghosts were symptomatic of a particular mental disease and civilized people had no reason to fear them out of superstitious belief. Still, we cannot ignore the fact oral performances of the *Yotsuya kaidan* enjoyed a considerable reputation among Meiji audiences as a typical ghost story whose main purpose was to strike terror into the listeners. Just how did O'Iwa manage to retain this power and survive the critique of enlightened discourse?



The word *revenant* in the title is French in origin and carries the folkloric nuance of “one who returns from the grave” to harm family or acquaintances. After drawing attention to the polysemic nature of the term, I will introduce it as a way to examine the meaning of Japanese ghosts in modernity.

### **Panel 28: *Philosophy of Religion III***

The Gist of the Two Teachings:  
Japanese Discussions between Buddhism and Confucianism

Paulus Kaufmann  
(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany)

Whereas discussions between Confucianists, Daoists and Buddhists in China—the so called Three Teachings *sanjiao/sankyō* 三教—have received much attention historically as well as in modern scholarship (see e.g., Teiser 1996), arguments between Confucianism and Buddhism in Japan have not been carefully dealt with yet. There were many Japanese thinkers, however, who invested much effort in discussing what they considered to be a rival teaching. Kūkai (774–835), for example, devoted his first book—The Gist of the Three Teachings 三教指歸—to a comparison between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, and also integrated all three teachings into the doctrinal classification of his opus magnum *The Ten Stages of the Mind* 『十住心論』. Neo-Classical Confucians like Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) and Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), on the other hand, revolted especially against the Buddhist elements they believed to have contaminated Neo-Confucianism. It is the aim of my presentation to give some exemplary insight into the interactions between Confucianism and Buddhism in Japan’s intellectual history.

In my paper I will leave out Daoism and thus only deal with

2 instead of 3 teachings. Daoism certainly had a great impact on Japanese culture as part of the package that Japan imported from China, Daoism as an institutionalized religion, however, never found a foothold on Japanese soil (Kohn 1995).

In my paper I will examine, in particular, which aspects of the other tradition Buddhists and Confucians pick out and criticize and how they characterize their own tradition in contrast. I focus, on the one hand, on Kūkai, an author from the early phase of Confucian-Buddhist interaction who has been presented as trying to overcome the Confucian ideology of language and politics (Abe 1999). On the other hand, I will examine the Neo-Classical critique of Buddhism in the Early Modern period, when Confucianism succeeded in overcoming Buddhism as the intellectual and cultural paradigm.

#### Select Bibliography

- Abe Ryūichi: *The Weaving of Mantra*. New York. Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Kohn, Livia: "Taoism in Japan: Positions and Evaluations." In: *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie*, Vol. 8, 1995.
- Teiser, Stephen: "The Spirits of Chinese Religion." In: Donald S. Lopez (ed.): *Religions of China in Practice*. Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Tucker, John: „The Meanings of Words and Confucian Political Philosophy: A Study of Matsunaga Sikigo's Ethics." In: John Tucker and Chun-chieh Huang (eds.): *Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014.

Making Rinzai Blush:  
Select Philosophical Poems from  
Ikkyū's Crazy Cloud Anthology

Andrew Whitehead  
(Kennesaw State University, USA)

Although the writings of the fifteenth-century Zen monk poet Ikkyū Sōjun 一休宗純 (1394-1481) have been translated by a select number of Japanologists in the latter part of the last century, the underlying philosophy of his thought remains largely unexplored outside of Japan. In what follows I present some of its key elements in order to draw attention to the valuable insights to be found in Ikkyū's philosophical poetry. Ikkyū's poetry, expressing emptiness and no-thing, is best understood as an adaptation of the practice of direct pointing as skilful means. In the writings of Ikkyū, poetry is used as an appropriate form for conveying paradoxical and self-disruptive contexts of instruction. Ikkyū reminds us that language, in poetic form, facilitates the breakdown of the relation between names and forms and the oppositional structures generated through contextualized rhetorical situations. His use of language is best interpreted as a particularly Buddhist method of bringing about appropriate understanding.

### **Panel 29: *Key Themes in Kyoto School***

Nishitani,  
une approche bouddhique du dialogue intra-religieux

Bernard Stevens  
(Université catholique de Louvain, Belgique)

Passer du dialogue inter-religieux au dialogue intra-religieux suppose de ne pas se satisfaire de l'écoute polie de l'autre et d'accepter de se laisser interpeler, permettre que la spiritualité de l'autre puisse avoir un retentissement, au cœur même de l'engagement religieux. Ce retentissement peut se situer à divers niveaux qui varient entre un registre plus doctrinal et un registre plus pratique. Et c'est généralement au niveau pratique, que le dialogue s'est montré le plus aisé et le plus fécond

(par exemple le fait de prier ou méditer ensemble). C'est essentiellement cela qui est pratiqué dans les rencontres inter-monastiques. Le dialogue au niveau du contenu doctrinal par contre est beaucoup plus délicat : mettre des mots précis sur l'expérience nouvelle que procure la rencontre avec l'autre, cela risque d'ébranler la cohérence de son appartenance, voire la foi elle-même. C'est pourtant cela qu'ont osé aborder des auteurs tels que l'Indien Panikkar (à qui l'on doit le néologisme "intra-religieux") ou le Japonais Nishitani. Mais, là où Pannikar nous aide à penser les enjeux sur un plan peut-être plus conceptuel, dans un souci de neutralité objective, Nishitani cherche à progresser dans une expérience effective de pollinisation réciproque, entre bouddhisme et christianisme.

What is the Reality in *The Structure of iki*?

Kazuaki Oda (Osaka University, Japan)

Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941) emphasizes that philosophy must be able to make us understand "reality." This means that he wants to comprehend vivid experience through philosophy. It is one of the most important characteristics of Kuki-philosophy and some preceding studies make mention of this point. However, "reality" is a vague concept. We need to think the meaning of the term for him and the way he comprehend "reality."

The objective of this presentation is to clarify the concept of "reality" in *The Structure of iki* (1930). Kuki describes "reality" in "Foreword" and "Introduction" of *The Structure of iki*. According to him, the tasks of the text are to comprehend reality and to express experiences in words. In order to accomplish them, he studies *iki*. Then, why is it the way of comprehending "reality" to study *iki*? He thinks that the concrete given for us is ourselves=our people. *Iki* is the central mode of being of our people. Therefore, it appears as "a meaning"

and is expressed “in word.” He also says that *iki* is a phenomenon that we know. In short, *iki* is the central concept of our “reality” and it appears as a word or a phenomenon that we know. Therefore, we can comprehend “reality” by clarifying the structure of *iki*.

Kuki chooses *iki* as a way of comprehending “reality.” However, his description of *iki* emphasizes the “unreality” of “iki.” According to him, *iki* consists coquetry (媚態), pride (意気地) and sophistication (諦め). All elements have “detachment from reality” in the center of their meanings. He concludes that *iki* is purposeless or uninterested autonomous-play ignoring the easy rules of reality, bracketing daily life boldly, standing aloof as a neutralist,” and *iki* is “transcendent possibility” which is the opposite of “realistic necessity” of love. In short, he thinks that our “reality” is unrealistic idealism. His idea is interesting. However, I think that it is too naïve.

Some preceding studies suggest that *iki* is not our “reality.” Miyano Makiko shows that we can find the influence of essays on love published in Taisho-era in The Structure of “Iki.” Takada Tamaki demonstrates the emphasis of possibility in The Structure of *iki* comes from Heidegger’s “Sein und Zeit.” Inoue Yasushi points out that Kuki’s *iki* is the female coquetry male describes. What Kuki describes as *iki* is not our “reality” but the “ideal” of Kuki Shūzō who writes a book in Showa-era, is familiar with Heidegger and is Japanese male.

It seems that he notices the mistake that what he assumes to be our “reality” is his “ideal.” He never refers to *iki* after publishing *The Structure of iki*. He loses “we” and thinks that the concrete given is “I.” He attempts to comprehend “reality” again in *The Problem of Contingency* (1935). He deals with “encounter” of “I” and “you,” in other words, he attempts to discover “we”=our “reality” in *The Problem of Contingency*.

The First Encounter of Philosophy with Japan:  
the Compendium of Philosophy, of Pedro Gómez (1535-  
1600) (1592) translated in 1595

Frédéric Girard  
(French Institute of Oriental Studies, EFEO, France)

At arriving in Japan, the Jesuits had to face the facts : the Japanese are animists, they can not distinguish an animal from a human being, a tree or a rock. Their ignorance is for them obvious in terms of anthropological conceptions. Everything is imbued with the presence of a divine form or soul. How many have had to disabuse ideas what Francis Xavier (1506–1552), their precursor, held on the Japanese people, solely on the basis of what said Anjiro (? –?). The problem arises of their mission in these terms: how such a reasonable population does not know that it is more promising than any other reason which characterizes their soul into what it is most noble, and that the rational soul is precisely that which ensures the eternity of their being and the eternal life with God ? The greatest hope of Francis Xavier vis-à-vis Japan held in such a proposal. The main features of the educational work of the Jesuits were traced : the importance of teaching in the first place to the rational soul that Japanese people were the best representative in the world as to be converted. This rational or intellective soul was distinct from the merely appetitive and vegetative soul that characterized the humankind's physiology, animals, and then plants, and maybe the mineral beings. Such views were developed in the *Compendium Catholicae Veritatis*, in its second part, the *Compendium of Philosophy*, of Pedro Gómez (1535–1600), composed in 1592 and translated in 1595. It was the first time that European philosophical ideas were introduced in Japan, which was a cultural shock. Some key-concepts were translated in Japanese language but it is obvious that there were no real discussion on them from the Jap-

anese side, Confucianist, Buddhist nor Shintō, though it appears that some indirect reactions may have appear afterwards mainly in Buddhist works. We shall examine the problematics involved by this Compendium of Philosophy from both sides, Chistian and Buddhist.

**Panel 30:** *Philosophy of Nothingness*

A Place for Reality:  
The Phenomena of Consciousness  
in the Light of the Absolute Nothingness

Felipe Ferrari Gonçalves  
(Nagoya University, Japanese)

In his essay “Basho,” Nishida states that all that which is must be implaced in something else. It means that, if a thing is to be understood as an existing being, there must be some place (*basho*) where it exists in. Hence to exist is the same as to be somewhere. At first glance, to say that all material things exist in a determinated place, or else in a portion of space, may be understood as an obvious statement, however Nishida does not talk on the places that things occupy in physical space, but rather on the place where the very existence of such things, as well as the relationships between distinct things are implaced. In this way, since material things occupy a certain place in space, there is no mistake in saying that such a place, as being an existing phenomena in itself, must also have a basho wherein its existence is implaced. And the same is also true for the all the non-corporeal phenomena alike. Having previously (in the *Zen no kenkyū*) classified the natural things external to the self and the emotions, volitions and all sorts of internal sensations under the same category of “phenomena of consciousness,” Nishida indentifies the consciousness

as the ultimate basho wherein all the existing phenomena are implaced. Such consciousness is not that characteristic usually considered to be intrinsic to the particular individuals, but rather a field that is shared by all the encompassed phenomena and in which even the self and its inner consciousness themselves are ultimately implaced. Thus, the experiencing self is, as all the experienced things, also a part of this experienced system of reality that is limited by a force field that Nishida calls the “field of consciousness.”

This presentation will be focused on how Nishida deals with reality according to a system in which all the existing phenomena have their places inside such a field of consciousness. Our main concern will be the matter of whether Nishida’s philosophy is able to accept reality as being independent from the experiencing self or if it, in a non-dualistic way of thinking, it deals with the existence of the physical world solely as a projection of the mind of the self in the field of consciousness.

Between Nishida and Heidegger:

A Hermeneutic Comparison of the Concept of Nothingness

Francesca Greco

(Universität Heidelberg, Germany)

The aim of this presentation is to point out the complexity of negativity and its highest expression as nominalization: the nothingness. There is an important gap concerning the nothingness which affects the entire history of philosophy. In fact, when we discuss the notion of nothingness, we rarely leave the viewpoint of an ontological monism. The direct consequence is the perception of nothingness on the backlight of being, namely as its opposite.

Among the philosophers who undertook an analysis of the nothingness, I would like to focus on Heidegger and Nishida



with hermeneutical caution. Their reflections show a horizon's deferment, that allows us to see the nothingness under a double light and maybe to overstep the being-nothingness dichotomy. Both philosophers faced Hegel's challenge towards the role of negativity and Leibniz's fundamental question, but they deal with these problems with different but remarkable outcomes. Taken together, these philosophers could give us a complete panorama about the nothingness as a non-unitary phenomenon. Both looked at the negativity considering its double nature of logical negation and the character of positive principle.

Nishida makes a distinction between the relative nothingness (*sōtai mu* 相對無) and the absolute nothingness (*zettai mu* 絶対無), whereas Heidegger highlights the partiality (*Verneinung*) or totality (*Nichtung*) of the negation. Within the horizon of being, we only consider the nothingness in its negating-annihilating activity and we perceive it as non-entity, in other words as the negation of something particular or the negation of entities. This interpretation holds us into the field of ontology, where the nothingness is depriving of ontological consistency by understanding it as lack of being. With this connotation we only grasp a part of the essence of nothingness. Consequently, the nothingness shows its highest potential as pure possibility and it is crucial for comprehending. The negativity makes room for either perspective free of positive neither negative connotations: this is the zero point of what Nishida calls consciousness (*jikaku* 自覚).

The Italian language can help to better bear in mind this distinction by employing two different words, niente and nulla. The first one "niente" presents the privative character of nothingness as negotiation of entities, while the second one, nulla, shows us its affinity with the origin point, possibility and beginning.

Without a deep analyses of negativity there is not a return path from the predominance of subjectivity or objectivity. It

is important to do not undervalue the hidden risk of hypostatizing the nothingness, especially if we consider it as something, as consequence, we go back to the starting question in a vicious circle.

Images, Worlds and Nothingness:  
Nishida, Nishitani and Aesthetic Materiality

Philip Martin  
(Macquarie University, Australia)

One of the most interesting divergences between representatives of the Kyōto School revolves around the relationship of aesthetics to ontology. This paper seeks to draw out in detail the critical differences between Nishida Kitarō and Nishitani Keiji's reflections on art and aesthetic experience. Though both Nishida and Nishitani only wrote extensively on art on a few occasions, I will contend that aesthetics is far-reaching and heavily integrated into their philosophies. In Nishida's case, philosophical problems of art, expression and ontology may even offer a more robust way of connecting his earlier and later thought (from volitional worlds to expression and the logic of place). As part of this centrality of aesthetics to ontology, one of the most significant differences between Nishida and Nishitani revolves around what exactly constitutes the material of aesthetic experience. I will argue that for Nishida, this materiality is the plastic matter and substance of the particular world which it expresses and transforms, while for Nishitani it is fundamentally sensations and synthetic images. This paper will draw out the consequences of these divisions, suggesting that Nishitani's poetic philosophy is restricted by a semi-passive vitalism which makes little room for the transformative impact of material activity in work and technology. In contrast, Nishida's emphasis on creative activity focuses on the artist, limiting the scope of his analysis and assigning aesthetic

experience a merely secondary role. I will draw upon Nishida's longer works *Art and Morality* and "The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview" alongside his shorter essays "Expressive Activity" and "The Standpoint of Active Intuition" to weave a broad interpretation of the significance of aesthetics in Nishida's development and his philosophy as a whole. Then I will compare this to the role of art and poetry developed by Nishitani in his essays "Ikebana" and "Emptiness and Sameness" in connection with his major work *Religion and Nothingness*. I will take Robert J. J. Wargo's account of Nishida's logic as a point of departure in both linking and drawing out the differences between these disparate texts and developing an interpretation of the expressive logic of aesthetic materiality that runs through the Kyōto School.

**Panel 31: *Japanese Studies and Philosophy:***

Possibilities to Overcome Methodological Nationalism –

Chair: Jan Gerrit Strala

Ching-yuen Cheung  
(Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)

Montserrat Crespín Perales  
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona &  
University of Barcelona, Spain)

Alfonso Falero (University of Salamanca, Spain)

On the occasion of the first annual conference of ENOJP (2015), we had the opportunity of discussing and checking with colleagues attending the conference about the possibilities to overcome cultural nationalisms as projections of a fixed entity—or the reflection of a "prescribed otherness." "Japan" considered as this fixed entity and "Japanese philosophy" as a category, sometimes plays the game of becoming this prescribed otherness towards philosophical eurocentrism and,

paradoxically, plays the same role when it is seen from “exotization” mechanisms.

In this roundtable, we want to discuss further the consequences of an inherent “methodological nationalism,” a concept coined by Herminio Martins (1974) and how in the 21st century, in a “hypothetically” global world landscape, it continues to be the frame for social as well as philosophical analysis. That is, methodological nationalism in philosophy, as in the case of Japanese philosophy, means that rather than focusing our attention on the critical study of definite philosophical inquiries, the mechanism functions with the *a priori* of “national culture”/“national philosophy.” That means that the study of authors/themes/texts is organized around a political and ideological project (implicit or explicit) built around “Japan” as an organic totality which, from the outside (i.e. European academy) or the inside (i.e. Japanese academy), the philosophical researcher tries to “decode.” The “decoding” task assumes a concept based on an acritical idea of “culture” which occludes any other possibilities of reaching the “transcendence” of the historical, linguistic, societal, or philosophical preconceptions.

Besides, we will discuss the possibility of overcoming “nationalism” with Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy of other. Nationalism tries to justify the existence of a nation (a pure I), but Nishida argues that the I is always linked to the other. The other can be found in me, and I cannot be separated from the other. In this case, the pure nation does not exist. Nishida’s philosophy can be understood as a transcultural philosophy.

In the same line, in recent years many proposals to overcome philosophical nationalism have come from a reinterpretation of Japanese philosophers as advocates of certain types of hybrid thinking, like has been the case of Tanabe Hajime. But the reaction to this kind of interpretation has been controversial. We have to reassess what the hybridization model has to offer in the light of the diverse trends towards globalization.

**Panel 32: *Philosophy and Praxis I***Philosophical Life as Somaesthetic Practice:  
*kata* in the Japanese Arts of the Body

Leon Krings (Universität Hildesheim, Germany)

Only fairly recently in the history of Western Philosophy has the body become a central topic for philosophers to ponder over. This trend started with thinkers like Schopenhauer who identified the fundamental principle of his thought, the Will, with concrete bodily acts, or Nietzsche who designated the body as the “big self” in contrast to the “small self” of the conscious subject. Today, mainly neurophysiologic and phenomenological approaches determine our philosophical understanding of the body.

Since antiquity the East Asian traditions have emphasized the role of the body for human life. Especially in some schools of Buddhism and Daoism—and under their influence, also of Neo-Confucianism—our bodily way of being-in-the-world as well as practices of somaesthetic self-care and meditative self-cultivation are a central concern.

Mainly under the influence of Zen-Buddhism, a variety of “Ways” (jap. 道 *dō* / *michi*) of somaesthetic practice have developed in Japan. Many of these ways of self-cultivation present the practitioner with a set of basic forms of bodily movement or posture called *kata* (型 or 形). The *kata* are fundamental bodily patterns of the respective “art” or “way” which have to be repeatedly embodied and provide a concrete starting ground for a reflective self-structuring and self-emptying of the human subject as something which both is the body as well as transcends it, as can be seen in Zen master Dōgen’s famous phrase “dropping of body and mind” or Nishida Kitarō’s concept of “historical body.”

Using the concept of *kata* as a mediator between theory

and practice as well as between body and mind, I will connect accounts of our being-in-the-world from Zen-Buddhism and modern Japanese Philosophy to phenomenological analyses of the lived body (*Leib*) in contrast to the body-as-object (*Körper*) and sensorimotor accounts of the role of proprioception, interoception and embodiment for our perception and structuring of ourselves and our world.

### Practice and Tranquility of Mind in Zen and Stoicism

Laurentiu Andrei

(Blaise Pascal University, Clermont-Ferrand, France)

Zen and Stoicism can be considered as two kinds of disciplines that share a similar ambition: to offer a way of achieving a state of mind freed from any trouble. In Zen terms this state is called “peace of mind” (*anshin* 安心) which is a state of “bliss and joy” (*anraku* 安楽). The Stoics call it “imperturbability” (*ataraxia*) or “equanimity” (*apatheia*), a state of tranquillity they consider to be the same as happiness (*eudaimonia*). In both cases this state of tranquillity characterises the mind of the wise or the enlightened, whom nothing disturbs. This condition can be reached through the practice of specific spiritual exercises. Yet, if tranquillity can be considered as the goal of practice, practice implies a kind of ascetic effort which seems *prima facie* incompatible with the idea of tranquillity. By comparatively addressing the question of the relationship between the ascetic effort and tranquillity of mind, this paper aims to clarify the function of the ascetic dimension of Zen and Stoicism and the nature of this tranquillity that is to be reached.

**Panel 33: *Political Philosophy I***

Ishibashi Tanzan, His Philosophy and Political Thought

Yusuke Suzumura

Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) and Alfred Fouillée  
(1838–1912): Synthesis as Philosophical Method  
to Think Republicanism

Eddy Dufourmont  
(University Bordeaux Montaigne, France)

The first years of Meiji era are well known to be pioneer period for the introduction of philosophy in Japan. If the roles of Nishi Amane or Inoue Tetsujirō are been discussed concerning this process, Nakae Chōmin played also a role that need to be explored. Nakae Chōmin cannot be reduced to his translation of Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (*Minyaku yakkai*, 1882) or the materialism he expressed at the end of his life with One year and half sequel. He also wrote the first handbook for philosophy, *Rigaku kōgen* (1886) and translated Alfred Fouillée *History of Philosophy* (*Rigaku enkakushi*, 1885–1886). But very few researches have focused on this aspect.

We will discuss this work, showing that it is much more than a translation. Like *Minyaku yakkai*, Chōmin did not try to just translate in the goal of translating, but used the translation as a way to rewriting the text, in order to express his own philosophy. This philosophy is, as we wil show, very close to Alfred Fouillée's philosophy itself. We will demonstrate that, like his French counterpart, Chōmin deeply linked philosophy and politics, and like Fouillée again, inspired by Victor Cousin eclectism, Chōmin tried to think a synthesis between spiritualism and materialism. In the case of Chōmin, this syn-

thesis was not only between spiritualism and materialism but also between European philosophy and Chinese thought: Chōmin used his translation of Fouillée's book to establish a link between Kant, Rousseau and Mencius, in order to propose a Japanese version of republican humanism. We are convinced that synthesis as philosophical method in Chōmin's case is important to understand the history of philosophy in Japan.

### **Panel 34: *Aesthetics II***

#### **Fukada on the Experience of Art**

Cody Staton (University of Leuven, Belgium)

Fukada infused an aesthetic sensibility in Kyoto school philosophers of the early 1900s the likes of which rippled down through generations of Japanese philosophers of aesthetics. Yet, for all the seriousness to which Fukada devoted to disseminating his view of aesthetics, it must be said that he was entirely infatuated with the simplicity of interpreting art, or so I will argue in this paper. Taking up Fukada's studies of Kant and Schiller as my guide, I aim to show that the experience of art, for Fukada, emerges from a sense of playfulness. Kant and Schiller both stress the absolute freedom of the imagination in the feeling of pleasure in art. That both thinkers influenced Fukada's aesthetics no doubt resonates in the sheer number of works the Japanese philosopher devoted to the two. Fukada's transmission of Kant's aesthetics to subsequent Kyoto school philosophers in the early 1900s is an interesting pursuit in its own right. However, what this essay will seek to lay bare is the way in which Fukada interprets the experience of art as a kind of serious playfulness. Picking up on Kant and Schiller's lead, I will argue that Fukada used works such as Degas's *Danseuses* as a foil that allowed him to assume an ambiguous stance,



where the experience of art is neither strictly intellectual, nor totally imaginative.

The Role of Humor in the *Hekiganroku*:  
Laughter as a Skillful Means

Rudi Capra  
(University College Cork, Ireland)

Zen Buddhism has often been presented as a religion and a way of living imbued with a peculiar “comic spirit” (Hyers 1975). In this paper, I present humour as a “skillful mean” (*upaya*) with a pedagogical and soteriological use along the path leading to realization (*satori*). In particular, I consider humorous narratives taken from the *Hekiganroku* (*The Blue Cliff Record*), an important literary source for Japanese Zen Buddhism compiled in China during the Song dynasty.

Drawing from contemporary theories of humour and their notions of “incongruity” and “resolution,” it will be shown how a consistent affinity between the process of humour and Zen pedagogy is illustrated in the *Hekiganroku*.

**Panel 35: *Philosophy and Praxis II***

On Daisaku Ikeda’s Philosophy of Action

Vinicio Busacchi (University of Cagliari, Italy)

The figure and work of Daisaku Ikeda (b. 1928) seems so strongly inspired by Nichiren’s Buddhist doctrine and vision that it seems impossible to separate within it creed from argument, faith from reason, and religion from philosophy. In fact, the concept of philosophy in its speculative sense cannot be used to synthetically resume the meaning and entity

of this work and action. Being a work and action clearly and explicitly inspired by faith, the unifying religious perspective is its true spiritual, cultural, and moral source. In his essay “For the Sake of Peace” (2001), Ikeda states with more emphasis that the human spirit has the capacity to transform even the most difficult situations, creating value and producing richer and richer meanings, and that when all people will flourish to their full spiritual potential of enlightenment and will jointly progress, a new culture of peace and a new era of life will arise. Spiritual self-reformation and religious commitment are the alpha and omega of such a conception and vision. Therefore, there is no room for a rational, argumentative philosophy. If there is any place for such a philosophy, then the question of under what argumentative logic is it possible to separate it from the doctrinal/religious corpus arises. Except for the disciplinary sectors of sociology of religion, peace studies, and environmental philosophy, Ikeda is currently of little or no significance in speculative philosophy. This is so even in his own country where he is not even counted among those Japanese philosophers who connect philosophy and Buddhism, like the case of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945). An explanation perhaps lies in the fact that, unlike Ikeda, Nishida was not only a professor at the Imperial University of Kyōto but also someone who developed a large theoretical research on Idealism, Neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology, connecting it with Zen. However, we have to introduce another historical approach to evaluate this case, because remembering that our western history of ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy is full of non-academic and non-rigorous speculative figures is not of secondary importance; and “religious philosophers” and religious movements in philosophy or philosophical movements in religions are not rare.

## Japanese and the Meaning of Work: Will Japanese people change their working attitude?

Mariko Ishida  
(International School of Brussels, Belgium)

Ninomiya Sontoku was famous in Japan for reading books while walking and carrying firewood on his back. This has been regarded as a hard-working attitude and this attitude was respected by the people and society in Japan.

Productive activity is essential and it is said that if any would not work, neither should be eat. This might be common all over the world, however, Japanese so-called “workaholic working style” is not a new trend that was started by young generation recently.

Japanese working style is discussed as a “long-hours work culture.” MsCurry shows that around 22% of the Japanese work more than 49 hours a week, compared with 16% of US workers and 11% in France and Germany (The Guardian, 22 February, 2015). Given such a statistical data, it brings up a question of why the Japanese have such an extensive work hours and what the factors are that make the Japanese “workaholic.” Yet it also needs to be addressed that the perception towards the Japanese workaholic style is changing overtime.

This presentation will consider the change in the perception of work culture amongst the Japanese.

Japanese attitude such as a hard-working-character is stated that it comes from the mixture of Shintoism(神道), Confucianism(儒教) and Buddhism(仏教).

Suzuki Shosan is in the early Edo Period of Zen, said that it is an ascetic practices for human being to devote himself to works, which is given. This means that human beings can be united to form order of the nature of the universe-which exists in mind. As the result, innocent virtue (*Murou-no-zen*) appears.

All professional ethics can attain enlightenment along the ascetic exercise path.

「何の事業も皆仏行なり。人々の所作にをひて、成仏したまふべし。」「武士なくして世治べからず。農人なくして世界の食物有べからず。商人なくして世界の自由、成べからず。此外所有事業、出来て世のためとなる。唯是一仏の徳用なり。」

However, Japanese people's working style has changed recently. It is reported that there are differences of "Average annual hours" per worker between Belgium(1541 hrs) and Japan(1719hrs). Though paid holidays are 20 days per year in Japan, only half of the given dates are consumed, and around 18% of Japanese people who took the holiday has the sense of shame. This consciousness of working or taking holiday has got influenced by Japanese tradition culture and society.

This presentation will show what has and has not changed in the perception of working culture.

### **Panel 36: *Political Philosophy II***

Voie de la guerre chez Sun Tsu et Myamoto Musashi

Martin Bolle (Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgique)

Ce travail serait la comparaison de l'Art de la guerre de Sun Tsu et du Traité des cinq roues de Miyamoto Musashi proposant une vision de la guerre comme étant une voie, celle de la déception ou tromperie pour l'un assurant la victoire sans bataille, celle de prendre l'avantage pour l'autre. Malgré l'influence de Sun le Japon semble privilégier davantage le combat. Mais, ce serait sous-estimer le pragmatisme de Musashi et donc la possibilité d'usage japonais de ninjas héritiers de Sun Tsu.

Deleuze and Guattari:  
Towards an Ecology of Axiomatic Transactions

Patrick Simar  
(Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)

In *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe capitalism as being axiomatic: it would characterize our modernity with a formal functioning filled with signs, pure relations, structural rules, and valid deductions. Based on a logical point of view, an axiom requires operations of transformation perfectly executed and a rigorous reasoning in order to expel subjectivism and casuistry through rules, definitions and demonstrations. It also imposes an explicit enunciation of the first terms and propositions as well as a presentation of pure logical relations in order to develop a progressive absorption process of the expected reality. This orderly transformation in successive stages and internal variations is at the same time a test of its own consistency, since it is understood that, during this complexification process, new axioms and new propositions can arise within the movement. However, the deleuzo-guatterian gesture is precisely a pragmatic questioning of this axiomatic logic in the social domain, as they want to distance themselves from structuralism and Marxism, both in search of a structural invariant unfailingly winning over social heterogeneous multiplicities. My paper intends to dramatize this problem by considering the axiom's nature. If we make a close study of the nature of capitalist transactions, we see that an axiom (e.g. profitability, market imperative) is never arbitrary because it has a characteristic power of capture, extortion, replica and bears an immanent injunction: what is axiomatically realizable has the tendency to be realized. Similarly, any axiom as a suffering being requires, in a febrile manner, permanent activation and solicitation in order to not disappear (a national GDP requires experts, account-

ing calculus, laws...). Thus, a true ecology is displayed here, imposing complex negotiations, routines, ways of reproduction, and even difficulties of existence. This dynamic process certainly requires calculability but it also implies a plastic reconfiguration of its consistency field and of its coexistence and reproduction conditions (every capitalist crisis is vital)—this is what Marx could not clearly conceive by reducing the Capital subsumption to the productive scheme (boss, worker, machine) and omitting his plural attachment modes. The axiomatic capitalism depends on formal imperatives and conversion speed provided with an accommodating therapy. Although there is no spirit of capitalism per se, there are modes of capture (a way to catch an accumulation), proliferation speeds (extension of appropriations), operations of normalization (the “Invisible Hand” by Adam Smith), and calibration instruments (statistics). Finally, this axiomatic process, lightly available, which is vital for its existence (ruse, theft, parasitism, cf. Marx’s *Capital*), will make sure to persevere while exacerbating its constitutive powers and weaknesses.

**Panel 37:** *Environmental Philosophy and Contemporary Bioethics*

Watsuji’s Conception of the Self  
as the basis of Ethics of Sustainability

Lajna Droz (Kyoto University, Japan)

Starting at an individual everyday-life decision-making level, concerns about how to face responsibly the current challenges presented by the global environmental crisis bring us back to the basic ethical questions of how to live, who we are and what is our relation with the environment and with others. I argue that Watsuji Tetsurō’s Ethics can make a precious and relevant

contribution to the contemporary debates on sustainability.

The mainstream model of capitalism which brought us to the environmental crisis is based partly on the conception of the homo oeconomicus according to which the self is self-interested and independent. An alternative to this model might help to elaborate ethical guidelines corresponding to a more sustainable way of life. The conception of homo oeconomicus is illusory as the self is by its own active existence dependent on and supporting the socio-cultural network and the ecosystem he is part of. An alternative acknowledging these aspects can be found in the conception of human being sustained by Watsuji Tetsurō. At the core of Watsuji's ethics lies a conception of human beings as intrinsically relational to others and to its environment, or milieu (*fūdo*). The realization of the self lies on a dynamic and essential coupling between the individual and its social and natural environment. The self is thus embodied and embedded in a web of relationships with its environment.

I will focus here on two key concepts of Watsuji's ethic: human and relation (*ningen* 人間 and *aidagara* 間柄), and milieu (*fūdo* 風土). According to him, human being is interdependent, social and situated. The relation is then at the center of ethics. The milieu (*fūdo*) is a web of significations and symbols; it is the environment lived by a subjective relational human being and not artificially objectified. The milieu cannot be separated from its temporal—or historical—dimension as it is directly related to the “now,” to perceptions, and thus to actions in the world. Watsuji's notions of milieu and human being are thus directly related to the notion of sustainability given that it questions how to act now as an agent imbricated in the past and the future and who codetermines its social and natural environment.

Finally, as the environment cannot meaningfully be objectified and separated from the subject, environmental sustainability is intrinsically linked with social sustainability and

the conception of human beings. Then, survivability implies to keep the Earth livable and habitable for humans, not only as a passive chemico-physical receptacle for human existence, but more importantly as a signifying milieu. The debate is not about preservation of the environment as such, but about preservation of the relational milieu as part of our existence. That is what the medial ethic (notion coined by Augustin Berque, inspired by Watsuji's work) is seeking for, by exploring the very root of human existence and the essential question of what it is to be human.

### The Concept of Persona in Watsuji and its Importance in Contemporary Bioethics

Masahiro Morioka (Waseda University, Japan)

Watsuji Tetsurō uses the word “persona” in an original way in his essay “Mask and Persona,” published in 1935. He argues as follows. In a Nô play, a Japanese traditional stage performance, a player sets a special mask on his face and dances on the stage. He says that a Nô mask looks like the face of a person who has died suddenly. However, as soon as a Nô player puts a mask on his face, the mask starts to show various expressions as if it were the face of a living person. The movement of the Nô player's body breathes “life” into the dead mask and lets it show various emotions of a living person. At first the player's mask is that of a deceased person, but gradually the player's bodily movement begins to give life to it, and finally, in the midst of a beautiful dance, the mask acquires vital sparkles on its surface. Watsuji suggests that in a Nô play the mask or the face is considered a locus of personhood, that is to say, “persona.”

Watsuji's concept of “persona” is unique in that it does not necessarily presuppose the existence of self-consciousness or rationality, which are necessary and inevitable elements when we talk about “person” in the context of contemporary bio-



ethics in the English speaking world. In bioethics, the existence that does not have self-consciousness or minimum rationality is rarely regarded as a “person.” However, I believe that this is the place where Watsuji most gives off a brilliance. His concept of “persona” has the potential to help salvage the discussion of personhood in bioethics to a higher dimension. “Persona” is a Latin word that corresponds to “person” in English. One of the original meanings of “persona” is “mask,” which is the main reason Watsuji uses this word when he discusses the Nô play, but at the same time, many ancient people thought that there was another meaning in this word, that is, the “voice.”

In contemporary Japanese bioethics discourses, we can find many cases in which people claim to hear voices of marginalized persons at the bedside. Most striking examples can be found in the case of brain death, for example, in the famous case of journalist Yanagida Kunio’s brain-dead son. In my presentation, I will examine some cases in which family members hear the “voices” of brain-dead persons and try to talk to them, and I propose a new interpretation of the concept of “persona” in the context of contemporary bioethics.

### **Panel 38:** *No-Self and Not-Knowing*

The self / no-self in Nishida’s early philosophy:  
An epistemic examination

Montserrat Crespín Perales  
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  
& University of Barcelona, Spain)

In this paper, I shall discuss Nishida’s philosophy of self / no-self early period philosophy (1911–1923) and the possibilities or limitations of his conceptualization of consciousness

and subjectivity.

Analytical philosophy of mind as well as continental orientations are now reactivating a fructiferous dialogue addressing issues about subjectivity, phenomenal consciousness, self-consciousness, selfhood and temporality. After decades dominated by the postmodernist simulacra, mainly based on the burial of the very idea of subjectivity or consciousness, what is clear today is that the question on self is still open. In addition, those different philosophical perspectives will converge and arrive to more valuable tentative explanations if there is a real knowledge about many orientations and perspectives, including those originated and developed in modern and contemporary Japanese philosophy.

It is the objective of this proposal to introduce and, in addition, incorporate, Nishida's views to the actual discussions about consciousness and subjectivity. As James Heisig affirms at the end of a recent essay, Nishida's philosophy was and continues to be, from the start to finish, a philosophy of mind<sup>1</sup>. If in recent years the scientific contributions have contributed to understanding the self, there is still need for more philosophical approaches. Nishida's core ideas about self or, as Dilworth and Silverman explained it, "De-ontological self paradigm,"<sup>2</sup> could contribute with the renewal philosophical interrogations about consciousness and subjectivity.

The general aim of the proposal is to present some central aspects regarding Nishida's analysis of self-consciousness/self-awareness and reflection describing how these ideas appear in his early works. As the main objective will be to suggest a study from an epistemic perspective, I shall interpret Nishida's core ideas about self from the First-person perspective (FPP) (pure experience or intuition as intrasubjective experience) and Second- person perspective (SPP) (reflection as intrasubjective communication) and also regarding mental states as "raw feeling"<sup>3</sup> or pure experience in case FPP and as reflection or recognition from SPP. A secondary objective is

to relate Nishida's philosophy with the idealistic phenomenological tradition dealing with subjectivity and consciousness. In this sense will be particularly important to explain how he explores important issues about consciousness and cognition and, particularly, how attends the temporality of experience.

In conclusion, I propose to expose in a clear manner Nishida's ideas regarding particularly self-consciousness/self-awareness confronted with an epistemic examination to facilitate further analysis and confrontation of his ideas with the classical continental positions and contemporary theories dealing with self.

1 HEISIG, James W., "Nishida's Philosophical Equivalents of Enlightenment and No-Self", Bulletin Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, N. 39, 2015, p. 60.

2 DILWORTH, David A., SILVERMAN, Hugh J., "A cross-cultural approach to the de-ontological self paradigm", The Monist, Vol. 61, 1978, pp. 82-95.

3 See METZINGER, Thomas, Conscious Experience; Thoverton: Imprint Academic, 1995.

## Not-Knowing or Knowing-Nothing? Exploring a Non-Metaphorical Epistemology through the Aesthetics of *Yūgen*

Yi Chen  
(Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Germany)

Though *Yūgen* 幽玄 permeates into every fibre of Japanese aesthetic expression, it evades a clear definition. In the words of the 15th century monk-poet Shōtetsu (1381–1459): "*Yūgen* can be apprehended by the mind, but it cannot be expressed in words. Its quality may be suggested by the sight of a thin cloud veiling the moon or by autumn mist swathing the scarlet leaves on a mountainside." When quoting Shōtetsu in his pioneering essay on Japanese Aesthetics, Donald Keene considers

*Yūgen* to be an expression for poetic vagueness and ambiguity, which defies any efforts for precision (Keene 1969: 296). But if we carefully observe the deceptive simplicity of Japanese architecture, a haiku, even the packaging of daily items such as a bento box or a roll of toilet paper and especially, the *Bonsai* that brings out the nature of a pine tree more natural than any tree found in nature, we are amazed how the most striking effect of *Yūgen* in fact expresses an aesthetic precision that is naturally woven into the pattern of the thing-itself, and this suggests an immanent attitude of Japanese Aesthetics that is NOT decorative, but a sophisticatedly cultivated mode of perception—an epistemology that attains truth(s) of the Other even in the most mundane, most overlooked tiny vignette of life.

In a recent international Conference on Japanese Philosophy held in Kyushu University, Japan, I qualified this “Japanese” aesthetic approach to epistemology as being “non-metaphorical”; by contrast, a metaphorical approach is a way of familiarization and domestication of the uncanny other. Such non-metaphorical perception is the essence of Japanese Aesthetics, and *Yūgen* expresses an uncompromising commitment that the 15th century writer, aesthetician and expert on *Nō* theatre Zeami Motokiyo (1363–1443) names the “Primary Meaning” that a person should “imitate” to the degree that one transcends self and reaches the level of the thing-itself, whether on stage or in life. *Yūgen* unfolds the depth of things, realized through an utmost precise imitation, which ultimately requires a Zen attitude of “Not-knowing” (Nicht-Wissen), as it is expressed in the Koan: “Not-knowing is the most intimate.”

However, “Not-Knowing” is NOT “Knowing-Nothing” (*Nichts-Wissen*)—*Yūgen* does not yield to an epistemology of nebulous ignorance—or simply “ambiguity”—but demands an immanent aesthetic attitude that pierces into the nature of things. To illustrate, I will compare examples of Japanese Raku

Ware with the Chinese Sòng dynasty Rú ware, to show how *Yügen* is particularly formulated through a seemingly random expression of irregularity that conveys a specific natural precision to achieve a persuasive unity between aesthetics, epistemology and ethics. Such non-dichotomous unity, however, might again evoke a deeper, disturbing concern regarding the claim of an “aesthetic universal” that may or may not be able to warrant against its own abuse.

## EASt – Centre for East Asian Studies Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

**EASt (“East Asian Studies”) is the research unit of the ULB dedicated to the study of East Asia.**




Established in 2016 and hosted by the ULB’s Maison des Sciences Humaines (MSH), EASt shares its aim to highlight the importance of Humanities and Social Sciences and the necessity of their interdisciplinary cooperation when seeking to understand the world, past or present.

As an incubator for further research on East Asia at the ULB, EASt organizes guest lectures, inter-disciplinary teaching chairs, seminars and workshops on topics bound by a shared interest for one of the most dynamic regions in the world.

EASt, as a unique initiative within the Belgian French-speaking community located in the heart of Brussels, is ideally positioned to reach students, policy makers and the wider community of informed citizens in Brussels engaged with East Asia.

Rooted in both original research and teaching, EASt’s current projects focus mainly, but not exclusively, on East Asian Youth’s Changing Values



and Social Norms; Occupation and Use of Public Space in East Asia; Production and Circulation of Knowledge in

Contact: [east@ulb.ac.be](mailto:east@ulb.ac.be)  
Website: <http://msh.ulb.ac.be>



East  
Asian  
Studies

## Interested in Asian Languages and Cultures? Welcome to the Université libre de Bruxelles !

*The Faculty of Letters, Translation and Communication offers Japanese and Chinese (Mandarin) language courses from beginner to advanced levels, as well as full BA and MA degree programs. Japanese language courses and China and South-East Asia related courses are also offered in the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences.*

*All courses are taught in French.*

**Learning Japanese language (without prerequisite) and culture is an opportunity in:**

- BA in Modern Languages and Literatures (Language B)
- BA in Information and Communication (Language 2)
- BA in Modern Languages and Literature (spe. General)
- BA in History (Language 2)
- BA in History of Art / Musicology (Language 2)
- BA in Philosophy (Language 2)
- MA in Modern Languages and Literature (spe. General/spe. German in option "Third Language")
- MA in Translation/Interpretation (Language 3)
- MA in Multilingual Communication (as Initiation Language)

**Learning Chinese language and culture is an opportunity in:**

- BA in Translation (no prerequisite)
- MA in Translation (module EN/CN - with prerequisite)
- MA in Modern Languages and Literatures (spe. Oriental Studies - with prerequisite)

### Contact about the programs:

#### Japanese

Ms. Shizuka WATANABE

Dpt. of Translation and Interpretation  
M : [watanabe.shizuka@ulb.ac.be](mailto:watanabe.shizuka@ulb.ac.be)

#### Chinese

Ms. Vanessa FRANGVILLE

Dpt. of Languages and Literatures  
M : [vanessa.frangville@ulb.ac.be](mailto:vanessa.frangville@ulb.ac.be)

Ms. Jianping XU

Dpt. of Translation and Interpretation  
M : [jianping.xu@ulb.ac.be](mailto:jianping.xu@ulb.ac.be)

**For other Asia-related courses : [east@ulb.ac.be](mailto:east@ulb.ac.be)**

## List of Presenters

- Laurentiu ANDREI (Blaise Pascal University, Clermont-Ferrand): Practice and Tranquility of Mind in Zen and Stoicism.
- Peter BAEKELMAN (KU Leuven): The link between Meditation and Phenomenology
- Carlos Andrés BARBOSA Cepeda (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): Logos as Dharma or the Re-enchantment of Natural Law: A Place for Interreligious Encounter.
- Andreea BARBU (University of Bucharest): The formation of secularity in Japan.
- Martin BOLLE (Université libre de Bruxelles) : Voie de la guerre chez Sun Tsu et Myamoto Musashi.
- Pierre BONNEELS (Université libre de Bruxelles): What Kind of Genesis/Evolution of Freedom Can We Find in the Works of Ōmori Shōzō?
- Vinicio BUSACCHI (Università degli studi di Cagliari): On Daisaku Ikeda's Philosophy of Action.
- Rudi CAPRA (University College Cork): The Role of Humor in the Hekiganroku.



- Fabio CERAVOLO (University of Leeds): Yukawa's Philosophy of Science: The Early Eastern Demise of Positivism.
- Yi CHEN (Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics): Not-Knowing or Knowing-Nothing?: Exploring a Non-Metaphorical Epistemology through the Aesthetics of *Yūgen*.
- Ching-yuen CHEUNG (The Chinese University of Hong Kong): Japanese Studies and Philosophy: Possibilities to Overcome Methodological Nationalism.
- Montserrat Crespín Perales (Universitat de Barcelona): Japanese Studies and Philosophy: Possibilities to Overcome Methodological Nationalism.
- David Cseh (Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest): Reflections of Ambiguous Realities: A comparative analysis of mimesis and monomania in the Writings of Aristotle and Zeami.
- Diogo César Porto da Silva (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais): Kuki Shūzō's Philosophy of Literature: Rhyming Difference.
- Jaime Derenne (Université libre de Bruxelles) La «science de la félicité» chez Leibniz.
- Lucas dos Reis Martins (Universität Hildesheim): Be-

yond Japan: Sketching Out a Decolonized Way to Intercultural Philosophy.

- Laïna DROZ (Kyoto University): Watsuji's Conception of the Self as the basis of Ethics of Sustainability.
- Eddy Dufourmont (University Bordeaux Montaigne): Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) and Alfred Fouillée (1838–1912): Synthesis as Philosophical Method to Think Republicanism.
- Simon EBERSOLT (INALCO / Paris I) : Du donné à l'éternel retour du même. Phénoménologie, existentialisme et spéculation chez Kuki Shūzō.
- Alfonso FALERO (Universidad de Salamanca): Japanese Studies and Philosophy: Possibilities to Overcome Methodological Nationalism.
- Amanda Sayonara FERNANDES Prazeres (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): Nishitani Keiji's Criticism of the Cartesian Cogito.
- Felipe FERRARI (Nagoya University): A Place for Reality: The Phenomena of Consciousness in the light of the Absolute Nothingness.
- Mark W. FLORY (Metropolitan State University of Denver): Mutual Illuminations: Metanoetic and Hesychastic Insights into Spiritual Transformation.

- Masato GODA (Meiji University): « Polémique » à propos de la « Logique de l'espèce » de Hajime Tanabe.
- Francesca GRECO (Universität Heidelberg): Between Nishida and Heidegger: A Hermeneutic Comparison of the Concept of Nothingness.
- Frédéric Girard (École française d'Extrême-Orient): The first encounter of Philosophy with Japan: the Compendium of Philosophy, of Pedro Gómez (1535–1600) (1592) translated in 1595.
- Filip GURJANOV (University of Vienna / Charles University Prague): Nishitani's Understanding of Time.
- James HEISIG (Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture): An Apology for Philosophical Transgressions.
- Maximilian Gregor HEPACH (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg): A Phenomenology of Weather and *ki*.
- Quentin HIERNAUX (Université libre de Bruxelles – FNRS) : Penser autrement le statut du végétal à partir du concept de *Fûdo* chez Watsuji et de sa reprise mésologique chez A. Berque.
- Tatsuya HIGAKI (Osaka University): Kuki Shūzō and the Logic of Sense.
- Mika IMONO (Université de Strasbourg): Au-delà du dual-

isme : chez Motoki Tokieda et Kitarō Nishida.

- Yu INUTSUKA (University of Tokyo): The Concepts of *Mono* and *Koto* in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsurō.
- Mariko ISHIDA (International School of Brussels): Japanese People and the Meaning of “Working.”
- Yuko ISHIHARA (University of Copenhagen): Ueda on Philosophical Reflection.
- Yoko ITO (Universität Bonn): Shinran and Thomas Aquinas: Comparative Study of Philosophy of Religions in the 13th Century.
- Christine A. James (Valdosta State University): Zen Buddhism, Women, and Japan: The Life of Hiratsuka Raichō.
- Makoto KATSUMORI (Akita University): On Hiromatsu’s Theory of the Fourfold Structure.
- Paulus KAUFMANN (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München): The Gist of the Two Teachings – Japanese Discussions between Buddhism and Confucianism
- Leon KRINGS (Universität Hildesheim): Philosophical Life as Somaesthetic Practice: kata in the Japanese Arts of the Body.
- Akinobu KURODA (Université de Strasbourg): Lieu de me-

diation : Nishida, Tanabe, Simondon.

- Piéro LEDENT (Université libre de Bruxelles) : De l'hypothèse d'une logique sans axiome ni règle d'inférence primitive.
- Hans Peter LIEDERBACH (Kwansei Gakuin University): Anti-Cartesianism in Japanese Thought: Kuki Shūzō and Watsuji Tetsurō.
- Alex LIN (Princeton University): A Temple Must Be Destroyed: Mishima, Nishitani, and Nothingness.
- Adam LOUGHNANE (University College Cork): Ueda Shizuteru Panel.
- Rebeca MALDONADO (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México): The Different Modes of Time in Kyoto School
- John MARALDO (University of North Florida): What Phenomenologists Can Learn from Nishida about Self-Awareness.
- Samuel MARIE (Lyon Institute of East Asian Studies): The Critic of Japanese Modernity by Maruyama Masao: Beyond Ethnocentrism and Westernization.
- Lorenzo MARINUCCI (University of Rome, Tor Vergata): Sabi, Fūga and Irony: the Aesthetic Inquiry of Ōnishi Yoshinori.

- Philip MARTIN (Macquarie University, Sydney): Images, Worlds and Nothingness: Nishida, Nishitani and Aesthetic Materiality.
- Sergej MILANOVIC (University of Copenhagen): Comparative Philosophy as Phenomenology of Religion in Modern Japanese Thought.
- Isamu MIYAHARA (Nagoya University): Destruction of Subject and Quest for Self: Fundamental difference between Nishida and Watsuji.
- Yusuke MORINO (Osaka University): On Nishida Kitarō's Concept of Impulse.
- Takeshi MORISATO: A Closing Speech: The Past, the Present, and the Future of ENOJP 2.0.
- Masahiro MORIOKA (Waseda University): The Concept of Persona in Watsuji and its Importance in Contemporary Bioethics.
- Ralf MÜLLER (Universität Hildesheim): Turning Philosophy into a Temple Garden: On Inoue Enryō and the Problem of Translation & Ueda Shizuteru Panel.
- Lucas NASCIMENTO Machado (University of São Paulo): Between Hegel and Nāgārjuna: Dialectics in the East and the West and Nishida's Philosophy.

- Jonatan NAVARRO (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): Wang Yangming in Nishida's Inquiry into the Good.
- Ayano NISHI (Osaka University): Zeami's theory about *Yūgen*.
- Kazuaki ODA (Osaka University): What is the Reality in The Structure of "Iki"?
- Hitoshi OGAWA (Yamaguchi University): Philosophy of Japanese Sensitivity As Global Philosophy.
- Hitomi OMATA Rappo (Boston College): L'adoption de la notion de « martyr » (junkyō) dans le Japon de Meiji: une réécriture du passé.
- Rossa O MUIREARTAIGH (Aichi Prefectural University): The truth of untruths: understanding D.T. Suzuki's *soku-hi* logic.
- Roman PAȘCA (Kanda University of International Studies): The Human Being's Lapse from Nature: A few Considerations on Ando Shōeki's Concept of hito.
- Marc PEETERS (Université libre de Bruxelles) : Kuki Shūzō et le temps.
- Vasil PENCHEV (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences): Heidegger Questioning (a) Japanese.

- Delia POPA (Université catholique de Louvain) : L'ambiguïté de l'expression : l'endroit et l'envers selon Doi Takeo.
- Luis PUJADAS Torres (Universitat de les Illes Balears): Understanding Tanabe's Experience of Zange from the Point of View of Ohashi's Notion of Philosophy as Auto-Bio-Graphy.
- Javier Santana RAMÓN (Freie Universität Berlin): The Limits of Subjectivity: Karatani Kōjin's Concept of Parallax.
- Gaetan RAPPO (Harvard University): Correlative Thinking and Ritual Symbolism in Medieval Japan: Monkan (1278–1357) and His Ritual of the Three Worthies (Sanzon gōgyōhō).
- Rein RAUD (Tallinn University).
- Makoto SEKIMURA (Hiroshima University): Comparaison entre la pensée esthétique japonaise et grecque.
- Yayoi SEKIYA (Osaka University): Zeami and his Zen Philosophy.
- Jordanco SEKULOVSKI (Kobe University): Rethinking Kāta as a Technology of the Self: Japanese and Continental perspectives.
- Kyle SHUTTLEWORTH (Queen's University Belfast): Watsuji Tetsuro's Honraisei and Nishitani's Ūnyatā as "Buddhist



Authenticity.”

- Patrick SIMAR (Université libre de Bruxelles): Deleuze and Guattari: Towards an Ecology of Axiomatic Transactions.
- Niklas SÖDERMAN (University of Helsinki): Critique of Modernity in the Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji.
- Leszek SOSNOWSKI (Jagiellonian University): On the Protection of National Heritage: the Case of Japanese-European Relations
- Cody STATON (University of Leuven): Fukada on the Experience of Art.
- Raji C. STEINECK (University of Zurich): The Limits of Nature: Reification and Its Discontents.
- Bernard STEVENS (Université catholique de Louvain): Nishitani, une approche bouddhique du dialogue intra-religieux.
- Jan Gerrit STRALA (Aichi Prefectural University): Open Speech.
- Yusuke SUZUMURA (Hosei University): Ishibashi Tanzan, His Philosophy and Political Thought.
- Takako TANIGAWA (Tsukuba University): Descartes and the Japanese Subjectivity.

- Takashi SAITO (Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture): The Abject Revenant: A Modern Japanese Ghost in the *Yotsuya kaidan*.
- Andreas THELE (Université de Liège) : Sérénité et culture du principe vital : conceptions philosophiques du bien-être dans la pensée japonaise.
- Liliana TIMÓTEO (Universidade Lusofona de Humanidades e Tecnologias): Who is God in Nishida's thought?
- Yoshinori TSUZAKI (Tsukuba University): Taïken, kéïken et exercice selon Arimasa Mori, lecteur de Descartes.
- Kristyna VOJTISKOVA (Charles University Prague): Imani-shi Kinji 's Ethical View of Nature.
- Annewieke VROOM (Vrij Univresiteit Amsterdam): Can the "Eastern Emptiness" Help Out in Dealing with Diversity?: A Case Study and Critique of Masao Abe's Theory and Practice of Diversity.
- Andrew Whitehead (Kennesaw State University): IMaking Rinzai Blush: Select Philosophical Poems from Ikkyū's Crazy Cloud Anthology.
- Michiko YUSA (Western Washington University): Affirmation via Negation: A Zen Philosophy of Life, Sexuality, and Spirituality.

## Centre de recherche de la Faculté de Philosophie et Sciences Sociales de l'ULB

### PHI - Centre de recherche en philosophie

Le « PHI - Centre de recherche en philosophie » défend une idée de la philosophie comme pratique vivante et profondément actuelle. C'est dans cet esprit qu'y sont abordés non seulement les différents champs de la philosophie (logique, métaphysique, ontologie, épistémologie, théorie de la science, éthique, esthétique...), mais aussi son histoire et ses multiples courants. Les membres du PHI considèrent cette diversité des pratiques de recherche comme une condition cruciale tant pour l'enseignement que pour un engagement actif et pertinent dans les débats contemporains et dans les problématiques développées depuis d'autres champs (les arts, le droit, la politique, les sciences et la production des savoirs en général).

The PHI - Research Centre in Philosophy supports a conception of philosophy as a living practice deeply engaged in the present. It is from this perspective that not only the different fields of philosophy (logic, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, theory of science, ethics, aesthetics...), but also its history and its various trends, are approached. The members of the PHI consider this diversity as a crucial condition for both teaching and an active and relevant involvement in the contemporary issues and debates as well as in the problems developed from other fields (art, law, politics, sciences, as well as the production of knowledge in general).

<http://phi.ulb.ac.be/index.php>

## Le Groupe de recherche en ontologie formelle et en logique développementale

Le groupe est une structure de recherche qui dépend du Centre de recherche en philosophie (PHI) attaché à la Faculté de Philosophie et Sciences sociales (PHISOC) de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

Ce groupe de recherche travaille sur certaines des expressions les plus contemporaines de la logique et de l'ontologie. Depuis la mise en évidence d'une métaphysique authentiquement kantienne déployée dans la Critique de la raison pure et la Critique de la faculté de juger, la métaphysique a suivi des tours et détours jusqu'à culminer aujourd'hui dans la métaphysique analytique, libérée de la philosophie du langage, et s'inspirant de l'œuvre plus vivante que jamais de Leśniewski. La méréologie extensionnelle classique, l'ontologie formelle, et même la protothétique connaissent des développements inattendus s'appuyant sur les recherches formelles les plus contemporaines, comme, par exemple, la topologie ou la théorie de la dépendance existentielle. Le travail du groupe de recherche est à la fois prospectif et historique. Il s'intéresse ainsi particulièrement aux travaux métaphysiques et logiques de Lambert, Kant, Hegel, Bolzano, l'École de Brentano (Meinong, le jeune Husserl, Ehrenfels, Marty, etc.), le cercle de Vienne (Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, etc), Frege, Russell, l'École de Lvov-Varsovie (Twardowski, Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Ajdukiewicz et Kotarbiński et leurs élèves), Whitehead, Ingarden, Hintikka, Goodman, et d'autres encore. Les thèmes de recherche sont axés sur l'étude de la métaphysique moderne et contemporaine, de la logique développementale, c'est-à-dire celle de Leśniewski et de son école, et, de manière générale, des relations entre logique et métaphysique.

*[http://phi.ulb.ac.be/domaine\\_05.php](http://phi.ulb.ac.be/domaine_05.php)*

## CEJ

Le Centre d'Études japonaises de l'Université de Liège a pour objectif de promouvoir le Japon, sa culture et sa langue.

Tout au long de l'année académique, le Centre propose diverses activités :

- des cours universitaires dans le cadre d'une mineure et d'un master
- des cours du soir tout public
- des activités de promotion culturelle tout public.

*<http://web.philo.ulg.ac.be/cej/>*

## The UCL Collection of Classical Japanese Books



The collection of Japanese old books was offered to the University of Leuven by Japan in the 1920s in the context of the “Oeuvre internationale de Louvain” which worked at the reconstruction of the collections of the library destroyed by a fire in 1914, further to the German occupation of the city.

On 23 October 1922, a national committee was created and it decided of the type of donation: recent books and periodical, old classic books, all published or produced in Japan. An appeal calling for the donation of books and money was launched to schools and scientific institutions, libraries and private persons.

Between August 1924 and August 1926, 3.202 titles in 13.682 volumes were shipped to Leuven. This donation was probably the largest donation of Japanese books to an European library before the second world war.



Two men were responsible of the selection of books: Wada Mankichi, the head librarian of Tokyo Imperial University and Urushiyama Matashirô, an eminent bibliographer and specialist of Japanese literature. They made a very classic selection. They wanted it to reflect “Japanese classical civilisation” in the eyes of the western public. They selected books in different categories.

For example philosophy, shintô, religion, literature, arts, history, geography, economy, law, physics, industry or sport and games. A catalogue dividing the collection in 26 sections was send with the donation.

We find in this collection different types of documents: manuscripts, scrolls and different processes of printed books; different bindings and various writings: Chinese, Kanbun and Japanese. The majority of books dates from Edo period (1600-1868) and the selection includes a number of precious printed editions and manuscripts

During the Second World War, the university library in Leuven fell once again victim to enemy attacks. However, the Japanese collection miraculously escaped the damage. When the French speaking university (UCL) moved to Louvain-la-Neuve in the 1970's, the central holdings of the Leuven library were divided in two halves. The entirety of Japanese collection, then, went to LLN and is now conserved in the precious



reserve of the UCL libraries among the other heritage collections.

<http://dial.uclouvain.be/Numerisation/Japan/>

## RENCONTRE

Jean-Luc Nancy – Peggy Boursin

« Ce qu'il trace n'est rien que lui même qui prend son élan et bondit sans rien. Et lui-même, qu'est-ce d'autre que ce trait imprévu ? » Max Loreau, de la création

Ce qu'on nomme « le trait heureux » doit son bonheur, sa bonne chance, à cette recherche sans guide de ce qui se donnera de soi comme une juste vibration.

De cette justesse ne témoigne nulle conformité, mais toujours la levée d'une ligne accordée à son seul élan.

Le plaisir est lié en général à un rapport : à la perception d'un rapport ou à sa mise en oeuvre. deux possibilités qui se recoupent ou même se rejoignent. Le plaisir est dans un rapport qui tend vers sa répétition ou sa prolongation.

Le rapport c'est l'altérité, c'est l'altération, qui ne survient au sujet par accident, mais qui lui est essentielle.

Le plaisir est dans la relance -en droit, indéfinie- de l'altération.

Il faut ici préciser ce qu'il en est du rapport en général. Le rapport se distingue de l'être pour autant qu'on entende être à l'instar de la plus fréquente tradition et de la grammaire comme un verbe intransitif.

Le rapport affecte un sujet. Ce qu'on nomme « sujet », c'est une puissance de rapport : puissance tant active que passive, capacité d'affecter et d'être affecté.

En dernière instance, la *mymésis* n'est pas autre chose que la mise en rythme de la manifestation par laquelle se donne à connaître ou à reconnaître et à participer le mystère – ou



l'évidence- de la levée des formes en général.

L'architecte Henri Gaudin disait un jour : « dans le dessin, l'espace se met à vibrer, systole et diastole ; ma soif du monde rompt la ligne, j'efface, je rature... ».

Le plaisir est indissociable de cette tension active et passive, de cette spontanéité réceptive.

« cela me convient » est une phrase d'une extrême banalité, subjective et relative ; mais la même phrase peut prendre un autre ton : je peux accepter ainsi un défi dont je ne mesure pas l'ampleur, auquel je m'accorde ainsi sans mesure. Tel est sans doute toujours le premier accès à une oeuvre d'art.

*<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RyznaYxjF8s>*



## Notes

